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Foreword
The 50th anniversary conference of the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre (SDSC), from which the essays in this volume are drawn, drew its 
inspiration from a similar event that Professors Robert O’Neill and David 
Horner hosted at The Australian National University in July 1980 under 
the theme ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking’.
There are some striking parallels between the period in which O’Neill and 
Horner held that conference—at the onset of the so-called second Cold 
War—and the world in which we find ourselves today. As Hedley Bull 
noted in his remarks to that earlier gathering:
In the late 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s, it was widely held 
in the Western world that the role of force in international relations had 
gone into decline … A school of writers about international politics began 
to argue that the strategic factor in international power relationships 
was  giving place to an economic factor … Today, rightly or wrongly, 
[those ideas] are in large part rejected. In the Western world there is now 
a widespread expectation that the role of force will not diminish but 
increase—an expectation that is borne out by the evidence of mounting 
arms and arms expenditures in the Soviet bloc, the Third World and the 
West itself.1
Fifty years after SDSC’s founding, geopolitics is making a comeback. 
The January 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
for instance, boldly asserts that ‘interstate strategic competition, not 
terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security’.2 Talk of an 
1  Hedley Bull, ‘Force in international relations: The experience of the 1970s and prospects for the 
1980s’, in New Directions in Strategic Thinking, ed. Robert O’Neill and D.M. Horner, George Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1981, p. 19.
2  US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, DC, 2018, p. 1, 
www.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (retrieved 
28 January 2018).
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emergent Asian arms race, spurred by North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear 
and missile capabilities, is becoming increasingly prevalent, and respected 
commentators regard the chances of war breaking out on the Korean 
Peninsula as being as high as 50 per cent.
Scholars and practitioners alike, such as Harvard Professor Graham 
Allison and Chinese President Xi Jinping, have cautioned repeatedly on 
the dangers of China and the United States falling into a ‘Thucydides 
trap’ in a historical allusion to the strategic competition between Athens 
and Sparta 2,500 years ago, which tragically brought to an end a golden 
age in ancient Greece. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, 
who is equally fond of this historical analogy, has warned against taking 
the so-called Asian peace of recent decades for granted. As Turnbull 
observed in his keynote address to the June 2017 Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore, ‘the gathering clouds of uncertainty and instability are signals 
for all of us to play more active roles in protecting and shaping the future 
of this region’.3
The need for high-quality strategic thinking is becoming increasingly 
urgent and apparent in the emerging landscape of international politics. 
Yet the world at large, and the Asia-Pacific region where much of this new 
era in strategic competition will be played out, is unfortunately starting 
from a lower-than-optimal base.
That is because the fate of strategic studies is intimately and inevitably tied 
to its international political and security milieu. For instance, the first two 
decades following its birth as a formal field of study in the late 1940s have 
been characterised as a ‘golden age’ of strategic studies. The primary focus 
of scholars during this period was with a set of dilemmas associated with 
the onset of the nuclear era, including how use of these devastating new 
weapons could be avoided, or at least controlled and limited should war 
involving their use ever break out.
In the radical political milieu of the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, 
strategic studies quickly fell out of fashion. The emergence of a strong 
anti-war sentiment in the United States rendered the study of such issues 
unfashionable and even distasteful. The so-called oil shocks of the 1970s 
shifted international focus more towards the potential use of economic 




weapons and saw greater emphasis given to the economic dimensions of 
security. A period of détente between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, coupled with the normalisation of US–China relations, rendered 
the prospects for interstate conflict even more remote.
As Bull’s remarks to the July 1980 SDSC conference suggest, the renewal 
of US–Soviet tensions in the 1980s challenged these assumptions for 
a time. Within a decade, however, the Cold War was over, and by the early 
1990s the Soviet Union had evaporated. A swathe of articles appeared that 
questioned whether strategic studies should even survive in an era that 
the prominent international relations scholar Francis Fukuyama famously 
characterised as marking the ‘end of history’.
Fifty years following SDSC’s founding, the question of whether strategic 
studies has any future is increasingly being answered resoundingly in the 
affirmative. Indeed, a strong case can be made that a new ‘golden age’ in 
the history of strategic studies is upon us. This is not only reflected in 
the significant expansion of the Centre that has occurred over the past 
half decade or so. It is also evident in the fact that new strategic studies 
programs are beginning to emerge throughout an Asia-Pacific region that 
in many respects has traditionally displayed an aversion towards studying 
use of force issues in any formal sense.
Some might see this more crowded landscape as posing a threat to the 
future of SDSC. Instead, it should be regarded as presenting an enormous 
opportunity. Some SDSC scholars, such as the late Desmond Ball, played 
an important advisory role in the establishment of Singapore’s Institute 
of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS). IDSS is now, of course, part 
of the world-leading S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
and continues to enjoy a close and productive relationship with the 
Centre. To be sure, as Amitav Acharya observes in his contribution to 
this volume, the provision of similar intellectual leadership, particularly 
regionally, during this next ‘golden age’ will need to be undertaken with 
a  considerable  degree of sensitivity. That said, it is an aspiration that 
SDSC should not shy away from. The excellent set of essays in this volume 
provide an impressive foundation from which to begin.
Brendan Taylor





Twenty-five years before the conference recognised in these pages, 
The Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre 
(SDSC) marked its silver anniversary with a conference and resulting 
proceedings entitled New Directions in Strategic Thinking. SDSC marked 
the passage of another quarter century with a similar event graced by the 
offerings that follow: presentations by speakers from among the world’s 
most renowned thinkers in their fields. The following were fortunate in 
serving on the Centre’s faculty or staff in mid-2016: Joan Beaumont, 
John Blaxland, Jean Bou, Jack Bowers, Allison Cadzow, Andrew Carr, 
Aurore Chow, Rhys Crawley, Bel Curujo, Peter Dean, Stephan Fruehling, 
Robert (Bates) Gill, Russell Glenn, Chui Ling (Evelyn) Goh, Amy King, 
Tamara Leahy, Daniel Marston, Garth Pratten, Gregory Raymond, centre 
head Brendan Taylor, Helen Taylor, Joanne Wallis and Hugh White. 
These colleagues were joined by visiting professors and others holding 
honorary positions: Desmond Ball, Chris Barrie, Richard Brabin-Smith, 
Bob Breen, Leszek Buszynski, Paul Dibb, Peter Edwards, James Goldrick, 
John  Gould, David Horner, Ron Huisken, John McFarlane, Anthony 
Milner, Sam Roggeveen and Clive Williams.
Select staff from the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and student 
volunteers were invaluable to the success of the conference. The former 
included Jasmine Henkel, Kerrie Hogan, Ashley Roge, Thea Gellerfy 
(Ross), Ravneet Deo and Elke Larsen. William Baulch, Matthew Bunten, 
Robert Cook, Matthew Gambrill, Nathan Randell, Brandon Smith and 
Bradley Wood provided student support.
Raoul Heinrichs assisted with the editing of this volume. Many thanks 
to our reviewers, Sheryn Lee of Macquarie University’s Department 
of Security Studies and Criminology, and Stephen Meekin, retired major 
general and former Deputy Secretary of Defence.
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These men and women joined their forebears from the half-century 
since SDSC’s founding in 1966 to offer their services to the university 
of which they were a part, its students, the Australian Government and 
international partners, and broader academic communities spanning the 
globe. In so doing, they collectively set the stage for yet another 50 years 
of service in a half-century that promises to be no less in need of insight, 





Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman was Professor of War Studies at King’s 
College, London, from 1982 to 2014, and was Vice-Principal from 
2003 to 2013. He was educated at Whitley Bay Grammar School and 
the Universities of Manchester, York and Oxford. Before joining King’s 
College, he held research appointments at Nuffield College, Oxford, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs.
Sir Lawrence was appointed Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign 
in 1997, and in June 2009 he was appointed to serve as a member of the 
official inquiry into Britain and the Iraq War.
Sir Lawrence has written extensively on nuclear strategy and the Cold 
War, as well as commentating on contemporary security issues. Among 
his books are Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (2000), 
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (third edition, 2004), Deterrence (2005) 
and the two-volume Official History of the Falklands Campaign (second 
edition, 2007). He has also written an Adelphi Paper, The Transformation 
in Strategic Affairs (2004).
A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East won the 2009 
Lionel  Gelber Prize and Duke of Westminster Medal for Military 
Literature. Sir Lawrence’s most recent book, Strategy: A History (2013), 
was awarded the W.J. McKenzie Book Prize by the Political Studies 
Association.
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Amitav Acharya
Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, 
American University, Washington, DC
Professor Acharya has held the UNESCO Chair in Transnational 
Challenges and Governance at American University since 2011. He was 
Professor of International Relations at York University in Toronto and 
Professor of Global Governance at the University of Bristol in the United 
Kingdom. He was a Fellow of the Asia Center, Harvard University, and 
Fellow of the Center for Business and Government at Harvard’s John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. Professor Acharya was elected to the 
Christensen Fellowship at St Catherine’s College, Oxford, in 2012, and 
held the Nelson Mandela Visiting Professorship in International Relations 
at Rhodes University, South Africa, in 2012–13. Professor Acharya was 
the first non-Western scholar to be elected President (for 2014–15) of the 
International Studies Association (ISA), the most recognised and influential 
global network of international studies scholars worldwide. His  recent 
books include Constructing Global Order (2018), The End of American 
World Order (second edition, 2018), Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia (third edition, 2014), The Making of Southeast Asia (2013) 
and Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (2009). 
With Desmond Ball, he co-edited The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy 
and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (1999). His articles have 
appeared in leading international relations journals such as International 
Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, 
Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Peace Research and International Affairs 
and World Politics. He has received Distinguished Scholar Awards from 
the International Studies Association’s Global South Caucus in 2015 and 
the International Organization Section in 2018.
Robert Ayson
Professor of Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington
Professor Ayson is Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University 
of Wellington, where he works closely with the Centre for Strategic 
Studies. In New Zealand, he has also held academic positions at Massey 
University and the University of Waikato, and official positions with the 
New Zealand Government as an intelligence analyst and select committee 
adviser. Professor Ayson is an Honorary Professor at the New Zealand 
Defence Force Command and Staff College, and an Adjunct Professor at 
The Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, 
where he was Director of Studies from 2002 to 2009. Professor Ayson 
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gained his PhD in War Studies as a Commonwealth Scholar at King’s 
College, London, and his MA as a Freyberg Scholar to ANU. His recent 
writings include Asia’s Security (2015).
Hal Brands
Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs, 
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global 
Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments. He is the author, most recently, of American 
Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (2018). His other books are Making 
the Unipolar Moment: US Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold 
War Order (2016), What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in 
American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014), Latin 
America’s Cold War (2010), From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for 
Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (2008) and The Power of the Past: 
History and Statecraft (co-edited with Jeremi Suri, 2015). From 2015 
to 2016, he served as special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
strategic planning, and he has consulted for a range of government offices 
and agencies and think tanks. He has also served as lead writer for the 
Commission on the National Defense Strategy of the United States.
Paul Dibb
Emeritus Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre,  
The Australian National University
Emeritus Professor Dibb was Head of SDSC from 1991 to 2003. 
His previous positions include Deputy Secretary of the Department of 
Defence, Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation and Head 
of the National Assessments Staff (National Intelligence Committee). 
As  Deputy Secretary, he chaired the Force Structure Committee with 
the Vice Chief of the Defence Force as his deputy and the service chiefs 
as the other senior committee members. Emeritus Professor Dibb is the 
author of five books and four reports to government, as well as more than 
150 academic articles and monographs about the security of the Asia-
Pacific region, the US alliance and Australia’s defence policy. He wrote the 
1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (the Dibb Report) and was 
the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. His book The Soviet 
Union: The Incomplete Superpower was published by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, in 1986, then reprinted 
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in 1987 and again in 1988. On behalf of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Emeritus Professor Dibb has represented 
Australia at 10 meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Expert and 
Eminent Persons group, most recently in Singapore in March 2016. 
He was a  member of the  Foreign Minister’s policy advisory panel for 
the nine years of its existence until 2007. His areas of expertise include 
international security concepts, Asia-Pacific regional security issues and 
Australian defence policy and force structure. He was made a member of 
the Order of Australia in 1989.
John J. Frewen
Principal Deputy Director General, Australian Signals Directorate
Lieutenant General Frewen AM is a career infantry officer who specialised 
in rapid response forces. In 2003, as Commanding Officer of the 2nd 
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR), he led a multinational 
military intervention force supporting police to re-establish law and order 
in Solomon Islands. This combined joint task force comprised almost 
1,800 troops from five nations and used an array of air and maritime 
assets. Lieutenant General Frewen’s other service includes deployments 
with the United Nations in Rwanda in 1994 and NATO in Afghanistan 
in 2007. At the time of writing, he was the Head of Military Strategic 
Commitments in Australian Defence Headquarters. He was the national 
commander of all Australian forces in the Middle East, including Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in 2017. John assumed the position of Principal Deputy 
Director General, Australian Signals Directorate, in March 2018.
Russell W. Glenn
Assistant Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre,  
The Australian National University
Dr Russell W. Glenn retired from the US Army in 1997. He thereafter 
spent 16 years in the think tank community as a senior defence analyst, 
later joining the faculty of Strategic & Defence Studies Centre at 
ANU. Dr Glenn is currently Director, Plans and Policy for the G-2, 
US Army Training and Doctrine Command. His education includes a 
Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy 
and master’s degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, 
Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and 
MS, Operations Research) and the School of Advanced Military Studies 
(Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his PhD in American 
history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military 
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history and political science. His books include Reading Athena’s Dance 
Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam (2000) and Rethinking Western 
Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict 
(2015). He is author-editor of the forthcoming Trust and Leadership: The 
Australian Army Approach to Mission Command.
Evelyn Goh
Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies, Strategic & Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University
Professor Goh has published widely on US–China relations and 
diplomatic history, regional order in East Asia, South-East Asian strategies 
towards great powers, and environmental security. Her latest book is 
The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post–Cold 
War East Asia (2015). Professor Goh edited the volume Rising China’s 
Influence in Developing Asia (2016), and is co-editor of the Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations book series with Christian Reus-Smit 
and Nicholas Wheeler. Professor Goh commenced at ANU in 2013, and 
has held positions at the Royal Holloway University of London (2008–
13), the University of Oxford (2006–08) and S. Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies in Singapore (2002–05). She has held visiting 
fellowships at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and 
the East-West Center, both in Washington, DC. Professor Goh’s major 
project grants include a UK Economic and Social Research Council 
Mid-Career Fellowship, an East Asia Institute Fellowship and research 
grants from the British Academy, MacArthur Foundation, Sasakawa 
Peace Foundation and Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. Professor Goh 
holds master’s and doctoral degrees in international relations and an 
undergraduate degree in geography, all from the University of Oxford. 
She also holds a masters in environment and development from the 
University of Cambridge.
Peter Ho
Senior Adviser, Centre for Strategic Futures
Peter Ho is the Senior Adviser to the Centre for Strategic Futures and 
a Senior Fellow in the Civil Service College. He also chairs the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority of Singapore and the Social Science Research 
Council. When he retired in 2010 after 34 years of public service, Mr Ho 
was Head, Civil Service, which was concurrent with his other appointments 
of Permanent Secretary (Foreign Affairs), Permanent Secretary (National 
Security and Intelligence Coordination) and Permanent Secretary 
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(Special  Duties) in the Prime Minister’s Office. Before that, he was 
Permanent Secretary (Defence). Mr Ho was also founding Chairman of 
the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore.
Amy King
Lecturer, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre,  
The Australian National University
Dr King specialises in Chinese foreign and security policy, China–Japan 
relations and the international relations and security of the Asia-Pacific 
region. Dr King is the author of China–Japan Relations After World War II: 
Empire, Industry and War, 1949–1971, which was published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2016. It examines the post-war rebuilding of economic 
ties between the People’s Republic of China and Japan. It also explains 
how and why Japan became China’s most important economic partner in 
the aftermath of major war, and at a time when the two countries were 
still Cold War opponents. The book is based on hundreds of declassified 
documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive, gathered during 
extensive fieldwork in China between 2008 and 2012. Dr King received 
a DPhil in international relations from the University of Oxford, where 
she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. Her doctoral thesis was awarded Oxford’s 
2013 Dasturzada Dr Jal Pavry Memorial Prize. Dr King completed her 
MPhil in Modern Chinese Studies at the University of Oxford, BA Hons 
(First Class) in International Studies, and BBus in International Business 
at the University of South Australia.
Nicola Leveringhaus
Lecturer in War Studies (East Asian Security), Department of War Studies, 
School of Security Studies, King’s College, London
Dr Leveringhaus specialises in Asian nuclear weapons issues, especially 
Chinese views of nuclear weapons, past and present, as well as ideas of 
responsibility in the global nuclear order. Nicola was previously Lecturer 
in International Politics in the Department of Politics at the University 
of Sheffield (2015–16), a British Academy Post-doctoral Fellow in the 
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of 
Oxford (2012–15) and a Stipendiary Lecturer in International Relations 
for Trinity College, Oxford (2014–15). Funded by an ESRC British Inter-
University China Centre scholarship, she completed an MPhil in Modern 
Chinese Studies and DPhil in International Relations at St Antony’s 
College, University of Oxford. She also holds an MSc in International 
Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
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and a BScEcon (First Class Hons) in International Politics and Strategic 
Studies from the University of Aberystwyth. She has studied at Peking 
University and Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, and has worked 
at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. 
Her most recent book, China and Global Nuclear Order, from Estrangement 
to Active Engagement (2015), was nominated for the ECPR Hedley Bull 
Prize in 2017.
Robert O’Neill
Emeritus Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre,  
The Australian National University
Professor O’Neill AO FASSA was introduced to strategic studies by 
Captain Basil Liddell Hart and Professors Norman Gibbs and Michael 
Howard at Oxford, from 1961 to 1965. He then served with the 
Australian Army in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967, and was mentioned in 
dispatches for his work. Professor O’Neill taught military history at the 
Royal Military College Duntroon from 1967 to 1969. He then moved to 
the Department of International Relations at ANU and was appointed 
Head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre in 1971. Between 1970 
and 1982, he wrote Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, the two-volume 
official history of Australia’s role in the Korean War. He relocated to 
London as Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), then to Oxford in 1987 as Chichele Professor of the History of 
War. He also chaired the Imperial War Museum and the Council of the 
IISS, and was a member of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. 
Professor O’Neill returned to Australia in 2001 and chaired the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (2001–05). He served as a board member of the 
Lowy Institute for International Policy (2003–12) and Planning Director 
of the US Studies Centre, University of Sydney (2006–07). He is also a 
Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
Brendan Sargeant
Honorary Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University
Mr Sargeant retired from the Department of Defence in October 2017, 
where he was Acting Secretary from May to September of that year. 
From September 2013 to October 2017, he was the Associate Secretary of 
Defence. Prior to that appointment he was the Deputy Secretary 
Strategy. As Associate Secretary, he was responsible for oversight of the 
implementation of the First Principles Review, a major reform of Defence 
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organisation and enterprise governance, planning, performance and risk 
management. He was principal author of the 2013 Defence White Paper. 
Mr Sargeant has degrees in English literature and political science.
Hew Strachan
Professor of International Relations, University of St Andrews
Sir Hew Strachan is a Life Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, 
where he taught from 1975 to 1992, before becoming Professor of 
Modern History at Glasgow University from 1992 to 2001. He was 
Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford and 
a Fellow of All Souls College (where he is now an Emeritus Fellow) from 
2002 to 2015, and Director of the Oxford Program on the Changing 
Character of War (2003–12). He serves on the Strategic Advisory Panel of 
the Chief of the Defence Staff and on the UK Defence Academy Advisory 
Board, as well as being a Commonwealth War Graves Commissioner and 
a member of the national committees for the centenary of World War I 
of the United Kingdom and France. In 2010, Sir Hew chaired a task 
force on the implementation of the Armed Forces Covenant for the Prime 
Minister. In  2011, he was the inaugural Humanitas Visiting Professor 
in War Studies at the University of Cambridge and became a specialist 
adviser to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. He is 
also Brigadier in the Queen’s Bodyguard for Scotland (Royal Company of 
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Russell W . Glenn
July 1966 saw the founding of The Australian National University’s 
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC). Fifty years later, the Centre 
celebrated its half-century of research, publication, teaching and informing 
government decision-makers with a two-day conference entitled ‘New 
Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’, the numerical designator being a tip 
of the hat to a similar event conducted, as noted in Dr Brendan Taylor’s 
foreword, in 1980. That pair of days saw the podium graced by many of 
the world’s premier thinkers in the strategic studies field. The evening 
between them brought together academics, practitioners and other 
honoured guests at a commemorative dinner held beneath the widespread 
wings of the ‘G for George’ bomber in the Australian War Memorial, an 
event privileged by speaker Brendan Sargeant, Associate Secretary of the 
Australian Department of Defence, and Professor Desmond Ball making 
one of his last public appearances.
The essays comprising the remaining chapters herein summarise the 
remarks  provided by the conference’s speakers. The sequence of their 
presentation maintains the thematic flow of the two days, all but the 
keynote speaker both providing initial remarks and later serving on 
a  panel with colleagues addressing the themes noted in the agenda 
(see Appendix 2).1
1  Five speakers were unable to provide written contributions for this volume.
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Sir Lawrence Freedman, the conference’s keynote speaker, addressed the 
decline of classical military strategy during and in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. Two fundamental elements of this decline were the diminishment 
of non-combatants’ non-involvement as subjects of combat and the 
degradation of state acceptance of war’s results in light of battle outcomes. 
In World War II, the first of these had became well established. Despite 
recognition of nuclear war’s consequences, investigations of how such 
a conflict might be won continued, adaptations in conventional forces 
largely being in the service of supporting objectives during a nuclear 
exchange. So too non-state actors came to avoid confronting forces 
so equipped by turning to irregular warfare and thereby lengthening 
conflicts. Freedman concludes: 
The challenge for the West in all of this is that wars have come to lack 
borders and endpoints. The idea of conflict as something contained in 
time and space, where there is a sharp demarcation between peace and war 
and between the civilian and military spheres, is consistently undermined. 
The classical model of warfare, of decisive campaigns, remains a beguiling 
ideal, but the real challenge for Western strategists is to come to terms 
with wars of continuing political struggle where military action ensuring 
a satisfactory political outcome have proved to be elusive.
SDSC’s own Amy King followed Sir Lawrence and opened the ‘Strategy 
and Power’ panel presentations with her consideration of the relationship 
between economics and strategy. Economic growth, she observed, leads to 
growing demand for energy resources among states and thus can become a 
source of competition spurring international conflict. Similarly, economic 
decline can be a source of insecurity; states perceived to be in a state of 
decline might be more likely to take preventive military action in order to 
bolster their power position. Somewhat balancing these negative influences: 
recent international relations research points to an increasing linkage 
between economic interdependence and security. We find political–security 
tensions and thriving economic relations between China and Japan are not 
a contradiction but rather two sides of the same coin. Dr King observed 
that the world’s most powerful state, the United States, is  locked in a 
(albeit at times somewhat inconsistent) technological embrace with two 
rising competitors: China and India––this despite theoretical predictions 
that the United States should distrust and shun collaboration with these 
rival powers. She concludes that understanding such complexity requires 
avoiding previous approaches to analysis that separated economics and 
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strategy while also suggesting that such studies must incorporate not only 
international considerations but also those internal that affect relationships 
between economics and security.
The Australian Army’s Major General J.J. Frewen provided the first 
morning’s third offering. He warns against conflating policy and strategy 
while noting that while strategy might have its historical origins in military 
affairs, it has evolved to become relevant to achieving broader national 
aims. Resultantly, the best national strategies are those that integrate all 
the elements of national power within a nation’s means. Unfortunately, the 
United Kingdom’s Chilcot Report2 on that country’s involvement in Iraq 
concluded that recent national leaders can at times still rely too heavily on 
military capabilities alone, employing them in costly and uncoordinated 
ways. Major General Frewen concludes that Australia’s situation is less 
dire than that of the United Kingdom. He nonetheless suggests that it 
would be wise to create an Office of National Strategy for, in the absence 
of a formal mechanism for national strategy, the potential is there for its 
military being deployed without clear definition of the intended purpose 
or being fully integrated with the other elements of  national power, a 
situation unlikely to deliver an enduring solution to strategic challenges.
Professor Evelyn Goh concluded the ‘Strategy and Power’ panel 
presentations with her ‘Grand power grand bargains: Myth or reality?’, 
considering whether a US–China or Japan–China agreement to alter 
current negative relationships might be possible and what the character 
of those agreements might entail. Recognising that such bargains have 
historical precedent, Goh concludes that the post–Cold War emergence 
of US–Chinese economic ties constitutes the ‘most important systemic 
context for a new bargain’. Yet Chinese perceptions that Japan and the 
United States have reneged on previous grand bargains undermines 
Chinese faith in such bargains, perhaps explaining to some extent what 
underlies China’s reconsideration of its former ‘biding time’ policy and its 
recent willingness to challenge the existing order’s status quo. Professor 
Goh concludes that compromises could conceivably facilitate a US–China 
grand bargain while recognising that the result will ‘entail sea changes in 
attitudes and expectations on every side’.
2 United Kingdom Cabinet Office, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry [Chilcot Report], 6 July 2016; 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry (retrieved 16 January 2018).
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Professor Robert Ayson opened the first day’s afternoon session regarding 
‘Strategic Thinking: Concepts and Challenges’. His ‘Old wine in 
new bottles?  The continued relevance of Cold War strategic concepts’ 
considered adverse partnerships: partner relationships formed despite the 
parties being serious rivals. He cites Washington and Moscow. Although 
each defined strategic stability differently, the United States and Soviet 
Union recognised mutual survival during the Cold War as a core interest. 
Ayson questions whether the US–China relationship has a similar shared 
interest. He goes on to identify five factors underlying the Cold War 
partnership, concluding that US–China economic interdependence alone 
fails to meet this handful of factors, a cause for no little concern.
The legacy of the Cold War also underpins Nicola Leveringhaus’s 
consideration of nuclear strategy in the aftermath of that conflict. Strategies 
from that period constitute ‘conceptual hangovers’ that strategists today 
struggle to improve upon. Her argument considers a series of post–Cold 
War time periods. The first saw nuclear deterrence lose its primacy given 
the emergence of weapons control and non-proliferation. The later 1990s 
saw a re-emergence of such primacy given detonation of devices by 
Pakistan and India while both countries also chose not to join the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Regional rather than worldwide nuclear strategies 
joined an arena previously limited to those of global scope. More recent 
strategic perceptions influencing strategic thought include the emergence 
of new technologies and attempts to delegitimise the weapons themselves.
Paul Dibb introduced discussion of Session 3—Strategy and Domains—
with ‘The return of geography’. His essay cites the historical foundations 
of Russian perceptions that the 14 newly independent states formed 
out of the Soviet Union’s collapse had long been considered part of that 
country while also serving the critical role of securing its perimeter. 
Moscow therefore believes that these must be recognised as falling within 
Russia’s sphere of influence. Geography also influences Russia’s self-
perception as not only a vital Asian power but also solidly a member of 
the European community rather than being but peripheral to its expanse. 
Not Europe and Asia then, but rather a post–Soviet Union Russia that 
conceives of a single Eurasian continent. Dibb then turns his attention 
to China, concluding that recent assertiveness by that country demands 
the United States and its allies—including Australia—demonstrate that 
such behaviour is unacceptable. Concerns regarding China’s territorial 
bellicosity underlie both recent Defence White Paper elevation of 
South-East Asian security as Australia’s most important strategic interest 
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and emphasis that the country’s ‘relationship with Indonesia is vital’, 
an  importance reflected in Australia’s upgrading of military facilities in 
its own north.
Day 2 opened with contemplation of ‘Strategic Studies in Practice’, the 
penultimate conference session. SDSC Professor Hugh White’s essay 
provides the Australian perspective on the topic. He begins with a sweeping 
review of Australia’s history from the first British landings to the present, 
thereby establishing a foundation for the country’s present strategic 
options. He relates slippage in confidence regarding willingness of the 
United Kingdom and the United States to guarantee Australia’s security, 
first when the United Kingdom failed to respond to German occupation 
of northern New Guinea in the 1880, and later with its 1968 ‘East of 
Suez’ announcement. Questions arose regarding US commitment after 
Richard Nixon presented his 1969 Guam Doctrine. Although political 
stability and economic progress somewhat shielded the country from 
these shocks, Australia’s leaders perceived the necessity for increased self-
reliance and the emergence of ‘Defence of Australia’ as the underpinning 
of its security policy. US hegemony after the Cold War signalled a return to 
closer ties with the United States, ties reflected in increased military force 
interoperability and contribution of contingents when the hegemon led 
coalitions. The result, White concludes, is an Australia ‘more comfortable 
relying on our allies for our security than we have been at any time since 
1880’. Can this reliance continue in the face of Chinese assertiveness? 
The answer greatly relies on how seriously the United States is challenged 
in the region.
Singapore’s Peter Ho next addressed the session topic, stressing the 
importance of the symbiotic relationship between history and security 
studies. While much of strategic studies rely on hindsight and historical 
insight, history’s past cannot be relied on to demonstrate the future’s 
trajectory. Perceptions in part explain this variance. Ho introduces the 
concept of a ‘black elephant’, a linkage of sorts regarding black swan 
incidents and the elephant in the room: events seemingly obvious that 
nonetheless surprise owing to an unwillingness to consider the possibility 
of their outcomes. How then can governments create plans and policies 
for the long term? Adopting methods aiding in the reduction of strategic 
shock are critical, methods strategic studies can assist in developing. Among 
their elements are maintaining a systematic view of the future, applying 
techniques such as looking for emerging issues and trends (‘horizon 
scanning’) that seek to better distinguish weak signals and emerging issues 
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otherwise likely to be overlooked. Only with a more interdisciplinary 
approach than has been the norm, Ho assets, can strategic studies meet 
the demands of 21st-century security challenges.
Four speakers addressed the conference audience on the fifth and final 
session’s topic of ‘New Directions in Strategic Studies’. Hal Brands’ 
‘US grand strategy in the post–Cold War era’ includes the author’s ‘three 
pervasive misconceptions’: (1) that the country executed a dramatic break 
from its previous strategy; (2) the US post–Cold War grand strategy was 
ineffective; and (3) the world is seeing the end of US primacy, which 
will precipitate a fundamental retrenchment. Support of international 
peace and promotion of open and liberal economies were no less a 
priority post-1989 than before, goals consistent with long-standing 
US objectives. Brands highlights the prescience of the 1950 National 
Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) outlining US efforts ‘to foster 
a world environment in which the American system can survive and 
flourish’, which constituted ‘a policy which we would probably pursue 
even if there were no Soviet threat’.3 Nor do analyses decrying the failure 
of US strategy stand up to scrutiny. Promotion of democracy, a notably 
aggressive element of US  policy after the Cold War, provides but one 
example. The world saw the number of electoral democracies increasing 
from 76 in 1990 to 120 some 15 years later. Addressing the third ‘myth’ of 
declining US primacy, Brands notes that such claims tend to overstate the 
significance of narrowing economic and other gaps. The United States’ 
global military power, for example, remains unchallenged. While powers 
such as China might assert themselves regionally, no country can compete 
on the worldwide scale. US primacy might not last forever, but its 
disappearance—should it occur—is distant. The country should therefore 
seek to sustain a grand strategy in an era in which primacy remains, if 
perhaps in more contested environments. Brands concludes by offering 
five principles to support that sustainment.
Professor Sir Hew Strachan considered ‘The future of strategic studies: 
Lessons from the last golden age’. Strategy in the aftermath of World War 
II underwent a dramatic shift from a focus on force employment to its 
containment. History saw a diminution in the eyes of strategists as a result, 
the importance of armed force in the ‘golden age’ now taking a back seat 
3  National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), ‘United States Objectives and Programs for 




to consideration of how to bring about its limitation. Technology gained 
importance in the eyes not only of tacticians but also strategists. Strachan 
advises that it is the historian’s responsibility to deal with discontinuities 
in history by accepting and dealing with ‘contingency and shock’ in an era 
during which, in Bernard Brodie’s words, ‘strategic studies were no longer 
focused on the waging of war but on its avoidance’.4
Amitav Acharya poses the question of whether the time has come for 
creation of an Asian school of security or strategic studies akin to the 
Copenhagen and English schools. Any such school is justified if it 
explains not just what happens in a country or region but additionally 
generates ideas that can travel beyond them to offer general or universal 
applicability. Unfortunately, he commiserates, current candidates do not 
qualify given this standard. It is a situation derivative in no small part 
due to ‘entrapment’, which Acharya describes as the links between states 
and think tanks or academics that undermine independent thought and 
expression of views incompatible with those of state sponsors. Those 
failing to adhere to state positions find themselves without funds and 
generally excluded from opportunities to continue presenting their 
research. He concluded by citing SDSC’s Desmond Ball as ‘the exemplary 
combination of academic rigour, scholarly independence and policy 
relevance’ who could stand as an example to Asian scholars in overcoming 
such obstacles to creation of an Asian School.
The responsibility of concluding two days of session presentations and 
spirited exchange fell to Professor Robert O’Neill. He began his remarks 
with the observation that Australia’s ‘national record in the past for 
developing strategic policies has not been a distinguished one’. In the 
years immediately following World War II, this was in part attributable 
to strategy’s development being solely an internal process with its 
military creators showing little interest in contributions from journalists, 
diplomats or academics. This changed somewhat in the 1960s, but 
political contributions were—with the notable exception of Percy 
Spender—confined to resource considerations: statements of what could 
and could not be afforded. The founding of SDSC in the late 1960s saw 
tentative steps towards offering advice, advice that drew on centre leaders’ 
broadening experiences at London’s International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. From those years, O’Neill identified ‘necessary ingredients for the 
4  Bernard Brodie, ‘The absolute weapon’, in Strategic Studies: A Reader, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken 
and Joseph A. Maiolo, Routledge, London, 2008.
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flourishing of strategic thought today’ in organisations such as the Strategic 
& Defence Studies Centre: expert people, breadth of intellectual and field 
experience, a supportive underlying institution such as The Australian 
National University and bringing to bear both national and international 
perspectives. Nor, he warned, should academics alone be the source of 
advice, having ‘found that a high proportion of our best contributions in 
debate, in conferences and in advice generally came from the civil service of 
the United Kingdom, other European NATO states, the United States and 
Canada’. Regardless, history is fundamental to strategic studies, offering 
as it does a past providing a basis for assessing new policies and warnings 
for those who might succumb to over-optimism, too great a reliance on 
technology and other shortfalls. So also do academics potentially have a 
notable role in bridging divides between countries as did Australians with 
Soviets in the Cold War years of the 1970s. Such observations are no less 
relevant in the 21st century as security environments are ever evolving.




The decline of the classical 
model of military strategy
Lawrence Freedman
The classical model of military strategy, as described by the great theorists 
of the Napoleonic War, is the one to which contemporary strategists still 
aspire. It described how wars should be fought and so is best described 
as an ideal type in that it has always been understood that it would 
be difficult to realise this model in practice. According to this model, 
political objectives are achieved when enemy forces are no longer able 
to fight, preferably because they have been defeated in a decisive battle. 
Long  wars can be accommodated in the classical model, but the best 
strategy offers a route to quick victory at tolerable cost. The essential 
feature is that warfare involves regular forces pitted against each other. 
Wars can be won by inspired commanders exploiting their strengths and 
the enemy’s weaknesses almost independently of the underlying material 
strengths of the belligerent states. In its original form, this model involved 
two vital conventions: first, that non-combatants must be kept out of 
the frame; and second, that governments must accept the result of the 
fighting. Political gains would follow naturally from military gains.
The first of these conventions had been completely lost by the time of 
World War II. The non-combatant category had almost lost meaning 
as volunteers engaged in guerrilla warfare against an occupying army 
and populations came to be seen as legitimate targets either because by 
their everyday work they were supporting the war effort or else their 
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subjugation was a war aim in itself. Yet the second convention still held. 
In the end, both World Wars I and II were decided as a result of a series 
of battles, their conclusions being marked by the surrender of the armies 
of one side to the other. But these were not wars that had been won so 
much by brilliantly conceived military operations as by the remorseless 
application of superior resources. In a book entitled The Revolution in 
Warfare, completed just as the Pacific War was concluded, the British 
strategist Basil Liddell Hart lamented the transformation of war ‘from 
a fight to a process of destruction’.1
The idea of a military sphere with its own rules and conventions, which 
could  be kept separate from a more innocent and safe civilian sphere, 
appeared to have been forever lost. All the history of that deadly century 
warned that battle would keep on bursting out of past boundaries, 
uncontainable in space or time, with civilians caught in the centre of the 
frame rather than kept safe at the margins. Technology had pushed states 
to total war as ever more sophisticated means were found to slaughter 
people on a large scale. Future conflict promised to be even more 
destructive. Even without atom bombs, centres of civilian population 
were still subjected to air raids during the Korean War. In the 1950s, 
there were successful tests of multi-megaton, city-busting, thermonuclear 
weapons.
In these circumstances, it was hard to expect that a war could take the 
form of a succession of battles leading to a military victory, as opposed 
to an escalating process of ever more horrendous devastation leading 
to mutual annihilation. The theorists of deterrence concluded that the 
only way to manage the situation was to embrace and then manage the 
destructiveness of modern weaponry. This required putting aside any 
thought of a nuclear battle with a clear victory. Once it was assumed 
that one side was preparing to fight a nuclear war, the assumption itself 
could result in massive instability and a catastrophe that might otherwise 
be avoided. Nonetheless, possible routes to a nuclear victory were still 
explored in think tanks and on military staffs, as if this might be possible 
if the right weapons were developed and deployed in the most effective 
way so as to disarm the enemy in a pre-emptive strike.
1  Basil Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, Faber, London, 1946, p. 33.
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The possibility of pre-emption was a natural concern for the United States 
as a result of Pearl Harbor. The fear of a bolt from the blue that would 
take out its most vital nuclear assets and leave them without any means 
of retaliation was given credibility in studies undertaken at RAND by 
a team led by Albert Wohlstetter. In 1954, its members demonstrated 
how the United States might be caught out with a pre-emptive strike 
by a calculating Soviet Union. This was not well received by RAND’s 
client, the US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (USAF SAC). They 
considered it unrealistic in its modelling of a Soviet strike and unfortunate 
in suggesting that SAC needed to put effort into ensuring the survival of 
its own bombers rather than gear up for its own first strike. Wohlstetter 
considered SAC dangerously complacent and set about campaigning to 
have the vulnerability problem recognised. He lobbied in Washington, gave 
numerous briefings and went public with his anxieties. In an influential 
article on ‘The Delicate Balance of Terror’, he warned against assuming 
that just because both sides were acquiring sizeable stocks of weapons, 
the situation was becoming stable. Instead, he argued that stability would 
depend on many factors such as the range, yield and accuracy of weapons 
and the hardness and mobility of targets, along with issues of warning and 
sequencing.2
This approach encouraged the view that the stability of the nuclear balance 
could be known for sure only through complex calculations. It was not 
enough to assume that the possibility of mutual annihilation would scare 
political leaders away from rash actions. Both sides were seeking out 
advantage in new technologies, and the concern in the United States was 
that the Soviet Union was moving ahead in this race. Not only had it 
tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile, but also it had launched, 
in October 1957, the world’s first artificial earth satellite: Sputnik  1. 
In the event, the US missile program was more successful than the Soviet 
Union’s. Nevertheless, in Washington there was little confidence that 
a successful first strike could be launched without it turning out to be 
catastrophic and suicidal. By the mid-1960s, it was accepted that the 
prevailing condition was one of ‘mutual assured destruction’.
Now that it was accepted, fatalistically, that any war would probably 
‘go nuclear’ almost immediately, the major powers were scared into 
caution. This was not the result of complex analyses of the balance but 
2  Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The delicate balance of terror’, Foreign Affairs, January, 1959, pp. 211–34.
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the smallest of risks of becoming involved in a nuclear exchange. Their 
nuclear arsenals were prepared for war, but their main function was to 
serve as a reminder that however deep the antagonism they should not 
let any disputes get out of hand. Wars had to be deterred, not fought. 
This left the task of designing, constructing and sustaining conventional 
armed forces extremely difficult. The word ‘conventional’ suggested 
some link with the past ‘conventions’ of classical warfare, but there was 
no obvious route to a decisive battlefield victory against a nuclear-armed 
opponent. Preparations for conventional war did not necessarily assume 
that a nuclear war could be avoided. Instead, the aim was to reinforce 
deterrence, for only an all-out conventional war was likely to create the 
conditions that could potentially bring about Armageddon. As a cold 
decision, a nuclear strike appeared irrational, but one that became more 
credible as something more emotional and hot-headed, taken in the fever 
of war, with casualties already accumulating and land torn apart as great 
offensives were launched and resisted.
A slightly more congenial possibility was that a defensive line might be 
held, or an enemy’s advance made costly and painful, thereby allowing 
sufficient time for second thoughts and active negotiations, hopefully 
interrupting the nuclear powder trail before it reached its explosive climax.
The Americans were always deeply uncomfortable with this state of affairs. 
They were unnerved by the possibility of a war in Europe putting their 
homeland so directly at risk if matters escalated to nuclear exchanges and 
worried that if they made their anxiety on this matter too evident they 
would undermine the credibility of the deterrent and so help to create 
the situation they were desperate to avoid. From the early 1960s, they 
therefore began to press the Europeans to improve conventional forces 
so that at least there was no need to rush into the dire choice of suicide 
or surrender in the event of sudden aggression. While it might have 
been the case that the prospect of nuclear war ensured caution at time 
of crisis, this was not something upon which the Americans wished to 
rely. They worked to separate the nuclear from the conventional, with a 
firebreak between the two, and to encourage the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to build up its conventional forces.
Eventually, in 1967, the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ was adopted 
whereby the Europeans recognised the US requirement for an extended 
conventional stage so that the first shots across the Iron Curtain would 
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not lead automatically to a nuclear holocaust. In return, the United States 
accepted the need for a clear link between a land war in Europe and its 
own strategic nuclear arsenal.
By this time, the work was underway that would result in the transformation 
of conventional warfare. The most impressive development lay in 
the improved accuracy of modern weaponry. ‘Smart’ bombs were first 
employed during the USAF’s Linebacker campaigns in the closing stages 
of US military involvement in the Vietnam War. Whereas once it might 
have taken numerous sorties for an important bridge to be destroyed, now 
this could be achieved with a single weapon. The success of air defence and 
anti-tank weapons during the opening stages of the October 1973 Arab–
Israeli War encouraged confidence that the trend could include moving 
as well as fixed targets. Over time, the same accuracies could be achieved 
over ever-extending ranges and against a moving target, so long as it was 
in the open. With increasingly intrusive sensors it was also becoming 
possible to work out where enemy forces were and what they were up to. 
They could then be hit with a high probability of success. Liddell Hart 
had concluded in 1945 that the rot had set in to modern warfare when it 
was realised that air raids could not be used to hit specific military targets 
but instead only large civilian areas. ‘Inaccuracy of weapon-aim resulted 
in inhumanity of war-aim.’3 The corollary of this was that, if bomb aim 
was more accurate, so too could be war aim. War could become more of 
a fight. The trend away from decisive battle might at last be reversed.
But quick victories had proved to be elusive well before the nuclear age. 
If a war could not be won quickly then it tended to drag on with the 
advantages moving to those with the greatest financial, industrial and 
demographic strength—and therefore durability. The early evidence was 
that the new technologies would not necessarily support conventional 
offensives. The greatest beneficiaries of improvements in accuracy and 
lethality appeared to be defensive weapons, whether firing against aircraft, 
tanks or warships, so that future blitzkriegs would be even harder to 
execute. Anything in range and out in the open was vulnerable.
If frontal assaults were hazardous, then manoeuvrability appeared to be 
the best way to get around strong defensive positions. From their study of 
Warsaw Pact exercises and military literature, NATO planners concluded 
that their adversaries had put a lot of effort into developing armoured 
3  Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, p. 31.
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divisions and plans for moving fast to outflank NATO defences.4 This led 
to pressure for NATO to start preparing along the same lines, improving 
mobility to match that of the Warsaw Pact. Much more fluid and complex 
battles were envisaged. Their conduct would be facilitated not only by 
precise weaponry but also by improved means of intelligence-gathering, 
surveillance, command, control and communications. In this way, the 
digital revolution would make itself felt. A return to the classical model 
now seemed possible.
Eventually, in the Gulf War of 1991, the possibilities of the new technologies 
were revealed, albeit not against the Warsaw Pact but instead against 
a much weaker opponent that had adopted Soviet weaponry and tactics. 
The US-led coalition was able to fight an essentially classical conventional 
campaign to a swift and decisive conclusion and with limited casualties 
(especially on the coalition side). Here was a demonstration of the 
advantages American commanders enjoyed as a result of improvements in 
sensors, data management and communications as well as accuracy, so that 
Iraqi units were left stranded and picked off with ease while cruise missiles 
arrived at individual targets in the middle of built-up areas and destroyed 
them with minimal damage to any other buildings in the vicinity. The Iraqi 
military was swiftly rendered blind, deaf and dumb. Although the new 
capabilities were not quite as effective as some of the initial propaganda 
suggested, it did not take very much imagination to see how this form 
of warfare could be taken further. A rosy future for the US armed forces 
was at hand in which they might expect to be completely dominant. The 
combination of precision guidance and the new information technologies 
led to talk in the early 1990s of a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA).5
As the technology became even smarter, so the choices became sharper. 
Picking targets moved on from large military formations to specific units 
and then on to particular facilities—even in the middle of civilian areas—
and eventually, by this century, designated individuals. Unmanned drones 
controlled from a distance can now hover over an area, identify targets 
and, on command, attack them. The cumulative impact of all these 
developments has had a profound influence on Western military thinking.
4  Johan Holst and Uwe Nerlich (eds), Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims, New Arms, Crane 
Russak, New York, 1977.
5  See Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 
2013, Chapter 16.
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Despite the fact that the new weaponry was employed against much 
weaker forces unable to fight back in kind, its successes encouraged the 
view that war in general could be turned away from its assumed totality 
and destructiveness. It raised the possibility of getting away from massive 
destruction and back to the classical view of war as a contest between 
regular forces acting apart from society. It has become possible to think 
again of non-combatant immunity as a real value. This was reinforced by 
the view, first developed as a result of the surveys conducted after World 
War II’s massive bombing campaigns, that societies absorbed punishment 
in preference to surrendering and, if innocents were killed, then populations 
would be turned against the perpetrators. Consequently, a  vicious and 
uncontained approach to war would be not only reprehensible but also 
counter-productive. With new technologies, large-scale killing need no 
longer be tolerated as an unavoidable consequence of war. Instead,  the 
focus could be on disabling an enemy’s military establishment with 
the minimum necessary force. Opponents would be defeated by means 
of confusion and disorientation rather than carnage. No more resources 
should be expended, assets ruined or blood shed than absolutely necessary 
to achieve specified political goals.
If wars had to be fought, this was the way to do it. There was a particular 
appeal here for the United States and its allies. High-quality weaponry 
reduced the importance of numbers while putting a premium on high-
quality troops. Now that bomb aim could be accurate, war aims could 
also be more precise. The key thing, however, was that these qualitative 
advantages were embedded in a massive material advantage.
The problem with this vision was not that it was technically out of reach. 
By and large, the weapons performed as advertised. The problem lay in 
the nature of the conflicts. The Americans always understood that there 
were high risks in becoming drawn into fighting insurgencies, as they had 
done in Vietnam. This explains their reluctance to get involved in lesser 
operations that had little to do with what they considered to be proper 
warfare against serious military powers. A brief and unsuccessful peace-
keeping operation in Beirut in the early 1980s reinforced the lessons of 
Vietnam. It left no appetite for becoming involved in distant civil wars. 
Even without a Warsaw Pact to worry about, the focus remained on high-
intensity conflicts against delinquent states. There was scant interest in 
low-intensity interventions to keep squabbling populations apart, a task 
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recognised as likely to be both thankless and enduring. The focus and 
preparations were on decisive battles against other great powers—so-called 
peer competitors.
Yet the wars of the first decade of the 21st century came in response to an 
attack not from a revived Russia or an ascendant China but from the far 
end of the spectrum of threats. The most shocking perpetrator was not 
a powerful state but a terrorist group based in one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Al Qaeda organised an audacious attack against the symbols 
of US power. The attack employed one of the world’s oldest weapons—
knives—to hijack commercial airliners and turn them into deadly 
instruments of slaughter. Suddenly all the issues connected with ‘weak’, 
‘failing’, ‘fractured’ or ‘rogue’ states acquired a harder edge. The response 
took the form of interventions that were not presented as discretionary 
nor, initially, as humanitarian in purpose. They were justified by the 
demands of national security.
Both the Afghan and Iraqi regimes were toppled by an unremitting 
display of US military capability. But, in both cases, this was followed by 
fury and frustration as it proved to be impossible for US forces to resolve 
bitter internal divisions.
Unfortunately, toppling regimes meant that they had to be replaced, lest 
elements of the old regime return. The short, sharp wars were followed 
by long, gruelling and inconclusive counter-insurgency campaigns. These 
required establishing security and setting these countries on their paths 
to reconstruction. This was easier said than done. The idea was to hand 
over to local forces to keep security on behalf of a local government, but 
this was continually delayed. Then, when it was eventually thought safe 
to leave, it turned out not to be the case. The insurgencies returned in 
more virulent forms. There had been a failure to grasp the challenges that 
would be faced reconstructing a deeply divided and brutalised society and 
helping its people settle on a new form of government. The transition from 
an invading force to an occupying administration was poorly handled. 
The military and political dimensions could not be treated separately.
These forms of warfare were the opposite of the ideal types of classical 
warfare. Instead of relatively civilised combat professionally conducted 
by high-quality regular forces, the struggle was against murky, subversive 
forms of terrorism and militias. Instead of directing fire with precision 
against targets of evident military value, they faced opponents whose 
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strategies depended on maximising their enemies’ pain. The harsh 
reality was of conflicts that were prolonged, doleful and disappointing. 
Old  enemies refused to go away and new ones emerged, dragging the 
Americans and their allies into a continual, relentless war against opponents 
that for the most part preferred to remain hidden and, in many cases, were 
prepared to accept a martyr’s death as human bombs. All the clichés of 
guerrilla warfare, dimly remembered from the 1960s, of an enemy hiding 
in the shadows and the tactics of darting flea bites, returned. The lessons 
of Vietnam had to be relearned, so US forces adapted to the demands of 
counter-insurgency and began to work out what it took to contain, if not 
quite defeat, their new foes.
These conflicts exposed flaws with the revived classical model as an ideal 
type. The technological advances came from the West, and only wealthy 
countries could afford the weapons. This meant that opponents could 
not fight on Western terms. This problem was identified early on as 
‘asymmetric warfare’, capturing the theme that not everyone would or 
could fight in the same way. But it did not quite capture the extent to 
which those in weaker positions had no interest in keeping war apart from 
society. Their incentives were to use their own societies as sanctuaries and 
their opponents’ societies as targets.
The ideal type involved a vision for land warfare that involved light and 
agile formations not too encumbered by the need to carry their own 
firepower (because precision strikes could be called in from distant bases), 
and possessing knowledge of the battlespace to be able to avoid enemy 
traps and move swiftly into favourable positions. By contrast, counter-
insurgency campaigns required forces to move among potentially hostile 
populations, accepting the risk from ambush and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs). This required very different tactics from the management 
of large, disciplined forces under firm command and deployed as part 
of a larger plan.
Although the new technologies made it possible to choose targets to avoid 
populated areas and civilian infrastructure, they also made it possible to 
choose targets with exactly the opposite intention: to put more rather 
than fewer non-combatant lives at risk. Compare, for example, the 
Russian air campaign that devastated the city of Aleppo in Syria with 
the air campaigns of the United States and its allies.
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As a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama Administration became 
reluctant to get involved in more wars of this type, at least on the ground. 
It could justify anti-terrorism campaigns employing targeted killing using 
drones, but at most that helped contain a particular sort of threat. Only 
by bringing a degree of stability and security to the contested areas that 
provided the bases and recruits from such groups as ISIS and al Qaeda 
could the threat be truly degraded, let alone eliminated. Much can be 
achieved from the air, but it does not bring victory by itself. Wars are 
fought for political influence and control. That requires holding territory 
and exercising authority within it. Either intervention forces had to use 
their own infantry or else they had to rely on indigenous forces, which 
often meant awkward compromises over political objectives and military 
methods.
Consider Russia as a country also engaged in conflicts beyond its borders 
and one that also is reluctant to commit substantial ground forces of its 
own. It was more effective in Syria where forces loyal to President Assad, 
along with those of Iran and Hezbollah, provided sufficient ground forces. 
In Eastern Ukraine, by contrast, although Russia provided considerable 
material support plus Special Forces, the separatists remained hemmed 
into much of their original area after September 2014.
These wars rarely involve battles. There might be rushes of activity as one 
force is pushed out of a presumed stronghold, with frightened people 
scampering away after their supposed protectors have fled. At other 
times, the fighting might be marked by sporadic bursts of artillery and 
IEDs but otherwise little of note happening for weeks and months. Then 
some spark, perhaps a new atrocity or food shortages or a change in the 
weather, leads to another bout of killing and more pleas to desist. Protest 
movements morph into militias and then militias morph into criminal 
gangs or into rival factions, fighting each other with the same ferocity that 
they once fought their shared enemy. This is one reason why it is hard to 
bring conflicts to a definitive conclusion. For many of those involved in 
local militias, there are too many opportunities connected with trafficking 
in drugs, minerals, people and guns to allow a profitable activity to come 
to an end.
Nor were the militias and terrorists innocent of the new technologies. 
Their smart phones provided many of the new capabilities that made the 
RMA possible, offering access to vast stores of knowledge on an infinite 
number of topics, imagery of local terrain, navigation and instantaneous 
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communications. They could also often gain access to modern weaponry, 
whether from patrons and dealers or picked up from government forces 
that had fled rather than fought. Artillery and small arms were readily 
available. Sometimes portable anti-air weapons and even tanks could be 
found. There was always the possibility of improvisation––for example, by 
sticking machine guns onto the top of trucks. Of course, irregular forces 
lacked the training and discipline of the best regular forces, but they could 
improve over time. Their vulnerability was to air power. They could be 
spotted and destroyed if they moved out into the open.
The success of counter-insurgency campaigns could not be measured by 
victories in battle, but by the authority of the government or whatever 
political force was being backed. The critical effects were not those an 
armed force had on another, but those it had on the adversary’s political 
and social structures. From this came a view that a key feature of modern 
conflict lay in the ability to shape public opinion, about whether 
opponents could cope and who would prevail and whether there would be 
much to benefit ordinary people either way. This led to talk of narratives 
and information operations as being no less essential to success than more 
traditional forms of kinetic activity.
The problem with this lay not in the appreciation of the importance of 
prevailing perceptions of a conflict but in the ability to influence those 
perceptions and the potential consequences of the changed perceptions. 
The problem for those who sought to control the perceptions of others 
was that they could rarely control the totality of communications from 
their ‘side’. The most eloquent messages are often unintended, resulting 
from either the actions of careless troops or the policy statements of 
careless politicians. Reactions to being treated harshly and disdainfully for 
no good reason, especially by uninvited foreign troops, were not likely to 
vary greatly among otherwise diverse cultures. It would take more than 
a keen and well-resourced public affairs outfit putting a positive ‘spin’ 
on events to repair the damage in the aftermath of such behaviour. Most 
importantly, it would require evidence that policies had been changed 
and that more appropriate behaviour could be expected in future. Even if 
perceptions changed, there was not necessarily much that could be done 
with a different point of view. It did make a difference if a population 
yielded fewer recruits, sanctuaries, resources and intelligence to the 
enemy, but the key determinant of that was who actually was best placed 
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to provide security and shape behaviour on the ground. These ‘perception 
wars’ were products of the material conditions they were supposed 
to shape.
This can be seen with the Russian experience of using disinformation as 
an instrument of strategy. Thus, in Ukraine, they did not wish to admit 
the role their forces were actually playing as this would have required 
acknowledging aggression. The pretence therefore was that the individuals 
concerned were volunteers or on holiday. When one of their anti-aircraft 
missiles shot down a Malaysia Airlines aircraft in July 2014, instead of 
accepting responsibility, they sought to suggest that it was the Ukrainians, 
with the claims becoming ever more fanciful. As this pattern of behaviour 
became apparent, Russian officials were not believed about anything, 
even when telling the truth. Russian propaganda played well in Russia 
but badly everywhere else, which had the effect of increasing Russia’s sense 
of isolation but not of its influence.
The Russian strategy in Ukraine was characterised as a deliberate and 
skilful  application of ‘hybrid warfare’. This term gained currency 
after Israel  was caught out during the Lebanon War of 2006 by the 
combination of guerrilla and conventional tactics adopted by Hezbollah. 
It came to refer to an approach drawing upon instruments from across 
the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency, criminality and 
conventional operations along with the extensive use of information 
operations. As an approach, this is not simple as it requires a formidable 
command structure to pull together these various instruments to achieve 
the greatest strategic effect. In practice, it might refer to a number of 
separate efforts set in motion at the same time that might or might 
not reinforce each other. In Ukraine, complex command arrangements 
complicated Russian attempts to control the situation on the ground 
while efforts at deception were by and large ineffectual as they became 
progressively transparent. One possible success was in projecting a more 
menacing image than Russia’s actual strength warranted, which served to 
deter the West from escalating the conflict.
In practice, these forms of warfare acknowledged the limitations of the 
classical model in contemporary circumstances. Because of the difficulty 
of imagining a truly decisive military campaign under contemporary 
circumstances, it had been necessary to look for shortcuts and alternatives. 
Instead of the knockout blow in a decisive battle, various forms of force 
and coercion were used to reshape conflicts. Within these conflicts, the 
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balance of advantage might shift one way or the other, but it was difficult 
to bring them to a conclusion. Success required exceptional circumstances 
when either the first moves were decisive because the defeated party had 
been caught napping or else because the participants were exhausted and 
there was a genuine basis for a political settlement.
The wars fought by Western countries in Afghanistan and Iraq turned out 
to be frustrating and inconclusive. The wars that were not fought, however, 
would have been much, much worse. One benign interpretation of all 
this is that the appreciation of the limits the classical model has extended 
the arena of deterrence. When it comes to war involving great powers, 
there is an argument that the cautions induced by nuclear deterrence now 
extend to conventional conflicts as well. It may be—as with Russia taking 
on Ukraine and Georgia but not Estonia and Latvia—that the unique 
dangers involved in any sort of major power are sufficient to reduce risk 
taking. This is why military action by those revisionist powers that do have 
grievances that they would like to address tend to be geared to probing, 
exploring the limits of acceptable behaviour rather than bold offensives 
designed to take a large opponent out action.
It is possible to frustrate, deflect, divert and distract opponents with 
a variety of forms of coercion, including economic sanctions, cyber attacks 
and some forms of deadly force, including seizures of disputed territory. 
None of this constitutes true victory. Has Putin won or lost in Ukraine or 
even in Syria? The fact that we can even have this debate indicates that the 
outcomes of war lack the clarity of the victories sought in the past, those 
with ceremonial surrenders and an enemy state at your mercy.
The challenge for the West in all of this is that wars have come to lack 
borders and endpoints. The idea of conflict as something contained in 
time and space, where there is a sharp demarcation between peace and war 
and between the civilian and military spheres, is consistently undermined. 
The classical model of warfare, of decisive campaigns, remains a beguiling 
ideal, but the real challenge for Western strategists is to come to terms 
with wars of continuing political struggle where military action ensuring 






What is the relationship between economics and security, and how should 
strategists think about these two seemingly disparate areas of policy? Since 
the 1930s and 1940s, scholars such as Jacob Viner and E.H. Carr have 
recognised that economic and security aspects of policy-making ought 
to be studied in an integrated way. However, the economics–security 
nexus was traditionally neglected in Western International Relations and 
strategic studies scholarship. Michael Mastanduno suggests that in the early 
years of the Cold War, these fields became narrowly focused on military 
instruments of security at the expense of economic and other instruments 
of policy. This was partly due to the absence of direct economic contact 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and partly because the 
most important aspect of this bipolar system was nuclear deterrence and 
the potential for nuclear war. Whereas nuclear deterrence and other areas 
of military security and foreign policy were considered ‘high’ politics, 
economic matters were firmly relegated to the area of ‘low’ politics.2 
By the 1970s, US international relations scholarship was characterised by 
the development of two prominent subfields—international political 
economy and security studies—and scholars working in these subfields 
1 I am grateful to Andrew Kennedy and Satish Chand for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this chapter, and to the organisers of the conference ‘SDSC at 50: New Directions in Strategic 
Thinking 2.0’, where this chapter was first presented.
2  Michael Mastanduno, ‘Economics and security in statecraft and scholarship’, International 
Organization 52, no. 4, 1998, p. 836.
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asked different questions, used different methodological tools and 
typically published in different journals. As a result, the relationship 
between economics and security was systematically understudied within 
international relations.3 Outside the discipline of international relations, 
international economists were naturally focused on questions relating to 
the global economy but tended to be less interested in the ‘political and 
strategic dimensions of international economic relations’.4
Despite this neglect, there are of course several possible conceptual 
linkages that may be drawn between economics and security. At its most 
basic, economic growth allows government to devote greater resources 
to national defence expenditure and therefore economic wealth is the 
foundation of national military power. Traditionally, economic factors 
such as access to raw materials and technology, production of goods 
such as steel and iron, and a state’s manufacturing capacity have all been 
considered important indices of national power. Economic growth also 
leads to growing demand for energy resources among states and therefore 
can become a source of international conflict between states as they 
compete for scarce resources. Conversely, economic decline can be a source 
of insecurity. States that are perceived to be in a position of decline may 
be more likely to take preventive military action in order to bolster their 
power position. Economics and security are also directly related because 
states may use economic sanctions and other economic instruments in 
their pursuit of wider strategic goals. Alternatively, states may use security 
policies to promote economic goals, such as by engaging in expansionist 
military behaviour to obtain access to territory or raw materials.5 Or, as 
work by Thomas Christensen on Maoist China has shown, states may 
use limited forms of military conflict to mobilise a domestic population 
towards the pursuit of major economic campaigns.6
Moreover, there is an increasingly extensive research agenda in international 
relations on the linkage between economic interdependence and security. 
Liberal internationalists, and the strand of commercial liberalism in 
particular, view trade, investment and other economic ties as a force for 
3  Ibid., pp. 837–41.
4  Ibid., p. 836.
5  Brendan Taylor and Bruce Luckham, ‘Economics and security’, in Strategy and Security in the 
Asia Pacific, ed. Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2006, pp. 138–51.
6  Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict, 1947–1958, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, Chapter 6.
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peace between states.7 The self-interested pursuit of power by states can 
be mediated by economic interdependence, thereby offering ‘the possibility 
of escaping … a vicious cycle and finding new patterns of cooperation 
among states’.8 At the most basic level is the view that, in an interdependent 
relationship, the potential loss of economic ties makes the cost of conflict 
between states so high as to act as a deterring factor.9 Polachek demonstrates 
that countries with significant trade relations are less likely to engage in 
conflict with one another owing to fear of the welfare losses that would 
arise from the breaking of trade relations.10 Not surprisingly, states that 
engage in the trade of strategic goods are thought to be especially deterred 
from conflict because of the higher welfare losses that arise from potential 
disruption to the supply of goods such as oil and other raw materials.11 Yet the 
connection between interdependence and cooperation does not only derive 
from states’ concern for the welfare losses associated with conflict. Keohane 
views economic interdependence as a basis for institution-building between 
states, which can foster mechanisms for information sharing, trust-building 
and conflict resolution.12 In a parallel argument, Rosecrance suggests that 
trade is a superior method of the traditional military or imperialist means of 
acquiring products and markets in the international system.13 Furthermore, 
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer find that economic interdependence provides 
states with non-violent methods of signalling their intentions, thereby 
allowing states to display their resolve without the need for costly military 
conflicts.14 Finally, at the extreme end of the liberal view is the hypothesis 
that economic interdependence has led to the melting away of nation-state 
borders, thus reducing the relevance of state-based issues in a globalised or 
regionalised world.15
7  John R. Oneal, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, ‘The liberal peace: Interdependence, 
democracy, and international conflict, 1950–85’, Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1, 1996, p. 23; 
R.  Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, Basic 
Books, New York, 1986, pp. 24–5.
8  Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, p. ix.
9  John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, ‘The Kantian peace: The Pacific benefits of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations, 1885–1992’, World Politics 52, no. 1, 1999, p. 3.
10  Solomon William Polachek, ‘Conflict and trade’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1, 1980, 
p. 57.
11  Ibid., pp. 67–71.
12  Robert O. Keohane, ‘International liberalism reconsidered’, in The Economic Limits to Modern 
Politics, ed. John Dunn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
13  Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, pp. 30–9.
14  Erik Gartzke, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer, ‘Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence 
and international conflict’, International Organization 55, no. 2, 2001, pp. 418–19.
15  Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, Free Press 
Paperbacks, New York, 1995.
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To realists, this liberal view of the world is misguided. Buzan 
challenges the relationship between economic interdependence and peace 
by arguing that the ‘long peace’ that has existed since 1945 is due to 
the presence of nuclear deterrence and the structural stability associated 
with an international system of bipolarity, rather than economic 
interdependence.16 Furthermore, although observers have been forced to 
accept the presence of high economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific 
in particular, Morrison questions whether this interdependence has been 
sufficient to alter states’ competitive behaviour.17 To realists, economic 
interests will always remain subordinate to military ones for: 
so long as countries have reason to fear the recurrence of war, no emphasis 
on the economic benefits of international trade will induce them to 
forego such a measure of economic self-sufficiency as their Governments 
consider feasible and desirable for their military security.18
In fact, realists further extend these concerns and argue that economic 
interdependence may even become a source of conflict between states. 
In contrast to the liberal view that interdependence promotes information-
sharing and mutual respect between states, Kenneth Waltz argued that the 
closer contact and greater range of potentially competitive issues brought 
about by interdependence raises the likelihood of conflict.19 Economic 
interdependence may also be a source of conflict if the costs and benefits 
of the interdependent relationship are not symmetrically distributed. 
If states’ dependence on one another is not evenly balanced, asymmetric 
interdependence can be exploited as a source of power, thereby eroding 
the peaceful outcomes of interdependence.20 Doran speaks of the ‘gloved 
hand’ of power concealed by an asymmetric relationship in which 
smaller states are subject to the paternalism of those more dominant.21 
16  Barry Buzan, ‘Economic structure and international security: The limits of the liberal case’, 
International Organization 38, no. 4, 1984, pp. 605–7.
17  Charles E. Morrison, ‘Interdependence, policy networks, and security in Asia Pacific’, in Asia-
Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus, ed. Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1997, p. 123.
18  Heinz Arndt, 1944, quoted in Robert Gilpin, ‘Economic interdependence and national security 
in historical perspective’, in Economic Issues and National Security, ed. Klauss Knorr and Frank N. 
Trager, Regents Press of Kansas for the National Security Education Program, Lawrence, 1977, p. 52.
19  Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The myth of national interdependence’, in The International Corporation, 
ed. Charles E. Kindleberger, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1970, p. 205.
20  Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Little, Brown & Company, 
Boston and Toronto, 1977, p. 11; Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign 
Trade, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945, p. 15.
21  Charles F. Doran, ‘Living with asymmetry’, Mershon International Studies Review 38, no. 2, 
1994, p. 260.
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Essentially, while an asymmetric relationship might not necessarily lead to 
conflict between states, ‘the existence and abuse of unequal power within 
asymmetrical relations creates a predisposition for conflict that is greater 
than that found in symmetrical trade relations’.22
The view that asymmetry could become a source of conflict stems from 
the neorealist concern for relative gains or losses in power between states, 
rather than absolute gains or losses. States’ concern for this relative 
distribution of power—who will gain more?—is the result of existing in 
an anarchical international system.23 As Mastanduno explains, ‘Anarchy 
breeds fear and distrust, leading nation-states to worry, at the extreme, 
that they will be conquered or destroyed by their more powerful 
counterparts’.24 Because economic power is a particularly fungible form 
of power, economic gains could be easily transferred into military ones. 
Indeed, gains from trade create economic efficiencies, potentially freeing 
resources for increased military spending. In economic terms, this is 
referred to as a security externality. While trade between allied states can 
create a positive externality in the form of greater military spending and 
shared security for both, trade with an adversary also leads to greater 
military spending and therefore a decline in the security position of one 
state relative to another.25
Since the end of the Cold War, considerable intellectual effort has been 
expended in wading through these competing claims to determine whether 
economic interdependence is a force for peace or a source of conflict between 
states.26 Yet, in many cases, the underlying debate between realists and liberals 
22  Katherine Barbieri, ‘Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate 
conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1, 1996, p. 32.
23  Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism’, International Organization 42, no. 3, 1988, p. 500.
24  Michael Mastanduno, ‘Do relative gains matter? America’s response to Japanese industrial 
policy’, International Security 16, no. 1, 1991, p. 78.
25  Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, ‘Power politics and international trade’, American 
Political Science Review 87, no. 2, 1993, pp. 408–10.
26  See Barbieri, ‘Economic interdependence’; Gowa and Mansfield, ‘Power politics and 
international trade’; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman, Power 
and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security, Frank Cass, London, 2000; 
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, ‘Investing in the peace’; Scott L. Kastner, ‘Does economic integration 
across the Taiwan Strait make military conflict less likely?’, Journal of East Asian Studies 6, 2006; 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Trade blocs, trade flows, and international conflict’, 
International Organization 54, no. 4, 2000; Brian M. Pollins, ‘Does trade still follow the flag?’, 
American Political Science Review 83, no. 2, 1989; Richard Rosecrance, ‘Economics and national 
security: The evolutionary process’, in Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus, ed. Stuart 
Harris and Andrew Mack, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997.
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remains unresolved.27 Two recent edited volumes by T.J. Pempel and Avery 
Goldstein and Edward Mansfield have further contributed to these debates 
by examining the economics–security nexus within the context of East 
and North-East Asia in particular.28 These volumes contain new empirical 
evidence about the economic implications of maritime disputes, the role 
of energy insecurity and the relationship between economics, security and 
technology in East Asia. But, as Evelyn Goh’s recent review of these works 
points out, these two volumes are emblematic of an ongoing shortcoming 
in much of the existing literature on economics and security––that is, these 
works ‘treat the liberal assumption that economic interdependence leads to 
security, implicitly or explicitly, as the leading theory to prove or disprove’.29 
They therefore expend most of their intellectual energy trying to determine 
whether economic or security factors are the key independent variable 
explaining the outcome of peace or conflict. As Goh and the editors of these 
volumes themselves note, there is still no consensus on the answer to this 
question; it is possible to find evidence that supports either explanation. It 
is precisely for this reason that the debate continues to rage between realists 
and liberals, between pessimists and optimists, and between those who 
focus on security-driven explanations and those who focus on economics-
driven explanations. 
More importantly, though, many of these traditional approaches to 
studying the relationship between economics and security do not 
capture empirical reality, particularly in Asia where the nexus between 
economic and security factors is related in much more interesting and 
diverse ways. The China–Japan relationship, for instance, is emblematic 
of a relationship that has been shaped consistently by both extensive 
economic ties and considerable political and security tensions. Indeed, 
tense political–security relations and thriving economic relations between 
China and Japan are not a contradiction but rather two sides of the same 
coin. After World War II, Japan’s industrial capabilities made Japan not 
only a model of a modern and powerful nation and an important source 
of industrial goods and expertise for Communist China, but also a latent 
27  For an excellent overview of this literature, see Christina Davis, ‘Linkage diplomacy: Economic 
and security bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 1902–23’, International Security 33, no. 3, 
2008–09, pp. 147–9.
28  Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield (eds), The Nexus of Economics, Security, and 
International Relations in East Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012; T.J. Pempel (ed.), 
The Economic–Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, Routledge, New York, 2013.
29  Evelyn Goh, ‘Making headway on the ‘economic–security nexus’: Contributions from South-
East Asia’, Asan Forum 1, no. 3, 2013.
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military threat to China. These dual conceptions of Japan have shaped 
Chinese thinking since the late 19th century and continued to pervade 
the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party after 1949. Crucially, the 
existence of these dual conceptions poses a challenge to both the liberal 
thesis that economic ties must necessarily breed closer political and 
security relations and the realist contention that close political and security 
ties are a prerequisite for economic interdependence. Instead, the China–
Japan relationship demonstrates that insecurity can motivate economic 
engagement. Between 1949 and 1971, Chinese officials sought economic 
engagement with Japan because of a profound sense of insecurity about 
China’s low levels of industrial development and limited ability to win 
modern, industrialised wars. It was precisely because Japan served as 
a latent threat to China that Chinese officials looked to Japan for advice, 
goods and technology about how to ‘catch up’ and become a modern, 
industrialised and powerful state.30 
In addition, these existing approaches often fail to capture the importance 
of domestic factors in understanding the nexus between economics and 
security. For example, in his new book on Asian security, Robert Ayson 
writes about the uneven effects of economic transformation occurring 
within China, where coastal fringes are developing much faster than inner 
provinces. This has a major impact on domestic security (often resulting 
in protests by state-owned company employees) and has undermined the 
legitimacy of Communist Party rule and a strengthening of the state’s 
internal security apparatus. Equally, in India, uneven economic development 
is an important driver of internal violence.31 Christina Davis’s work on 
the relationship between alliances and economics also highlights the need 
to better understand domestic drivers of economic and security policy-
making. Much of the early literature on alliances and economics argued 
definitively that countries with military alliances were much more likely to 
enjoy strong trade and investment ties. Yet Davis’s research on the Anglo-
Japanese alliance of the early 1900s demonstrates that alliances might not 
necessarily lead to larger or more favourable economic relations between two 
states. This is because when a state offers special investment rights, unilateral 
30  Amy King, China–Japan Relations after World War Two: Empire, Industry and War, 1949–1971, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. In fact, the ongoing combination of political–security 
tensions and close trade and investment ties in the China–Japan relationship continues to motivate 
new findings on the economics–security nexus, as an important recent study demonstrates: Christina 
L. Davis and Sophie Meunier, ‘Business as usual? Economic responses to political tensions’, American 
Journal of Political Science, 55, no. 3, 2011, pp. 628–46.
31  Robert Ayson, Asia’s Security, Palgrave, London, 2015, pp. 98–9.
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trade liberalisation or other preferential economic treatment to an ally, it 
faces domestic opposition from business groups whose interests might be 
harmed by the proposed economic deal.32 In these cases, domestic business 
groups will place political pressure on their government to impose higher 
tariffs and export quotas to protect their market share. Consequently, a state 
might pursue economic policies that actually harm the economic interests 
of its ally in order to meet the demands of domestic business interests.
The role of domestic factors continues to be vitally important in 
understanding the economic–security nexus in the contemporary Asia-
Pacific region. For example, the Australia, New Zealand, United States 
(ANZUS) alliance demonstrates how domestic interest groups in both 
countries have successfully lobbied for economic policies that have 
harmed the economic interests of the allied partner state. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the staunch protectionism of Australia’s agricultural, textiles 
and manufacturing sectors led to significant Australian discrimination 
against US exports and frequent trade disputes between the two 
countries. In the 1980s, the United States retreated from the liberalisation 
agenda being pursued by Australia and instead erected trade barriers and 
signed preferential trade agreements that were fundamentally harmful to 
Australia’s economic interests in Asia. In the 2000s, the two countries were 
motivated by foreign policy and security objectives to develop a bilateral 
preferential trade agreement: the Australia–United States Free Trade 
Agreement. Yet the agreement that was ultimately signed was detrimental 
to the Australian agricultural sector and consumers of intellectual 
property.33 Working in the opposite direction, Miles Kahler and Scott 
Kastner’s work on the China–Taiwan relationship has shown that cross-
Strait economic ties have had a transformative effect on domestic politics 
in Taiwan. In particular, the growing cross-Strait economic relationship 
in the 1990s and early 2000s led to the emergence of strong political 
constituencies in Taiwan that opposed Taiwanese independence or other 
foreign and security policy moves that could endanger Taiwan’s economic 
32  Davis, ‘Linkage diplomacy’.
33  Amy King, ‘Economic links between Australia and the United States’, in Australia’s American 
Alliance: Towards a New Era?, ed. Peter Dean, Stephan Fruehling and Brendan Taylor, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 2016, pp. 98–118.
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relationship with mainland China.34 How these economic factors affect 
Taiwanese domestic politics and the cross-Strait relationship under the 
administration of President Tsai Ing-wen, who came to power in 2016, 
will be a rich area for future research.
These and other examples serve to highlight the need to find new ways 
to understand the nexus between economics and security. Moreover, the 
examples suggest that there is nothing innate or predetermined about 
the relationship between economics and security; an important first step 
for researchers is to better understand how states actually conceptualise 
this relationship. One way to achieve this is to explore critical junctures: 
key historical moments when countries’ thinking about the relationship 
between economics and security has evolved in important directions. In 
the United States, the experience of World Wars I and II was powerful in 
shaping government officials’ understanding of the economics–security 
nexus. Robert Pollard argues that US officials became ‘preoccupied’ 
with the security implications of foreign economic policy in the 1940s 
because they had seen how economic nationalism, closed economic 
blocs and national depressions had led to major conflict in Europe and 
Asia; and how states had used economic sanctions, currency manipulation 
and blockades as weapons of war.35 Subsequently, in the wake of World 
War  II, the Truman Administration pursued the goal of ‘economic 
security’, a  concept that, in their eyes, meant to ‘create an open world 
economic order that would serve US strategic purposes’ by preventing 
the recurrence of dangerous economic nationalism, depression and 
war.36 The  US goal was to create an open economic order that would 
ensure freedom of the seas, free trade, equal access to raw materials and 
international collaboration in the economic realm.
In Japan, the concept of ‘economic security’ also evolved in a similar era, 
as Japanese military officers and political officials observed the defeat of 
Germany—the superior military power—in World War I. As Michael 
Barnhart has shown, Japan’s search for economic security in the wake 
of World War I stemmed from the belief that:
34  M. Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, ‘Strategic uses of economic interdependence: Engagement 
policies on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait’, Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5, 
2006, pp. 523–41.
35  Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1985, pp. 4–5.
36  Ibid., p. 2.
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Future wars would be fought not only with guns but with the entire 
resources of nations, from engineers to doctors, from cotton to iron 
ore. Without these requisites of economic security, the mightiest army 
would be paralyzed. And without a modern industrial base that could 
be mobilized in time of need, even these requisites would prove useless. 
A nation that could not supply all of its own needs in wartime, a nation 
that was vulnerable to economic pressure from other nations, would be 
neither truly secure nor truly sovereign.37
These views about the importance of self-sufficiency, particularly in 
relation to strategic goods, prompted Japan’s imperial reach into North 
and South-East Asia during the 1920s and 1930s. For Japan, a resource-
poor nation, the goal of economic self-reliance could only be achieved 
through imperialism. Thus, building on its existing colonies in Formosa 
(Taiwan) and Korea, Japan colonised the major new territory of 
Manchuria (North-East China). These colonies provided access to raw 
materials such as coal, iron ore and soy bean; opened up new export 
markets for Japanese products; and allowed Japan to build major light 
and heavy industrial sectors that could fuel Japan’s war machine.38 Japan’s 
imperial expansion and pursuit of economic autarky would ultimately 
draw it into outright war with China and later with the United States. The 
disastrous consequences of Japan’s search for ‘economic security’ meant 
that, after their country’s defeat in World War II, Japan’s leaders were 
required to come up with a new approach to securing Japan and gaining 
access to badly needed raw materials and export markets. One outcome 
of this was the development in the 1970s and 1980s of a new concept of 
‘comprehensive security’ (sōgō anzen hoshō), which acknowledged Japan’s 
dependence on the external world for access to resources, markets and 
security.39 Japan’s post-war concept of comprehensive security rested on 
the premise that Japanese security could not be grasped in terms of isolated 
notions of military, economic and political security; rather, these separate 
factors were ‘interactive indexes of Japan’s national power’.40 Because of 
these experiences of war and defeat, the Japanese understanding of the 
37  Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1987, p. 18 (emphasis in original).
38  Ibid., Chapter 1.
39  J.W.M. Chapman, Reinhard Drifte and I.T.M. Gow, Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security: 
Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence, Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1983, p. xvii; Y. Soeya, ‘Japan: 
Normative constraints versus structural imperatives’, in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational 
Influences, ed. M. Alagappa, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, pp. 216–17.
40  M.G. L’Estrange, The Internationalization of Japan’s Security Policy: Challenges and Dilemmas 
for a Reluctant Power, Policy Papers in International Affairs 36, Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1990, p. 16.
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relationship between economics and security is centred around the notion 
that economic strength cannot be separated from national or military 
strength; the two are directly correlated.41
Beyond critical junctures, researchers at the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre (SDSC) continue to explore the intersection between economics 
and security in Asia, a research program that builds upon a distinguished 
history of scholarship by academics including Stuart Harris, Desmond 
Ball and Brendan Taylor. In October 2015, the Centre hosted a major 
workshop entitled ‘Unpacking the economics–security nexus in Asia: 
New concepts, questions and research approaches’. The workshop 
brought together scholars from around Australia who are engaged in 
innovative research and using new concepts, methods and case studies to 
interrogate the relationship between economics and security. Participants 
in the workshop drew on a wide range of concepts and methodological 
approaches, including geo-economics and geopolitics, economic 
nationalism, economic sanctions, strategic geography and foreign policy 
analysis and case studies ranging from Indonesian resource nationalism, 
Chinese economic statecraft, oil and economic coercion and the 
securitisation of finance.
Not surprisingly, a number of workshop papers focused on China and 
interrogated Chinese economic statecraft, its connectivity projects and 
technological innovation and the strategic implications of its economic 
rise. For example, Darren Lim at The Australian National University 
(ANU) is investigating the conditions under which China might use 
economic interdependence as an instrument to coerce other states, noting 
that there is strong variation in the occasions on which China has been 
able to exert pressure on trading partners. Lim’s research importantly 
recognises the need to develop new measures of dependence and coercion 
because existing measures of dependence assume 20th-century conditions 
and therefore fail to view trade as part of a complex production network. 
In addition, Evelyn Goh is examining China’s infrastructure-building 
drive across mainland South-East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia 
since the late 1990s. While this aspect of China’s periphery strategy has 
garnered increasing attention because of the highly publicised ‘Belt and 
Road Initiative’42 (BRI) under President Xi Jinping, Goh argues that 
41  Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to 
Bandwagoning?, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 2.
42  ‘Belt and Road’ is also known as ‘One Belt, One Road’.
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BRI is but one element of a wider strategy designed to deal with China’s 
periphery and the outside world, which contains renewed geographical 
and geopolitical elements. Drawing on her background as a geographer, 
Goh is exploring how China is reviving an older tradition of geo-strategy 
as a result of numerous push-and-pull factors, including the constraints 
on China’s ambitions in maritime Asia and the need to tackle problems 
like energy security and insurgencies at its western peripheries.43
Another major focus of the workshop was how to analyse the complex 
linkages between the domestic and the international levels while 
simultaneously unpacking the economics–security nexus. One scholar 
doing just this is Andrew Kennedy, based at ANU, whose research 
examines the role of technology and innovation in shaping the relationship 
between the United States and rising powers such as India and China. 
Kennedy notes that the world’s most powerful state, the United States, 
is locked in a technological embrace with two rising competitors—China 
and India—despite theoretical predictions that the United States should 
distrust and shun collaboration with these rival powers. Yet the pattern 
of US technological collaboration with China and India is inconsistent. 
The United States remains a highly welcoming destination for foreign 
graduate students but has also placed limits on the migration of skilled 
labour and has not increased the number of skilled workers coming 
into the country since 2004. To explain this variation, Kennedy argues, 
we need to understand the role of subnational actors, such as research 
and development (R&D)–intensive firms and research universities and 
the lobbying role they play in US domestic politics. These actors have 
a  natural openness to skilled labour and, to the extent that they can 
ward off political opposition, play a powerful role in lobbying the federal 
government on migration policies.44
So what does all this mean for the field of strategic studies? First, it is 
vital that we do not return to the drift of the 1970s, when economics 
and security occupied increasingly separate realms. Strategists must pay 
closer attention to the myriad ways in which economic factors affect 
security outcomes, and the economic drivers underpinning some of the 
43  For more on these projects, see Amy King and Evelyn Goh, ‘Unpacking the economic–security 
nexus in Asia: New Concepts, Questions and Research Approaches’, Workshop Report, ANU 
Research School of Asia and the Pacific, 1 October 2015; sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/
uploads/2016-07/2015_12_15_economic-security_nexus_asia_web.pdf (retrieved 20 January 2018).
44  Ibid. See also Andrew Kennedy, ‘Unequal partners: US collaboration with China and India 
in research and development’, Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 1, 2017, pp. 63–86.
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key strategic challenges of our age: resource insecurity, trade ‘wars’ and 
economic influence and coercion. Second, we must be clear that we cannot 
take an either/or approach to studying economics and security. Both sets of 
factors will shape Asia’s future and the relationships between states in this 
region. It is therefore imperative that scholars find new and better ways of 
unpacking the connections between economics and security rather than 
assuming that one or the other will predominate. Third, as we deepen our 
research into the economics–security nexus, it is imperative that strategists 
consider the changes that have occurred in the global economy over the 
past half-century. Today, foreign direct investment, skilled migration and 
global value chains comprise increasingly important dimensions of the 
ways in which states interact in the world economy, yet the literature 
has failed to keep pace and tends to remain narrowly focused on trade.45 
Research that focuses on the security implications of these newer forms 
of economic interdependence is badly needed. Finally, recent trends in 
research in this field have demonstrated the vital importance of opening 
up the ‘black box’ of the state to understand how domestic factors affect 
the relationship between economics and security. And here, a field such as 
strategic studies is particularly well placed to consider the domestic level 
given its long-standing focus on how domestic factors shape decision-
making during moments of crisis.46 Economics and security factors are 
intimately connected in state policy-making. It is time for strategic studies 
to incorporate economics once more.
45  Some recent exceptions include Darren J. Lim and Rohan Mukherjee, ‘What money can’t 
buy: The security externalities of Chinese economic statecraft in post-war Sri Lanka’, Asian Security, 
28 December 2017; Andrew Kennedy, The Conflicted Superpower: America’s Collaboration with China and 
India in Global Innovation, Columbia University Press, New York, 2018; John Ravenhill, ‘Production 
networks and Asia’s international relations’, in Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, 
ed.  Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 
pp. 348–68.
46  Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd edn, Addison-Wesley, New 
York, 1999; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Are bureaucracies important? Or Allison Wonderland’, Foreign 
Policy, no. 7, 1972, pp. 159–79; Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing national interests’, European Journal of 




A bias for action? The military as 
an element of national power
John J . Frewen
Australia’s military instils in its members a ‘can-do’ culture with a bias for 
action, inculcated early in the careers of virtually all officers and enlisted 
personnel. This ethos seeks both to ensure that opportunities are seized 
and to avoid the more common historical peril of inaction. This instinct 
serves us well on the battlefield; it can be be of less benefit at the operational 
and strategic levels where consequences of decisions tend to be more far-
reaching. This bias is not merely a military concern. The public can also 
demonstrate a bias for action without due consideration of the broader 
political issues at stake. Depending on the circumstances, politicians can 
also demonstrate bias for either action or perceived action. Regardless, 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is a relatively well-resourced and 
capable asset available to governments for a broad range of contingencies. 
From high-intensity warfighting to humanitarian operations, the ADF 
can be rapidly brought to bear to satisfy the ends of policy—uniquely in 
our government, through the employment of armed force. Yet, while the 
ADF can contribute to Australia’s national security, it cannot alone deliver 
national prosperity.
Realising a nation’s potential requires considered thought about how to 
best utilise all the assets at its disposal. This is most readily achieved with 
a clear view of the nation’s highest aims and a strong sense of the risks and 
costs that can be accepted in their pursuit. Strategy—the art of aligning 
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ends, ways and means—is the surest path for defining those conditions. 
The use of military force entails profound risks, including the potentially 
pointless loss of life. This risk tends to be more acute if military elements 
are used in isolation from other instruments at the nation’s disposal. 
Nevertheless, a bias for military action remains evident in both the 
military and government even if the underlying motivations sometimes 
differ. This chapter explores the implications of a bias for military action 
on the making of strategy in Australia and on the military as an institution 
and important element of national power.
The making of effective strategy is one of the most complex and difficult 
aspects of government work. And although there are many capacities 
within government to develop strategic policy, it is important not to 
confuse policy with strategy. Policy is a statement of principles intended 
to guide actions. Strategic policy requires strategies to harness national 
instruments of power in the service of political objectives. In general, 
the best strategies are those that integrate all the elements of national 
power: the diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME).1 These 
elements can be prioritised differently depending on the circumstances, 
but integration is usually key to achieving the best effect, especially in 
complex endeavours.
Who does strategy?
In the Australian Government, and arguably in most comparable 
Western democratic bureaucracies, there is a stark contrast between the 
large number of people whose job involves contributing to the making 
of strategy and the relative absence of government bodies dedicated to 
formulating strategy as a whole. This is problematic because it disaggregates 
the strategy-making process to such an extent that it precludes the level 
of coherence needed to be effective.
While the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is meant to provide 
direction, no single entity within the Australian Government is presently 
tasked to routinely deliver national strategies that integrate all elements of 
national power. Extant government agencies and departments are geared 
to delivering policies or assessments. Policies are routinely well agreed and 
1  An alternative national power model to DIME also includes financial, intelligence and law 
enforcement (DIMEFIL).
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aligned across departments before consideration by the political executive, 
but only extraordinary circumstances drive governments to deliver 
national strategies that bridge the gap between policy and outcomes. 
Actual strategy clearly defines the political imperative (ends), parameters 
for action (ways) and the resources that may be utilised or expended 
(means). Unfortunately, for Australia, our strategic culture has long relied 
on a powerful ally to set overarching grand strategy, which denudes the 
capacity for coherent or sensible formulation of strategy here at home.
Other systemic issues stymie the long-term thinking and planning 
required for strategy as well. Our federal three-year electoral cycle, the 
24-hour news cycle and a growth in populist politics lead us towards 
short-termism in policy. Similarly, our key decision-making bodies, 
including federal parliament and the National Security Committee of 
Cabinet (NSC), by their natures also have a proclivity for near-term—if 
not immediate—resolution of matters without the consistent setting of 
clear national aims or ideas about the integration of separate elements 
of  national power. The resultant processes create systemic myopia in 
which government scrambles from one issue to the next, typically without 
prolonged consideration. For example, rarely does government pause to 
consider alternative scenarios to contest the wisdom of certain chosen 
courses or pay due consideration to the inevitable action/reaction cycles 
of complex strategic decisions.
This is not to say that Australia cannot make strategy at all. One example 
is the implementation of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) to cease the 
unauthorised arrival of people to Australia by boat. Regardless of whether 
one agrees with the morality of the approach, OSB provides an example 
where political will is married with a comprehensive integration of a wide 
range of national instruments to produce a successful political effect.2 This 
is an example of national strategy delivering sustained political objectives 
against an adaptive adversary. However, it is a rare example and far more 
the exception than the rule.
2  Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) employs diplomatic, intelligence, informational, law 
enforcement, economic, maritime and defence effects. All are individually crucial but are also 
interdependent on the other elements for success.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN STRATEGIC THINKING 2 .0
40
At the other end of the spectrum, the UK’s Chilcot Report3 provides 
a timely counterexample of military forces being employed in costly and 
uncoordinated ways. The report paints a disturbing picture of military 
commitments almost devoid of a coherent national strategic narrative.
The rush to action
The use of military power is problematic in a political environment that 
routinely privileges quick outcomes. Military forces can be employed 
overtly and almost immediately in pursuit of political ends. Because of the 
ready utility of armed forces, many forms of military action can be taken 
quickly—even in the absence of a fully developed strategy. The ADF can, 
at times, be used as a force of convenience rather than a force of necessity. 
This can be appropriate and successful in the resolution of small-scale 
emergencies, such as rescues or evacuations, but can also find nations 
mired in increasingly costly financial and mortal endeavours in situations 
that elude straightforward resolution or extraction.4 The ready availability 
of military forces, coupled with a can-do military culture, and politicians 
eager for quick responses can see military forces too easily deployed with 
military practitioners and politicians equally complicit.
Senior military officers are enthusiastic about demonstrating the utility 
and quality of Defence capabilities and are justifiably proud to see the 
men and women of the ADF succeed in difficult circumstances. However, 
their enthusiasm is diminished when operations are not supported by 
appropriate national strategies. Frustrations arise at the tactical level when 
strategic directives lack clear political objectives or a tangible military end 
state. Military concerns are compounded if political risk aversion also 
leads to impractical constraints on military operations (such as excessive 
restrictions on the employment of national assets within a coalition 
or a  stipulation that there be no casualties). Military resolve is most 
challenged when an inappropriate level of resourcing for operations or 
3 United Kingdom Cabinet Office, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry [Chilcot Report], 6 July 2016, 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry (retrieved 16 January 2018).
4  The American war in Vietnam is an example of primarily military action being commenced for 
initially limited aims before a doubling-down effect took hold to justify expenditure and losses and 
avoid a loss of national prestige.
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a  lack of commitment to achieving military victory risks lives without 
strong purpose. In recent decades, many now-senior officers have 
experienced each of these problems.
The ADF maintains a broad range of platforms and capabilities. These 
forces are highly responsive and willing, and have a planning culture that 
supports rapid employment. These combine to make the ADF one of the 
government’s instruments of first resort. Military forces present political 
leaders with rapid and tangible means to display resolve. A political 
bias for action becomes problematic when military capabilities are not 
effectively orchestrated with the other elements of national power, when 
the opportunity costs of utilising military assets rather than civilian assets 
are not considered, or when military personnel and equipment are either 
required to use force or are put at risk when some other national instrument 
could achieve the same effect. That no single entity in government is 
tasked to evaluate the relative merits of national assets or to ensure such 
integration via the development of overarching national strategies means 
that Australian military forces risk being deployed in suboptimal ways.
Parameters of force
The employment of military force should always be subordinate to policy, 
itself embedded in a firm conception of the national interest. What 
national interest is to be served? Is the use of military assets optional 
or vital (such as in the face of an existential threat)? Is the use of force 
necessary for the achievement of the task? Is the intended effect symbolic 
or substantive? Will we be acting unilaterally, be leading a coalition or 
be junior partners within a coalition? If in a coalition, will our military 
contribution be proportionate? What degree of integration will there be 
with other agencies? Do we understand the consequences and likely effects 
of the use of military forces? What is our tolerance for risk in relation to 
our forces and platforms? To complicate matters further, moreover, these 
considerations can change during an operation. For example, force might 
be required early in a mission but not later on. While these considerations 
do illustrate the complexity of military operations, and may temper the 
rush to use force, they cannot altogether ensure that decisions to employ 
military forces will be free of bias.
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The risks inherent in military commitments tend to be lower in the 
absence of an armed adversary. For example, the recent Operation Fiji 
Assist 2016—a humanitarian task with no requirement for use of force—
saw military forces acting in concert with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and New Zealand counterparts. Together, they 
quickly helped facilitate relief for the people of Fiji in response to the havoc 
wreaked by Tropical Cyclone Winston. The ADF also very effectively 
acted as ambassador for Australia and were subsequently extracted in 
a timely and appropriate way after having reinforced Australia’s standing 
in the region.
In 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
similarly saw ADF forces supporting DFAT and the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) in security operations to restore law and order during 
troubled times that included confronting potentially dangerous armed 
opponents. RAMSI demonstrated effective integration of the elements 
of Australia’s national power to avoid the emergence of a regional 
failed state. Australia’s efforts again enhanced the country’s reputation 
as a good neighbour and partner in the Pacific despite achievement of 
strategic objectives proving costlier in time and dollars than was originally 
anticipated. Arguably, our commitments in both Solomon Islands and 
Fiji were not optional or discretionary but central to our longer-term 
regional interests. Conversely, the benefits of our recent deployments into 
war zones have been less apparent.
Australian operations in Iraq in 1990–91 and since 2002 in Afghanistan 
can be argued as discretionary operations in which alliance considerations 
outweighed any threats to Australia’s direct interests. In these cases, ADF 
forces (other than special forces) were largely confined to limited combat 
operations designed to minimise the likelihood of casualties and avoid 
circumstances that might restrict Australia’s ability to extract forces at 
the time of its choosing. Although force was a necessary component of 
these missions, it was not required to attain Australia’s preferred policy 
outcomes, nor was it essential to achieving military victory. Indeed, 
what exactly constituted ‘military victory’ was not well defined and was 
left largely in the hands of US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) mission heads. In these cases, military force was employed 
more to support the US alliance, and thereby sharpen an instrument in 
Australia’s national security toolbox, than in direct defence of any vital 
43
4 . A BIAS FOR ACTION?
national interest. Notwithstanding the importance of the US alliance for 
Australia, in both these cases military efforts were not consistently well 
integrated with other elements of national power.
To focus on the case of Afghanistan, the ADF-led Australian efforts to 
establish security, develop civilian capacity and support local governance 
in Oruzgan Province. Supported by DFAT, AFP efforts focused on 
counter-drug operations despite the lack of an effective local Afghan police 
force or a viable program to develop such a capability. Australian on-the-
ground commitments were in consequence not in keeping with strategic 
objectives. ADF operations did contribute to denying insurgents a safe 
haven more broadly (as do our ongoing efforts). Yet more than a decade 
later it is difficult to portray a compelling case that the country’s efforts 
have provided an enduring effect.
The most enduring aspect of Australian commitments in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq is the affirmation of a commitment to our major ally in matters 
of global concern and of our support to troubled nations in times of crisis. 
Australian military presence was arguably more significant in an alliance 
sense than was any combat success or nation-building outcome they 
achieved. Australia’s military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced 
our reputation as a good global citizen, one committed to a rules-based 
world order. Yet actions in both countries lacked a strategy effective in 
integrating Australia’s broader government commitments for achieving 
anything beyond ‘showing the flag’. Perhaps, however, no strategy was 
needed given that mere presence was sufficient to achieve the strategic 
objective of reinforcing the Australia–US relationship.
Policy conundrums
This modern phenomenon, whereby the deployment of military forces 
can be the policy outcome itself, presents four conundrums. The first is 
that this style of employment of military force belies the traditional model 
of strategy as a bridge that links means with ends. This seems more like 
using means to secure other means. The second is that strategic policy is 
increasingly supplanting national strategy with implications that are not 
well understood. Third, military force is being used in isolation from other 
elements of national power, which rarely delivers sustainable outcomes. 
Finally, military personnel are at risk of being killed or wounded to bring 
about policy goals that could be achieved in other, less risky ways.
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As mentioned, the Australian Government is currently geared to formulate 
strategic policy, but not strategy per se. We are a policy-led bureaucracy 
in which the coin-in-trade is position papers and assessments presenting 
options to government. Strategic policy discussions and papers typically 
touch on principles for endorsement, recommended diplomatic stances, 
possible actions or responses in a broad sense, and discussion of risks and 
the ways they might be mitigated. These are often enough for guiding 
the routine relationships and business of government in a set-and-forget 
manner, but they are not sufficient for managing situations where some 
vital national interest is genuinely threatened. This is where policy falls 
short of strategy in defining the interrelationship of ends, ways and means, 
and where policy-makers fall short of the requirement for strategists 
to make plans in an interactive and competitive context. The dominance 
of strategic policy over strategy is also how we also continue to risk a ‘rush 
to action’ that favours rapid and highly visible military commitments 
without fully defined, longer-term national aims or integration with other 
elements of national power.
In a crisis, doing something is often seen as a common imperative. 
The high-readiness of military assets makes them available early in any 
crisis, but there are other reasons that government tends to reach for the 
military first. Military units and formations are structured to operate 
and sustain themselves independently if necessary. They are also trained 
to operate with restrictions, limitations and caveats on their authorities 
and activities—and have a culture that anticipates constant shifts in 
guidance. Government decisions can be quickly turned into orders and 
military forces moved out. Other elements of national power are rarely as 
responsive. Diplomatic agreements must be negotiated and coordinated. 
Informational activities can have immediate effects but can also require 
broad consultation and careful timing in ways that preclude immediacy. 
Economic or fiscal measures require agreement and can have unpredictable 
(and often delayed) effects. If being seen to take timely action is a priority, 
the military is the instrument of national power that can act before other 
elements of national power are effectively brought to bear. However, 
the non-integrated use of military force rarely delivers sound long-term 
solutions to a crisis.
The example of RAMSI demonstrates a comprehensive whole-of-
government attempt to restore security, law and order, good governance, 
a functioning justice sector and sustainable economy concurrently to 
a failing nation. After a decade, RAMSI has delivered sound results and has 
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Solomon Islands once again effectively managing its own destiny, albeit 
with some way still to go. In Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, 
a more linear—if not traditional—approach of military action with 
sequential transition to other aspects of national development sees Iraq 
and Afghanistan still dependent on international aid and assistance more 
than a decade after the initial military-led interventions and uncertain 
whether their governance and justice sectors can become effective or their 
economies can ever be self-sustaining. A bias for military action can mean 
a bias for incomplete solutions to international issues. Military action—
from humanitarian support to warfighting—without complementary 
other-agency actions risks a limited prospect of resolution and can 
prolong, or worsen, some circumstances.
The final concern with defaulting to military responses without 
comprehensive guiding strategies is a moral one. Just as the use of 
force by governments should be a last resort rather than a first impulse, 
governments have an obligation to put members of the armed forces at 
risk of injury or death only for justifiable reasons. In his Quarterly Essay, 
‘Firing line: Australia’s road to war’, James Brown portrays our national 
mechanisms for going to war as lacking the necessary institutional rigour.5 
While he focuses on the way such ‘grave’ decisions are made—rather than 
how strategy is managed—his concern is that these decisions should be 
grounded in public trust and democratic legitimacy. Aside from the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, contemporary commitments of military forces have had 
firm legitimacy within international laws and conventions. However, those 
same commitments, including combat roles, have generally maintained 
bipartisan support and have not been the subject of open debate within 
parliament before deployment.
Getting it right
The public have, in general terms, accepted that the use of the military 
has been appropriate and necessary even as Australian casualties mounted 
in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. Although Australia is unlikely 
to experience a Chilcot-style enquiry regarding Australia’s path into 
Afghanistan, further deterioration in the circumstances in Oruzgan 
Province might provoke deeper thought about what Australia’s strategy 
5  James Brown, ‘Firing line: Australia’s road to war’, Quarterly Essay 62, 2016, pp. 56–8.
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was and what the sacrifices there achieved. It is also likely that there will be 
a greater call for justification to families of the fallen. Our current process 
for developing national strategy and for deciding to commit forces to 
combat do not deliver clear articulation of why physical risks are necessary 
and just how much we are willing to sacrifice. Attempts to define this 
before combat commitments would likely demand clearer communication 
of overarching strategy in support of policies and a clearer statement of 
what military forces are required to achieve—beyond supporting policy 
by deployment alone. Military force should always be a political means, 
not a political end.
The next half-century promises to be one of profound global change. In 
Australia’s own region, we are witnessing the rise of China and India and 
challenges to a US-led, unipolar order that has maintained relative stability 
for the last 70 years. While India and China’s economies are growing, no 
Western democratic economies—including Australia’s—indicate similar 
sustainable growth paths. The most significant expansion in working-
age populations will be centred on the African continent in this same 
timeframe. Access to sophisticated military weaponry and technology is 
becoming cheaper and easier even for non-state entities. Whether we like 
it or not, Australia’s current relative demographic, economic and military 
advantages will decline in the decades ahead. Addressing this will require 
deliberate and careful efforts on a national level. Policy, planning and 
execution of national strategies will be required to retain or maximise 
Australia’s advantages.
Strategy, by its nature, is ultimately implemented in a competitive 
environment and should assume that competitors and adversaries will 
bring all relevant capabilities into play to achieve desired outcomes. 
Strategy should also assume that setbacks will occur. Because strategy 
is competitive, not all its elements can be resolved or discussed in the 
public domain. While policy objectives might be the subject of open 
debate, strategies require concealed elements such as which assets are to 
be employed (means), what tactics will be employed (ways) and what 
risk tolerances will be acceptable in achieving national goals (aims). 
Coordination of the elements of national power is difficult during strategy 
formulation and can be even more so during implementation. A further 
complication is the requirement to integrate strategies either with allies 
or coalition strategies and with non-government organisations. Each of 
these requires specialist practitioners and continued attention, which are 
not well met by ad hoc mechanisms and relationships.
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As discussed, no area of government is presently tasked to look ahead and 
to recommend strategy beyond the realm of policy. This needs to change if 
Australia is to maintain our current influence in an increasingly complex 
and competitive global order. The successful example of OSB initially 
necessitated the appointment of a three-star military officer to develop and 
implement an effective strategy. This has since evolved with the creation 
of Border Protection Command integrated into the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection to manage the full gamut of customs 
and border security concerns. Early successes notwithstanding, achieving 
the stated policy objective of ceasing unauthorised maritime arrivals to 
Australia requires the continued active participation of nearly all other 
government departments, including the stewardship of the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) during implementation of the 
related strategy. The myriad emerging challenges to each of Australia’s 
elements of national power alone—diplomatic, informational, military 
and economic—in a world of transnational threats and shifting power 
balances requires national strategies guiding employment of capabilities 
beyond those that any one government department can deliver.
In ‘Firing line’, James Brown argues for the establishment of a body to 
oversee the commitment of military forces to war.6 Although this might 
be beneficial, the incidence of such commitments is fortunately rare and 
could be handled in an ad hoc or as required manner. The requirement 
for national strategies is an enduring one, and it is extraordinary that 
no entity exists to manage this in Australia. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
our closest major allies, the United States and United Kingdom, have 
come to the same conclusion: that they also lack effective mechanisms 
in this regard. A 2014 RAND report, Improving Strategic Competence: 
Lessons from 13 Years of War, concluded that the United States suffers from 
a  lack of civilian–military mechanisms for developing national security 
strategy.7 As a result, they have conducted military campaigns without 
an adequate overarching political strategy. Similarly, a 2010 UK House 
of Commons report, Who Does UK National Strategy?, identified little 
evidence of sustained strategic thinking or a civilian–military mechanism 
6  Ibid., p. 56.
7  Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille and Raphael 
S. Cohen, Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War, RAND, Santa Monica, 2014.
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for strategic analysis and assessment.8 The report went on to cite a lack 
of development or education of strategic thinkers within academia or 
government institutions. A similar audit in Australia would identify that 
we are formally no better off.
To better face this future, Australia would be well advised to develop an 
Office of National Strategy. It is unlikely that the government would see 
fit to expand government bureaucracy and establish another entity akin 
to the Office of National Assessments (ONA), but this would be optimal. 
Non-government bodies such as think tanks might be commissioned to 
develop strategy but are not well suited to managing its implementation 
in a continuous sense. An ONA-like organisation could provide the 
ability to develop classified strategies for government approval—either 
on their own initiative or at government direction—and could assist in 
managing implementation with regular feedback to Cabinet or the NSC. 
An organisation of similar size to ONA could provide sustainable career 
paths for a growing body of trained strategists from all agencies. Failing 
this, the next best alternative would be to establish a team within PM&C 
that could convene as required. This group, comprising trained strategists 
from a range of agencies and disciplines, could provide more consistent 
oversight of national strategy development and implementation than 
is presently available to the government. Either of these entities would 
enhance Australia’s current ability to prepare for the future beyond the 
predominantly short-term focus of governments or the tides of passing 
popular sentiment. An Australian Office of National Strategy could also 
ensure that more fulsome decisions are taken about committing Australian 
military forces and with greater regard to the integration of other elements 
of national power.
Muddling on
Australia’s circumstances will, in all likelihood, become more complicated 
and challenging in the next few decades. Australia has many relative 
advantages both regionally and globally. These will progressively erode 
without strategies that seek to maximise the advantages inherent in 
effectively applying the instruments of our national power. Without 
8  Public Administration Select Committee, Who Does UK National Strategy? First Report of Session 
2010–11, UK House of Commons, Stationery Office, London, 18 October 2010; publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435.pdf (retrieved 29 January 2018).
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a body to develop and implement national strategies, response to crises 
tends to be reactive rather than planned. This, paired with a bias for 
action, risks the military—as the most responsive and visible instrument 
of government—being deployed without clear definition of the intended 
purpose or being fully integrated with the other elements of national 
power—and unlikely to deliver an enduring solution. In Australia’s 
case, incremental ‘muddling  through’ has not resulted in circumstances 
as dire as those criticised in the United Kingdom’s Chilcot Report. 
However, in the enduring absence of  a formal mechanism for national 
strategy, the potential is there if Australia were to become embroiled in an 
existential crisis.
To re-emphasise, the commitment of military forces should be a component 
of strategy and not an end itself. Force has its place as an enabler of policy—
but force alone cannot deliver enduring solutions. Its application should 
be one means among others to deliver sustainable solutions. Accordingly, 
national strategies should be just that—strategies—and not strategic 
policy in the guise of strategy. We need strategy as the bridge from policy 
to action. Military forces should deliver strategic aims due to necessity, 
not convenience. To ensure this, we need to foster a greater understanding 
of the elements of national power and their interrelationships, including 
the limitations on the utility of military forces. We need to ensure that the 
strategic dialogue between politicians, bureaucrats, military officers and 
the public is informed and frank.
Australia has more frequently employed military power appropriately 
in concert with other agencies in recent years. However, the temptation 
remains to send the military when rapid action is required. Systemic 
risk remains that we can race from policy to action without a strategy. 
While remaining policy driven, we must understand that policy alone 
is not strategy and that a bias for action is not strategic. Our bias should 
be for action through national strategies that integrate all the relevant 
elements of national power. We need to help governments to be strategic. 
To that end, we need greater investment in bodies to develop strategy, 
create more strategists and grow a national strategic culture that can best 
protect Australia’s future. This will also help Australia find its sweet-spot 





The prospects for a Great Power 
‘grand bargain’ in East Asia
Evelyn Goh
The future shape and form of the East Asian regional order presents one 
of the most pressing concerns for Australian strategic policy planners and 
analysts, who have also contributed significantly to associated regional 
and international debates and policy initiatives.1 Ultimately, strategic 
efforts are defined by their ultimate ‘big picture’ goals. From the broad 
perspective of cultivating regional order in East Asia, one key goal must 
be to forge a feasible and sustainable ‘grand bargain’ among its resident 
great powers.
For at least the last two-and-a-half decades, East Asia has been plagued 
by multiple uncertainties, especially regarding the economic and security 
implications of China’s resurgence and the durability of US preponderance 
and leadership in the region. The latter is currently the greatest of these 
‘unknown unknowns’ following Donald Trump’s occupation of the White 
House in 2017. Moreover, these questions sit alongside other important 
enduring regional uncertainties, particularly Japan’s ‘abnormal’ military 
condition, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the divisions between 
the two Koreas and between Taiwan and the mainland. In recent years, key 
voices on both the Chinese and US sides especially have mooted notions 
1  A slightly different version of this chapter was first published as Evelyn Goh, ‘Is a “grand bargain” 
the way forward in North-East Asia?’, Global Asia, Winter 2016, pp. 58–65.
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of closer collaboration and joint great power management in response to 
these multiple uncertainties—for instance, the idea of Washington and 
Beijing acting as a ‘G2’ to tackle global problems, or President Xi Jinping’s 
concept of a ‘new model of major power relations’ with the United States. 
But the necessary foundation for any such strategic collaboration must be 
new fundamental mutual agreements between the United States, China 
and other major East Asian states. In this vein, a number of scholars and 
analysts have begun to discuss more seriously the prospects for negotiating 
‘grand bargains’ of one type or another that might help to ease these 
uncertainties by creating the foundation for a stable new regional order. 
There are two notable examples.
First, in 2012, Hugh White published a subsequently much-debated 
book, The China Choice, calling for Washington to share power seriously 
with Beijing and suggesting that this should take the form of a new 
concert of powers involving the United States, China, Japan, India and 
possibly Indonesia. The book pays more attention to making the case 
for why this radical choice for accommodation is necessary than how it 
should be put into practice; however, in a small section, White lists seven 
‘essential understandings’ that the two sides must agree upon. In essence, 
these would be the basis for a new grand bargain between them. The list 
focuses on mutual legitimacy: treating each other as equals, recognising 
each other’s domestic political systems, respecting each other’s national 
interests and right to develop armed forces sufficient to defend them, 
committing to resolve differences peacefully, agreeing on the norms of 
legitimate conduct, mutual willingness to counter attempts to dominate, 
and ensuring the ability to sell this to domestic audiences.2 White does 
not provide more substantive explanations for what the power-sharing 
bargain between the United States and China might look like, but the one 
controversial condition he does mention is that a regional concert would 
have to include a more ‘normal’, independently militarised (and nuclear-
armed) Japan.
The second example is Charles Glaser’s 2015 argument that the United 
States ought to adopt vis-à-vis rising China a ‘limited geopolitical 
accommodation to avoid conflict’.3 He specifically proposes that 
Washington should negotiate a ‘grand bargain’ that would trade the 
2  Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2012, 
pp. 137–41.
3  Charles L. Glaser, ‘A US–China grand bargain? The hard choice between military competition 
and accommodation’, International Security 39, no. 4, 2015, p. 49.
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cessation of the US commitment to defend Taiwan in exchange for China’s 
peaceful settlement on ‘fair’ terms of its territorial disputes in the East 
and South China Seas and Beijing’s official acceptance of the US military 
security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward deployment. 
He argues that such a grand bargain would not be neatly symmetrical, 
but could be acceptable if the two sides can agree to ‘trade across multiple 
issues, making both sides better off, but not necessarily equally’.4
Apart from generating much polemical controversy, both of these 
examples help to advance the debate on US strategy towards contemporary 
China if only by forcing us to consider more seriously the terms under 
which a scenario of ‘negotiated change’ (as opposed to a war-torn power 
transition) might occur.5 In this sense, the debate these works aimed to 
fuel is about the content of a putative grand bargain between the United 
States and China.
To contextualise the debate about a possible new grand bargain for the 
analytical and policy challenges of strategic diplomacy in North-East Asia, 
I offer three entry points for discussion in what follows. First, I discuss 
the comparative advantages of adopting a grand bargain framework to 
understanding how a new regional order may be negotiated. Second, with 
the reminder that prior strategic bargains already exist in the wider Asia-
Pacific region, I consider how these pre-existing bargains could interact 
with the proposals for a new grand bargain. Finally, I briefly review some 
recent key Chinese ideas about such bargains to highlight the obstacles 
and opportunities faced by strategic diplomats seeking to broker a new 
grand bargain in East Asia.
The ‘grand bargain’ approach
At its most basic, a grand bargain between two states may be understood 
in a contractual fashion: it consists of a bundle of agreements by which 
state X gives up something of significant strategic value to itself in 
exchange for state Y committing to something that is of equal or greater 
strategic value. The overall purpose would be to bring about more clarity 
and predictability vis-à-vis their goals and interactions.
4  Ibid., p. 79.
5  For an earlier analysis of negotiated change scenarios compared to power transition, see Evelyn 
Goh, ‘The US–China relationship and Asia-Pacific security: Negotiating change’, Asian Security, 1, 
no. 3, 2005, pp. 216–44.
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A ‘grand bargain’ is based on the notion that coexistence among states 
(and especially major powers) is built upon reciprocal commitments, or 
fundamental political compromises, which allow some form of strategic 
exchange and interdependence to develop. Between great powers, grand 
bargains in their most advanced form must entail some form of negotiated 
constraints to their exercise of power. Grand bargains basically involve 
implicit or explicit agreement about the mutually acceptable terms on 
which peaceful relations can be conducted. These include understandings 
about recognition and status, mutual rights and responsibilities, mutual 
spheres of influence, terms of exchange and conditions of restraint. It is on 
this basis that scholars sometimes argue that the United States and China, 
or China and Japan, will need to negotiate a grand bargain between 
themselves and even with other key states in East Asia for regional security 
and stability to prevail.6
In general, the big advantage of a ‘bargain’ approach to understanding 
and influencing great power relations is its innate relationality: the 
reciprocal and transactional assumptions underpinning bargains obliges 
us to examine and try to reconcile the preferences, goals and tactics of 
each of the parties involved. This sits in contrast to the one-sided notions 
of containment or appeasement that often seem to dominate debates 
about how to respond to China’s rise, for example. Thinking about 
bargains involves taking seriously what the other side wants and values. 
Moreover, a grand bargain approach helps us to grasp the complexity of 
international orders. On the one hand, it connotes linkage across issue 
areas (as Glaser suggests). But it also crucially entails a systemic perspective 
beyond bilateral relationships; for instance, a grand bargain lens should 
additionally allow us to probe the broader regional and historical contexts 
that clearly affect the attractiveness, viability and scope of any putative 
new US–China bargain.
6  See Evelyn Goh, ‘Japan, China, and the Great Power bargain in East Asia’, East Asia 
Institute Fellows Working Paper Series no. 32, November 2011, www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_
report/2011103118375220.pdf (retrieved 29 January 2018). The key related approaches on 
institutional bargains, peace settlements and social compacts are respectively G. John Ikenberry, After 
Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of International Order after Major Wars, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001; Ian Clark, The Post–Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; and Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy 
and Transition in Post–Cold War East Asia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
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From such a starting point, we may identify at least two issues critical to 
the possibility of a grand bargain in contemporary East Asia: the effects 
of existing strategic bargains, and Chinese notions of the acceptable terms 
for a bargain with the United States. Both these issues affect how desirable 
proposals for grand bargains like White’s and Glaser’s might be from the 
points of view of China and crucial US allies in the region.
Strategic bargains in the status quo ante
Strategic bargains form the sinews of international order, and while they 
are most likely to be struck at critical junctures such as following crises 
or wars, once struck they do not simply disappear but continue to evolve 
and might be renegotiated. As such, anything we may propose in the 
contemporary setting would in fact be a new grand bargain between the 
United States and China. It would not be created from scratch, because the 
status quo ante is already marked by a series of ‘grand’, regional, trilateral 
and bilateral bargains. This is a fundamentally important point—it shows 
that Washington and Beijing (and other East Asian states, for that matter) 
have been and are capable of striking bargains. But this understanding 
also presents constraints for any new proposed bargain because it will 
involve revising or renegotiating previous, disintegrating or continuing 
bargains between the United States and China, and between them and 
Taiwan as well as Japan.
The most important systemic context for a new bargain is the post–Cold 
War economic security grand bargain between China and the United 
States. The economic side of this bargain is crucial but undergoing 
a difficult transformation. In simple terms, the bargain is based on 
intensified interdependence underpinned by the US dollar as the world’s 
reserve currency. Like other supporter states, China has gained access 
to the US market in exchange for its undervalued currency, which in 
turn supports massive US state spending. Essentially, this is a bargain 
that China and other key lenders and exporters keep accumulating US 
dollars while the United States keeps consuming foreign goods and 
services.7 As Michael Mastanduno argues, this grand systemic bargain has 
been fatally undermined by the global financial crisis, which will force 
7  Michael Mastanduno, ‘System maker and privilege taker: US power and the international 
political economy’, World Politics, 60, no. 1, 2009, pp. 121–54; Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: 
China, the United States and Power Balancing in East Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012.
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the United States to eventually draw down domestic consumption and 
borrowing, and consequently also reduce its tolerance for China’s export-
led growth strategy. In parallel, since the crisis, China has redoubled its 
focus on developing its domestic consumer market, and tried to diversify 
its foreign reserves holdings away from overdependence on US dollars. 
Both these trends are reducing their mutual interdependence, and, as 
their ‘special economic relationship’ becomes less special, so too will their 
mutual strategic restraint be dampened and their security relationship 
further strained.8 Given this trend, China’s incentives to strike a new 
asymmetrical bargain with the United States, like the one Glaser suggests, 
are unclear.
On the security side, any new US–China grand bargain would have to 
grapple with another central but disintegrating previous bargain. During 
the Cold War, the East Asian order was underpinned by the alliance 
between the United States and Japan in which Washington extended 
its security umbrella over Tokyo in exchange for Japan’s disarmament, 
pacification and guaranteed alignment with the ‘free world’. In effect, this 
bargain saw the United States stepping into the breach between Japan 
and China as an ‘outside arbiter play[ing] a policing role’. By making 
Japanese defence dependent on itself, the United States extended a ‘dual 
reassurance’, simultaneously guaranteeing China and Japan their security 
against each other, obviating the need for them to engage in direct security 
competition.9 After 1995, the revitalisation of the US–Japan alliance 
based on Japan playing a more active regional and global military role 
seemed to undermine Washington’s ring-holding ability between Japan 
and China. Beijing began to regard the US–Japan alliance less as a means 
to constrain than to facilitate Japan’s remilitarisation, a view reinforced by 
the central role of the alliance in the more recent US ‘rebalance’ to Asia.10 
There is also a growing view within China that the United States used the 
cover of the alliance to ‘illicitly transfer’ sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands to Japan during the 1970s.11
8  Michael Mastanduno, ‘Order and change in world politics: The financial crisis and the 
breakdown of the US–China grand bargain’, in Power, Order and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John 
Ikenberry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 162–91.
9  Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the US–Japan alliance and the security dilemma in East Asia’, 
International Security, 23, no. 4, 1999, p. 50; Hugh White, ‘Why war in Asia remains thinkable’, 
Survival 50, no. 6, 2008–09, pp. 85–104.
10  For a fuller explanation of this shift, and how Sino-Japanese normative tensions feature within 
it, see Goh, Struggle for Order, Chapter 5.
11  Amy King, ‘Where does Japan fit in China’s “new type of great power relations”?’, Asan Forum, 
24 March 2014.
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Using the lens of these disintegrating existing strategic bargains highlights 
the major unresolved sticking point of Japan’s increasingly contested role 
in the regional order. While Glaser does take Japan into account, his main 
concern is whether ending the US defence commitment to Taiwan will 
negatively affect the credibility of the US alliance with Japan.12 But the 
US–Japan alliance has already changed in character—and from China’s 
point of view to the detriment of a previous bargain. Thus, any proposed 
new Sino-American bargain that takes the US–Japan alliance as a constant 
while asking both China and Japan to make concessions in their territorial 
disputes is unlikely to be acceptable. Many Chinese no doubt would 
prefer to continue to characterise Japan as a second-rate ‘American lackey’, 
but increasingly under President Xi Jinping’s ‘striving for achievement’ 
strategy, these two allies are being differentiated, with the United States 
viewed as China’s only strategic competitor and Japan as one of its key 
‘hostile countries’.13 Against this background, the assumption that Japan’s 
‘normalisation’ is an inevitable prerequisite for regional power-sharing is 
too casual. Arguably, there is now more than an unintentional security 
dilemma between China and Japan,14 and their growing conflicts of 
interest and nationalism are likely to create an insecurity spiral that will 
undermine the prospects for a US–China grand bargain that involves any 
compromise between China and Japan.
Pre-existing and evolving bargains also surround the issue of Taiwan that 
is central to Glaser’s proposed strategy of territorial accommodation. 
On Taiwan, China and the United States achieved a limited bargain during 
the 1979 normalisation based on the principle of ‘one China’. Beijing 
was accorded diplomatic recognition and authority over all China, and 
Washington recognised that Taiwan is part of China and relinquished 
the right to encourage Taiwanese independence (although not its right 
to sell arms to Taiwan). While they agreed on the peaceful means of 
resolving the problem, they disagreed on the necessity of reunification 
as the eventual outcome.15 Since then, China and the United States have 
each tried to negotiate alternative bargains with Taiwan, partly to stabilise 
12  Glaser, ‘A US–China grand bargain?’, p. 77.
13  Yan Xuetong, ‘From keeping a low profile to striving for achievement’, Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 7, no. 2, 2014, p. 170.
14  Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Racing toward tragedy? China’s rise, military competition 
in the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma’, International Security 39, no. 2, 2014, pp. 52–91.
15  See Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: US–Taiwan Relations since 1942, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
2004; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2009.
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the remaining ambiguities of the status quo ante. The rival models come 
across clearly in an illuminating exchange between a Chinese and an 
American scholar, Jia Qingguo and Alan Romberg.16 Beijing’s offer is in 
the form of the ‘one country, two systems’ track of reunification, whereby 
Taiwan would trade independence for the preservation of its separate 
political system (exactly how is unspecified) and even control of its own 
armed forces.17 The current US bargain with Taiwan aims at preserving 
the status quo, exchanging the US defence commitment and arms sales 
for Taiwan’s ‘three nos’ to war, unification or independence. Ceasing US 
defence for Taiwan as Glaser suggests will mean not only withdrawing 
the US bargain but also making the Chinese one unnecessary, thus 
changing the potential terms of reunification. Understanding this context 
is important because it suggests that while Taiwan is central to China’s 
security and national identity, Beijing might not place as high a value 
on potential US accommodation on this issue as Glaser suggests. Within 
the Chinese discourse, there is grave doubt anyway about whether the 
‘Taiwan card’ is really that powerful any more in the relationship with 
the United States, given that China thinks that time is on its side.18 Thus, 
while accommodation on Taiwan is essential, it is unlikely to be sufficient 
to make Glaser’s grand bargain acceptable to the Chinese.19
16  Qingguo Jia and Alan D. Romberg, ‘Taiwan and Tibet’, in Debating China: The US–China 
Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, 
pp. 176–97.
17  Ibid., p. 181. On this ‘paradigm of persuasion’ adopted by the Ma Administration after 2008, 
see Richard C. Bush, Unchartered Strait: The Future of China–Taiwan Relations, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, DC, 2013.
18  Pan Fei, ‘Zhongmei zai yatai diqu de zhanlüe hudong yu Obama zhengfu de duitai zhengce’ 
[Sino-American strategic interaction in the Asia Pacific and the Obama Administration’s Taiwan 
policy], Taihai Yanjiu [Taiwan Straits Studies], February 2015, pp. 76–84; Robert Sutter, Taiwan’s 
Future: Narrowing Straits, National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, May 2011.
19  There is of course a deeper problem here in the tendency to objectify actors and political entities 
in the region to the extent that would support assumptions that issues, territories and peoples may 
be horse-traded in a fungible manner. This problem is echoed in other suggestions––for example, 
that the United States might cut a bargain with China by ‘foreswearing any intervention in a Sino-
Japanese conflict over the [Senkaku] islands in return for Chinese commitments to work on a legally 
binding code of conduct for the South China Sea dispute, or increased efforts to get North Korea to 
reduce or even eradicate its nuclear arsenal’ (William Choong, ‘The ties that divide: History, honour 
and territory in Sino-Japanese relations’, Adelphi 445, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 2014).
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Regional and Chinese ideas about 
strategic bargains
Within China, a debate is growing slowly but steadily in the transition 
away from Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui policy of biding time to 
develop comprehensive national power towards questions of what kind 
of great power China should be and whether China ought to support 
or challenge the existing order. But this is still a gradual awakening, 
and, without more coherence in narrowing down the parameters of 
this struggle for identity, power-sharing with the United States cannot 
be an option seriously favoured by opinion leaders against the backdrop 
of growing popular nationalism within China. Other countries in East 
Asia, meanwhile, either sustain national security identities that feed upon 
the assurance of continued US primacy, ground their national security 
strategies upon at least some degree of US–China rivalry, or seek to retain 
some strategic autonomy by forestalling great power domination. For all 
three reasons, any new bargain premised upon a potential US–China 
condominium is distasteful. Looking beyond North-East Asia, in South-
East Asia, it is hard to imagine effusive support for the concert of great 
powers White suggests, which would by definition exclude the majority of 
these small states. This was already evident in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) successful attempts to undermine an earlier 
Australian initiative to construct a major power–centred Asia-Pacific 
Community. Once again, picking out Indonesia as a subregional power 
only elicits alarm and resistance from this collection of states, which have 
expended so much political and institutional effort to create for ASEAN a 
‘driving seat’ in regionalism precisely to avoid great power dominance that 
would undermine their autonomy.
Returning to North-East Asia, the ideational, domestic political and 
strategic complexities that many scholars so vividly underscore on the 
US side are replicated on China’s part. First (and perhaps helpfully for 
anyone inclined to propose new bargains), the idea of strategic bargains 
comes naturally to many Chinese foreign policy interlocutors and 
their counterparts. For example, both China and Japan see the recent 
intensification of their territorial dispute in the East China Sea as resulting 
from the other side reneging on their 1972 normalisation agreement to 
set aside the dispute: the Chinese perceive Tokyo to have reneged on it in 
2012 when the Noda Government bought the Senkaku Islands, while the 
Japanese see Beijing as having reneged earlier in the 2000s by significantly 
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increasing paramilitary and military operations in the area and allowing 
more aggressive forms of confrontation on the ground. In the South 
China Sea too, the Chinese see then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
2010 diplomatic intervention in publicly criticising Chinese assertiveness 
as reneging on US professions of neutrality, while many Americans viewed 
reports of Chinese pronouncements about the area as a ‘core interest’ as 
evidence of an expanding Chinese sphere of claimed influence reneging 
on professions of ‘peaceful rise’.
Second, there is a Chinese discourse considering what a strategic bargain 
with the United States might look like, particularly since talk of a ‘G2’ and 
since President Xi Jinping introduced his notion of ‘a new model of major 
power relations’. In a fairly typical liberal vein, Wu Xinbo argues that ‘it 
is time for China and the United States to try to reach an understanding 
on the evolving regional architecture through candid dialogue’, one 
encompassing ‘more equal relations between the two sides of the Pacific’.20 
The theme of a more equal exchange is echoed in a recent Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences project on US–China relations, which states 
that China would support a ‘positive leadership role’ for the United States 
if the latter would also support a ‘more positive and vigorous role in East 
Asia’ that ‘leaves more room for maneuver for China in terms of claiming 
territorial rights and military development’. Specifically, the United States 
needs to ‘recognise China’s sovereignty claims within its historical rights’, 
‘avoid getting involved in the territorial disputes between China and its 
neighbors’, and ‘should never interfere militarily in the disputes and crises 
between China and its neighbors’.21
At least one Chinese scholar, Shi Yinhong, has explicitly discussed what 
a more equal bargain between China and the United States would look 
like at a broader grand strategic level. His proposition is for a ‘peaceful 
“final settlement”’ based on ‘selective preponderance’ in complementary 
realms.22 The United States would accept China’s leading position in 
Asia based on its superior economic size, trade volume and regional 
20  Wu Xinbo and Michael Green, ‘Regional security roles and challenges’ in Hachigian, Debating 
China, p. 202.
21  Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, ‘Zhongmei xinxing 
daguo guanxi jianshe: Zhanlüe renshi yu lujing xuanze’ [New type of great power relations between 
the US and China: Understanding strategy and future choices], Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu [Journal 
of International Relations], no. 6, 2014, pp. 18–19.
22  Yinhong Shi, ‘The United States, East Asia and Chinese “triumphalism”’, in China’s Rise and 
Regional Integration in East Asia, ed. Yong Wook Lee and Key-young San, Routledge, Abingdon, 
2014, p. 48.
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influence; mutual deterrence based on China having military parity and 
even marginal superiority in China’s offshore areas (with Taiwan’s eastern 
shore being the ‘prudent’ line); peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the 
mainland; and China ‘maintaining strategic space in a substantial but still 
narrow span of the western Pacific’. In return, China would accept US 
overall military superiority globally and in the central and western Pacific, 
and preponderant US influence in other world regions.
Conclusion
Strategic thinking needs to start from a consideration of the desired ends 
of policy. In terms of order in East Asia, one indispensable goal must 
be some modus vivendi among the major powers. As this brief overview 
suggests, there are some significant hurdles to be negotiated if we look 
slightly further down the line in considering how attractive current US-
oriented propositions of a new grand bargain might be to the Chinese 
audience. At the same time, these proposals would have to contend 
with the continuing attempts at renegotiating and contesting a number 
of bargains underpinning key bilateral relationships and regional order 
in East Asia. Any form of negotiated change in the US–China bilateral 
relationship will necessitate significant reversals to both US and Chinese 
mindsets and ambitions. The same huge challenge faces attempts to 
consider deep-seated change in the China–Japan relationship.
The bottom line is that a grand bargain is possible in East Asia—but 
it will entail sea changes in attitudes and expectations on every side. 
History suggests that groups of states find it very difficult to undertake 
transformational changes like this without the radical impetus (or shock) 
of systemic war. But such exercises in strategic thinking can help, at least 
by creating opportunities to stimulate what often seems to be the 
unthinkable vis-à-vis each other in Washington and Beijing, and between 
Beijing and Tokyo: non-military cooperative modes of security behaviour 
and non-zero-sum strategic interactions with each other. Generating 
a plethora of ideas and encouraging constructive debate about these issues 
is essential because, ultimately, a stable regional order will depend upon 





Old wine in new bottles? 
The continued relevance of 
Cold War strategic concepts
Robert Ayson
Cold War strategic concepts played a significant part in my time as 
a  student at The Australian National University (ANU). Arriving in 
Canberra in the early part of 1988, the penultimate year of the multi-
decade struggle between East and West, I joined the smaller predecessor 
to today’s much larger master’s program. The core course in that original 
master’s degree was dominated by a subject that has largely disappeared 
from today’s teaching in strategic studies. This was the strategic nuclear 
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and, in our case, 
there was a particular focus on the development of US nuclear strategy.
I owe a great deal to those half dozen nuclear strategy lectures and to the 
wonderful academic who delivered them: Professor Desmond Ball. In his 
classes, Professor Ball examined in detail the stability of that superpower 
nuclear balance. And it was the concept of stability in the Cold War period, 
and specifically Tom Schelling’s work on that idea, that formed the topic 
of my PhD thesis at King’s. Had it not been for the encouragement from 
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) academics who had taught 
me here in Canberra, I expect I would have had little chance of working 
in London with Lawrence Freedman, whose enthusiasm for the history 
of strategic ideas continues to be a major inspiration to me.
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With that background, you might expect me to choose stability as my 
chosen strategic concept from the Cold War. That possibility did cross 
my mind. But instead I will look at something stemming from another 
topic we covered in that 1988 core course. In this case, however, there was 
but one lecture. The theme was crisis management, and our teacher that 
day was Coral Bell.
Crisis management among the great powers, often against the risk of 
nuclear annihilation if these crises were mismanaged, runs through a 
good deal of Bell’s work. In reading her slim volume, The Conventions 
of Crisis, while I was on sabbatical here in 2013, one concept stood out 
to me as an approach to understanding the management of Great Power 
crises. This was an idea that Bell said she had borrowed from the Soviet 
specialist Marshall Shulman.1 It was to view the relationship between the 
main Cold War protagonists, the US and the Soviet Union, as an adverse 
partnership. And that concept is my focus in this chapter.
So what does, or perhaps what did, an adverse partnership consist of, and 
why was it important? As for the first question, an adverse partnership is 
pretty much what its two component words in combination suggest it to 
be. It is to regard adversaries, even when they are very serious rivals, as 
possible partners. It is to suggest that two or more great powers, whose 
relationship is characterised by deep competition, can nonetheless also 
find ways to work together, presumably on the basis that they have 
common interests as well as conflicting ones. A primary focus for their 
limited cooperation is the conscious management of the conflict that 
exists between them, avoiding its escalation into a situation that both 
of them will regret.
At the same time, we should not get too carried away, and Bell was 
generally not one to do so. An adverse partnership also implies that even 
when we do see great powers working together, we should not be fooled 
into thinking that they are no longer adversaries. These partners remain 
adversaries. Their limited cooperation is much more about coexistence 
than friendship. There is nothing harmonious here.
1  See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Oxford University 
Press for Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 1971, p. 50n.
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By ‘adverse partnership’ [she explained], I do not mean to imply anything 
particularly cordial, trusting or friendly: only a consciousness, between 
the dominant powers, that they have solid common interests as well as 
sharp conflicting interests.2 
The main point is that cooperation can coexist with competition. Neither 
one of these facts of international life needs to rule out the other.
And why is the idea of an adverse partnership important? Let me give two 
answers to that question. One applies to our own fading memories of the 
Cold War period, memories that we now seldom have in common with 
the majority of our students, who were born some years after the Berlin 
Wall was torn down. When I ask my undergraduate students for their first 
political memory, for some of them it is 9/11. But some of them do not 
even remember that far back.
For their benefit, it concerns me when the Cold War is stereotyped because 
of academic laziness or because of the simplification of complex history to 
serve geopolitical agendas. Academically, I do not take much relief from 
any view, however widely accepted it may be, that the United States and 
China are not sliding into a US–Soviet-style Cold War. To establish that 
position is no reason to take our eyes away from the still hazardous strategic 
competition between Beijing and Washington. Geopolitically, we should 
be wary of arguments that drawing Cold War parallels is a no-go zone. 
For the United States, acknowledging the possibility of a Cold War with 
China may also be to endorse containment as a central Cold War strategy. 
For China, the lesson from Russia’s experience is that a cold war can end 
with the dissolution of the contained power. Moreover, for great powers 
like China and Russia that remain outside the US alliance system, there 
is the convenient argument that these alliances reflect an obsolete Cold 
War mentality. Most of these positions say much more about political 
preferences than they do about accurate perceptions of the situation.
Amid these politically charged battles for the interpretation of the post-
war order, it is not surprising if some of our students see the Cold War 
as a period of unrelenting zero-sum competition. But the idea that the 
principal adversaries of that era can be regarded as partners as well as 
competitors suggests that this view is false. This is one reason why thinking 
about adverse partnerships is important. To regard Soviet Russia and the 
United States as adverse partners is one way of reminding ourselves, and 
2  Ibid., p. 50.
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our students, that Cold War tensions and anxieties waxed and waned. 
It helps us remember that, although these tensions were very serious and 
dangerous, they did not lead inevitably to war.
Above all, this picture of Great Power relations reminds us that in some 
situations rivals can actually manage their conflict. For those of us who like 
to emphasise the role of agency in strategy, and to suggest that strategic 
actors have choices that can affect the choices of others, the notion of an 
adverse partnership becomes even more significant.
Second, the conception of a US–Soviet adverse partnership is important 
for its place in debates that went on during the Cold War. We forget 
how revolutionary it was to argue that the two supposedly implacable foes 
could also be seen as partners. The United States and Soviet Union were 
after all geopolitical, ideological, economic, cultural, military, diplomatic 
and sporting rivals. The notion that they could also be partners rested 
uneasily alongside that fact.
This argument was perhaps not quite so hard for Coral Bell to make; 
after all, The Conventions of Crisis was published in 1971, by which time 
the short-lived superpower détente had well and truly taken hold. This 
was a year before the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I) talks, 
including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, would be completed 
successfully, a formal sign of the ability of the two superpowers to set 
limits on their nuclear competition. Washington and Moscow might have 
defined strategic stability in less than identical ways, but their arms control 
agreements reflected their joint assessment that they had a common 
interest in regulating a major aspect of their Cold War competition.3 Both 
saw mutual survival as a core interest, to use a term that has become 
associated with the foreign policy of today’s China. But unlike Beijing’s 
assertions today, it was a core interest the two sides had in common.
Today we are probably even more comfortable with the argument that 
the major nuclear powers needed to see themselves as partners in avoiding 
mutual annihilation. But in the late 1950s, when a fairly young American 
economist was asserting that the nuclear-armed superpowers had common 
interests (as well as competitive ones), he was actually explaining a point 
of departure for post-war strategic studies. This economist was Thomas 
Schelling, who argued that it was best to characterise the US–Soviet 
3  I take this argument from Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms 
Control in the Nuclear Age, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1961, p. 10. See my analysis in Robert 
Ayson, Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012.
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bilateral strategic interaction as a non-zero-sum bargaining relationship. 
They were not the pure competitors that orthodox microeconomics 
suggested would lead naturally to a market equilibrium. Instead, they 
were more like the two big oligopolistic firms whose every move depended 
on the move the other made, and whose self-interests did not include the 
disappearance of each other.4
The superpowers were like members of a cartel who needed to regulate 
their conflict out of mutual interest, where the market mechanism could 
not be relied on. They were, in other words, adverse partners (a term 
I do not think Schelling himself quite came to use). Lawrence Freedman 
identifies this logic perfectly when he argues, in his epic Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy, that ‘[a]t the centre of the strategy of stable conflict 
was the concept of incomplete antagonism’.5 The follow-on from that 
statement is that the incomplete antagonism provided an opportunity for 
managing the conflict.
Strategy to Schelling was a question of manipulating risk, but this logic 
worked only if you thought the other side had an interest in keeping the 
competition within limits. Threats of harm were more important than 
actual violence, and they were also more meaningful because actual violence 
could be so utterly devastating in the nuclear age.6 Once the Russians had 
broken the United States’ nuclear monopoly, a full-scale nuclear exchange 
would resemble the category of absolute war, which Clausewitz, writing 
more than a century beforehand, had suggested was philosophically 
necessary but which in normal circumstances was practically unreachable. 
Bernard Brodie’s famous warning in 1946 that from now on armed forces 
must be used to prevent war rather than prosecute it7 had indicated that 
nuclear weapons, if not managed properly, could make Clausewitz’s 
philosophical category all too real. This was just how it seemed to Hedley 
Bull, a close follower of Schelling’s work, who suggested that the nuclear 
age had also rendered obsolete Clausewitz’s observation that war did not 
consist of a single instantaneous blow.8
4  See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1960.
5  Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd edn, Macmillan/St Martin’s Press 
with International Institute for Strategic Studies, Basingstoke and New York, 1989, p. 208.
6  He developed this theme in Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1966.
7  Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1946, p. 74.
8  See Hedley Bull, ‘Society and anarchy in international relations’, in Diplomatic Investigations, 
ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, p. 46.
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We know that Bull also favoured the logic of adverse partnerships even 
though he also probably did not use the term. This precocious scholar, who 
took up his ANU chair a year after the SDSC was established, argued that 
the great powers had a special responsibility to recognise and nourish their 
common interests in the working of an international society. Principle 
among those common interests was the avoidance of major war, which 
the presence of nuclear weapons would make especially catastrophic. Bull 
saw that a fairly crude equilibrium of power in the form of the balance of 
terror had been created by the superpower arms race. But he argued that 
there was nothing permanent about this situation, which he therefore 
referred to as an accident of history. Instead, the Americans and the 
Russians were obliged to take deliberate steps to manage their conflict if 
deterrence was to be stable. They needed to recognise, in other words, that 
they had to be partners in order to manage the most dangerous aspects 
of their adverse tendencies.
It would be wrong to suggest that this theme was recognised consistently by 
all who adopted it, or that each one of the scholars mentioned here saw the 
adverse partnership operating in the same fashion. In 1980, as the Cold War 
was reintensifying, Bull, now back in Oxford, launched a stinging attack on 
Moscow and Washington for ignoring their Great Power responsibilities to 
international society, including their retreat from arms control.9 But barely 
half a decade later, and a year after Bull’s untimely death in 1985, John 
Lewis Gaddis described in his essay, ‘The long peace’, the rules of the game 
that both the United States and the Soviet Union had adhered to in order to 
maintain a measure of stability in their otherwise hazardous relationship.10 
Bull might well have agreed with Gaddis here as he had a strong tendency 
to disagree with himself. But years earlier, when the superpowers were in the 
middle of relaxing their tensions, even Shulman was not sure they had got 
it right. In 1971 he argued:
security in the realm of strategic weapons would be best served by a stable 
equilibrium at as moderate a level as can be managed through explicit or 
tacit agreement with our adversaries. On this point, the interests of the 
two countries are not opposed, but on neither side is this fact yet fully 
appreciated.11
9  See Hedley Bull, ‘The great irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union and world order’, 
International Journal 35, no. 3, 1980, pp. 437–47.
10  John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The long peace: Elements of stability in the post-war international system’, 
International Security 10, no. 4, 1986, pp. 99–142.
11  Marshall Shulman, ‘What does security mean today?’, Foreign Affairs 49, no. 4, 1971, p. 617.
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All of these perspectives could be right, of course. If partners are also 
adversaries, we cannot expect their partnership to be smooth or thoroughly 
consistent. Theirs is a rocky marriage in which they cannot live with each 
other but cannot live without each other as well. This helps us paint 
a more realistic view of Cold War strategic relations than the cardboard 
cut-out varieties we see in so much of the modern discourse. Just as some 
see the Cold War as an especially difficult and competitive period of 
international politics, which today’s Asia cannot afford to repeat, some 
others are tempted to look back nostalgically on an era that was not nearly 
as simple or stable as they might think. It is easy to forget that some of the 
crises that were survived in the Cold War could have become very serious.
This makes it even more important to lay out the factors that made for 
an adverse partnership. I think there were five of these in the Cold War 
adverse partnership.
The first of these might seem striking for us today. For the most part, when 
we think about US–Soviet Cold War strategic relations, the first thing 
that does not come to mind is their economic relationship. Containment 
was possible, we might think, because they were members of separate 
economic systems: one open and liberal, the other closed and centralised. 
But things were more complex than this initial picture suggests. There 
was at least some economic exchange, including in wheat sales. In a 1973 
essay, Shulman argues that a ‘cooperative side of the economic relationship’ 
was ‘reflected in the massive Soviet effort to expand its imports of grain, 
technology and consumer goods, and to develop Western markets for 
Soviet goods to pay for these imports in the future’.12 But it would be 
an entirely different step for us to assert that the Russians and Americans 
could always fall back on their common economic interests when the 
going got tough. This is worth remembering if we think that all the great 
powers have to do in the 21st century to run an adverse partnership is to 
attend to their relationships of economic interdependence.
The Cold War adverse partnership was based much more on restraint 
in the political–military arena, in the issues we in strategic studies tend 
to focus on.
12  Marshall Shulman, ‘Toward a Western philosophy of coexistence’, Foreign Affairs 52, no. 1, 
1973, p. 38.
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But the nature of this restraint brings to mind a second important factor. 
To use Schelling’s terminology, to which I am somewhat addicted, the 
adverse partnership was as much tacit and informal as it was explicit and 
formal. At times it was so tacit that the very existence of a partnership was 
plausibly deniable.
We should not overlook the importance of formal agreements such as the 
ABM Treaty, and other obvious collaboration including Incidents at Sea 
Arrangements. But, as Bull argued, these agreements were but symbols of 
the deeper recognition of common interests that constituted the limited 
understanding between East and West. A great deal still depended on 
the unilateral nature of that restraint. Tacit signalling, as opposed to 
formal negotiation, mattered a great deal. Bell asserts in The Conventions 
of Crisis that ‘the basic instrument of crisis management is what I shall call 
the signal’: 
By signal I mean a threat or offer communicated to the other party or 
parties to the crisis. Such signals [she added] are not necessarily verbal 
messages. Some of the sharpest and most effective of them are movements 
of military resources of various sorts.13
But therein lies a potential problem. One wonders whether the adverse 
partnership was akin to what Hedley Bull once said about Schelling’s tacit 
bargains. As he said in reviewing Schelling’s Arms and Influence: 
I find it hard to recognize American and Soviet behaviour in his picture 
of two governments orchestrating by purposive individuals, sending and 
receiving messages and ironing out understandings in these … fields with 
scarcely as much as a nod or a wink.14
A third factor is that these threats of force and other signals were used to 
sustain the central agreement on which the partnership relied. This was 
the informal agreement to avoid actual major hostilities. There might also 
have been something of a tacit understanding to deflect the competition 
into other areas, including the fighting of proxy wars, the competition for 
allies and the arms race itself. (‘In modern conditions’, Bell tells us, ‘it is 
only wars of limited objective and limited liability that have been found 
13  Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 73. A number of these themes had been explored by Schelling, 
including in T.C. Schelling, ‘Signals and feedback in the arms dialogue’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 21, no. 1, 1965, pp. 5–10.
14  Hedley Bull, ‘Review of Arms and Influence by Thomas C. Schelling’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 23, no. 3, 1967, pp. 25–6.
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feasible.’15 But even limited wars between the superpowers were out of 
bounds.) The crucial point is that so much of the conflict management 
that did occur did not happen through carefully calibrated exchanges 
of actual violence––it was conflict management through coercion and 
the management of that coercive diplomacy itself. If we regard mutual 
deterrence in the way Schelling refers to it as the exchange of all possible 
hostages,16 we can see how coercion (in the form of the threats of major 
harm) was used to sustain a joint no-attack commitment.
And a fourth stems from that: the incredibly high stakes of the game that 
was being played. I do not think even the most worrying climate change 
picture we can imagine today can quite compete with the potentially 
instantaneous gravity of a full-on thermonuclear exchange. The difference 
of course is that we are already getting at least some climate change. There 
is a good chance the world will never experience thermonuclear war; 
however, it was when both sides during the Cuban Crisis stared at the 
brink of that apocalypse that the arguments of Thomas Schelling, Hedley 
Bull and others really gained wings. It meant that the fostering of an 
adverse partnership was not desirable. It had become essential.
A fifth factor also has to be mentioned: how dependent others were on 
the adverse partnership that the two great nuclear powers were willing 
and able to strike. This feature only reinforced their dominance of the 
international system. The adverse partnership was an agreement between 
the elite powers, and it meant a willingness to subordinate the interests of 
even close allies if these got in the way. The two main powers remained 
in a more or less oligopolistic position, although in Asia, with China’s 
emergence, more of a triangle emerged.
An obvious and necessary question to ask is whether this formulation does 
have continued relevance. Given my argument that we often exaggerate 
the competitiveness of Cold War relations in comparison to our perception 
of today’s Great Power picture, and my corresponding view that there 
is more continuity than we are often led to believe between the Cold 
War and post–Cold War worlds, you might think my answer to this is 
a resoundingly positive one.
15  Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 49.
16  Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 231.
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My answer is yes, but only to a point. Let me explain what I mean 
courtesy of the most obvious early 21st-century test case for an adverse 
partnership, nothing other than today’s Great Power interaction between 
the United States and China. How that relationship evolves, and what 
it means for Asia’s security, and what that then means for Australia, will 
be the most important set of connected questions for many of the next 
50 years of the SDSC. So this is no idle consideration.
In the second decade of this new century, we are not as surprised as some 
Cold War audiences might have been about the possibility of adverse 
partnerships.17 After all, we are all aware of the close economic relations 
that the United States and China enjoy, which give them a common 
economic interest the Russians and Americans largely lacked. Hence, the 
first consideration regarding the adverse partnership seems in much better 
nick today than in the era of East–West strategic interaction.
Yet I wonder whether there is a problem here. The economic 
interconnectedness between China and the United States is at least 
partly an accident of economic history. It is as much a consequence of 
a decision made by Deng Xiaoping and his successors for China to engage 
the global economy and of the activities of self-interested US commercial 
enterprises as it is a deliberately choreographed situation that has been 
cooked up between Beijing and Washington. This interdependence is not 
the guarantee of a commitment to conflict management that some might 
want to think.
In terms of the second factor, we had better hope that the conflict 
management that does occur directly between China and the United 
States lies through informal, tacit and unilateral actions. I say that because 
there is not a great deal of evidence for formal security collaboration.
This is not the end of the world. The two sides can work together without 
counting rules, without incidents at sea agreements and even without 
China’s involvement in whatever will become of Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START). They do not necessarily require an Asian version of 
the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty. Nor do they need the East Asia 
Summit to do the impossible and create some real institutional legs. 
They can also agree to work together in formal responses to the security 
17  For one significant depiction of their other than zero-sum relationship, see Rosemary 
Foot,  ‘China and the United States: Between cold and warm peace’, Survival 51, no. 6, 2009–10, 
pp. 123–46.
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challenges that third parties pose to international and regional security––
think of joint US and Chinese involvement in the Iran nuclear deal, or 
their ability occasionally to vote for the same resolution on North Korea 
at the Security Council.
But in terms of their management of their own bilateral security 
relationship, the formal symbols of a deeper understanding are few 
and far between. This does not mean that they cannot have such an 
understanding. The two sides meet regularly at the US–China Economic 
and Strategic Dialogue. Washington and Beijing recognise that they have 
a common interest, for example, in not allowing their South China Sea 
grandstanding to escalate to war. They have a common interest in making 
sure that Taiwan continues to avoid moving formally to independence. 
They recognise a common interest in avoiding war in the East China Sea, 
and in ensuring through compatible unilateral signalling that Tokyo does 
not push either of them too far in that direction.
If there is such a common underlying commitment to keeping their 
own conflict within limits, that is well and good. But I am not sure 
how persuaded we should be of this. Does the relative absence of formal 
signs, including in arms control, suggest that the underlying informal 
understanding has not really been struck, or needs renegotiating? I wonder 
how much of an adverse partnership is really there.
At least initially, the third factor seems to be met without any question. 
This is a mutual commitment to use coercion rather than war itself as 
a way of managing the conflict, and indeed as a way of avoiding severe 
escalation to war. There has been no major power war in Asia for decades, 
and the commitment of the United States and China to avoid war in 
their own relationship needs mentioning here. Moreover, evidence of 
threats of force are not difficult to find. In the last few years, the United 
States, alongside its allies Japan and Australia, have accused China of 
using coercion to change the maritime status quo in East Asia, in both 
the South and East China Seas. Whatever the merits of these claims, 
it must be accepted that Washington cannot, and does not, accuse Beijing 
of using violent force, including actual hostilities, to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives. And few expect major war between the United States 
and China to be around the corner, even if some feel the tensions between 
them are growing.
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Similarly, an often overlooked fact is Washington’s reliance on coercion 
to achieve its strategic objectives in Asia, including, if we are to believe 
the implied messaging, to protect the status quo. That coercion includes 
the United States’ freedom of navigation patrols, its extended deterrence 
commitments to key regional allies and its strengthening of defence 
cooperation with South Korea to forestall a greater challenge from North 
Korea. This coercion also includes the United States’ direct deterrence of 
China (and vice versa). There is all manner of signalling going on here.
This coercion on the part of China and the United States is not one of 
Hedley Bull’s accidents of history. It is conscious activity designed to 
influence the expectations and behaviour of the other side, and to influence 
the expectations and behaviour of others in the region. There is enough 
evidence to suggest that China and the United States wish to avoid war 
in their relations and to keep any sabres rattling rather than brandished 
in an actual engagement. There is also enough evidence to suggest that 
they can work together to manage the interaction of their coercion—
think of their cooperation after the EP-3 spy plane incident and the now 
fairly regular management of some fairly hairy moments on the high seas. 
But it is a bit less clear how well they are able to manage their coercive 
interactions in a properly heated bilateral crisis. An adverse partnership 
requires a measure of crisis stability that we might wonder about.
One of the reasons for these concerns is connected to the fourth factor: 
that the Cold War adverse partners had seen the abyss in the Cuban Crisis 
and were aware what was at stake should their conflict not be managed. 
That abyss was created by an intense competition for nuclear parity that 
we do not see in the more asymmetric US–China nuclear interaction. I do 
not want the United States and China to be more scared of one another 
than they need to be, but you have to wonder whether they are quite 
scared enough. Despite all of their economic interactions, I am just not 
sure how much Washington and Beijing both believe that they must see 
each other as partners as well as competitors in their security interactions 
in Asia today. And I wonder whether they see an adverse partnership as 
completely necessary. Are they more inclined to think that they can press 
on with their aims—which for the United States includes the maintenance 
of regional primacy and which for China includes challenging that status 
quo—without worrying quite as much as we would want them to about 
the risks of that behaviour? It is a concern of this sort that I think led 
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Hugh White towards his China Choice.18 There, his sharing of power 
argument strikes me as more ambitious than Coral’s adverse partnership, 
based as the latter is on a similar recognition that there are common as 
well as competitive interests between the two.
What about the rest of us in the Asia Pacific, or, as Australia now likes to 
say, the Indo-Pacific? There is no doubt that the fifth factor applies: that 
the wider region depends heavily on the ability of China and the United 
States to mix a bit of partnering with their competition. In Asia’s Security, 
I was looking for those factors that linked the wider region together in 
security terms. I did this to allow us to talk about the security of Asia 
rather than just security somewhere in the region. My assessment, which 
should probably not surprise any of us, is that the China–US strategic 
interaction was the most important of these system-wide factors.19
This raises a further question. If the extent and quality of the China–US 
adverse partnership affects the rest of us, what does this mean in reverse? 
How much impact can we have through our own choices on the quality of 
their interaction? If an adverse partnership is in essence a way of managing 
conflict, what role do third parties have in helping that management? 
Is there more room today than there was in the Cold War for that to be 
happening? If the answer is yes, we had better get our strategic skates on.
Conclusion
My final point here is that the idea of an adverse partnership can do more 
than tell us a good deal about the US–Soviet strategic interaction during 
the Cold War. And it can do even more than offer us some good questions 
to ask about great power strategic relations today. I think the adverse 
partnership idea tells us a great deal about the nature of our subject. It can 
remind us what strategic studies is about. I say this because at the heart of 
the adverse partnership is the management of conflict. Schelling’s book, 
still hugely influential, is The Strategy of Conflict. But while Strategy as 
Conflict Management might not sound fantastic as an alternative title, 
I think it could be closer to home.
18  See Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Melbourne, 
2012.
19  See Robert Ayson, Asia’s Security, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.
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Strategy is not only the management of war, which is a subset of conflict. 
It is not the mere study of conflict, because, as Brodie once said, ‘strategy 
is a theory for action.’20 It is not just the pursuit of ends through available 
means, because to manage conflict is to have a deliberate influence on 
other actors in our interactions with them. Strategy is therefore much 
more than the use of conflict and threats of conflict. It is the conscious 
regulation of conflict as a fact of international life, whether in wars hot 
or cold or somewhere in between.
20  Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, Macmillan, New York, 1973, p. 452.
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Beyond ‘hangovers’: The new 
parameters of post–Cold War 
nuclear strategy
Nicola Leveringhaus
We are now more than a quarter-century into the post–Cold War 
period. Yet vestiges of a ‘Cold War mentality’ are said to remain, limiting 
our understanding of nuclear strategy today. For some, concepts and 
capabilities specifically developed with US and Soviet nuclear strategy in 
mind, such as mutual assured destruction (MAD) as an optimal strategic 
condition or a Second Strike Force, have become conceptual ‘hangovers’ 
that strategists have struggled to improve upon, leaving little room for 
innovation in the nuclear domain.1 This chapter seeks to push back at 
this ‘hangover’ narrative by drawing out global developments that have 
shaped thinking about nuclear strategy since 1990. It will also be argued 
that the global conditions under which nuclear strategies have been 
formulated are fundamentally different post-1990. This might seem 
a rather uncontroversial statement. Most would agree that, compared to 
the Cold War period, the prospects of nuclear war are thankfully much 
reduced today. However, there are relatively few academic accounts of 
how nuclear strategies have developed since 1990.2
1  For a longer elaboration of this hangover narrative, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 
Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, pp. 1–3.
2  An important exception is work by Lawrence Freedman. Recent editions of his seminal Evolution 
of Nuclear Strategy reflect changes in the post–Cold War period up to the early 2000s. See Lawrence 
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003.
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This chapter proceeds in a chronological manner to give a sense of time. 
The post–Cold War era problematically suggests a monolithic period 
forever tied to the Cold War. The chapter will therefore break down this 
era into set periods that have shaped the conditions under which different 
nuclear strategies have emerged. The first starts with the immediate period 
after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the 
emergence of the United States as the sole superpower (from 1990 to 
1997). This is a period in which nuclear strategy seems to take a back 
seat on global nuclear agendas. The second and main part of the chapter 
focuses on the period from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Transitions 
in the wider global order have important implications for nuclear strategy 
during this period––in particular, the emergence of regional centres of 
power, rogue powers and hostile non-state actors. The final part of the 
chapter turns to the late 2000s and developments that have, whether 
intentionally or not, begun to shape how we think about nuclear strategy 
and nuclear deterrence. Ultimately, it will be argued that since the 1990s, 
broader global developments have directly or indirectly shaped what is 
politically acceptable as well as militarily desirable and possible when 
devising nuclear strategies worldwide.
Early post–Cold War: Nuclear safety, 
not strategy
The break-up of the Soviet Union signalled major change on the global 
nuclear front. In December 1991, the USSR disintegrated into 15 newly 
independent states. The Soviet nuclear arsenal scattered with many 
parts unaccounted for across Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
The immediate nuclear challenge at the end of the Cold War was therefore 
proliferation based rather than focused on how best to design nuclear 
strategy in the post–Cold War world order.3 To address the problem of 
Soviet ‘loose nukes’, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was 
launched by the United States in 1991. By 1996, all three former Soviet 
republics were denuclearised.
3  Gilles Andreani, ‘The disarray of US non-proliferation policy’, Survival 41, no. 4, 1998, 
pp. 42–61.
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Beyond efforts to secure Soviet nuclear weapons, a succession of arms 
control and non-proliferation initiatives were signed in the early to 
mid-1990s. Russian and US Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) 
negotiations were accelerated; a testing moratorium was established 
that led to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) signed in 1996, 
and production of new nuclear weapons halted. In addition, in 1993 
a program (what would in 1997 become the Additional Protocol) was 
initiated to strengthen international nuclear safeguards, and in 1995 the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the most powerful legal framework 
prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons—was indefinitely extended. 
Elsewhere, China joined the NPT in 1992 and the CTBT in 1996; South 
Africa unilaterally gave up its nuclear program and joined the NPT in 
1991. All in all, the early to mid-1990s represented a golden era for 
strengthening global legal and institutional frameworks around arms 
control and non-proliferation.
While arms control and non-proliferation were centre-stage, nuclear 
deterrence—the cornerstone of mainstream strategic thinking concerning 
nuclear weapons in the Cold War—was branded passé and looked likely 
to lose relevance fast.4 Addressing the US–USSR nuclear relationship 
in a 1995 statement to Congress, the then US Secretary of Defence 
William Perry argued, ‘We now have the opportunity to create a new 
relationship based not on MAD but rather on another acronym, MAS, 
or Mutual Assured Safety’.5 Several academic and policy studies from the 
1990s onwards were tasked to consider how many nuclear weapons were 
necessary to maintain effective deterrence as a clear threat (e.g. the Soviet 
Union) was no longer the driver for formulating nuclear strategy in the 
United States.6 A 1995 US report recommended that US nuclear weapons 
policy be clear on the negative consequences of a nuclear response but 
ambiguous on the details of the actual response.7
4  Austin Long, Deterrence-from the Cold War to the Long War, RAND, Santa Monica, 2006; 
on this, see also Theresa Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for 
a New Era of Strategic Piracy, RAND, Santa Monica, 2012. Russia was an exception in some respects, 
abandoning ‘no first use’ in 1993.
5  William Perry, ‘Pursuing a strategy of mutual assured safety’, remarks at the National Press Club, 
Washington, DC, by the US Secretary of Defense, 5 January 1995.
6  I.C. Oelrich, ‘Sizing post–Cold War nuclear forces’, Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-3650, 
October 2001.
7  Policy Subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group, ‘Essentials of post–Cold War deterrence’, 
1995, www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/sagessentials.htm (retrieved 29 January 2018).
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Academia, for its part, was also losing interest in nuclear strategy. As such 
scholars as Vipin Narang highlight,8 by the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
intellectual consensus around existential deterrence started to build. 
According to this consensus, an existential nuclear threat based on one 
or two nuclear bombs was enough to deter, rending strategy somewhat 
irrelevant. Other developments in academia pushed strategy to the back 
seat. Philosophers, for instance, perhaps cheered by the reduced salience 
of nuclear weapons post-1990 (and the lower prospect of nuclear war 
more generally), almost completely abandoned intellectual conversations 
concerning the ethics of nuclear deterrence and technologies like missile 
defence. (Sadly, philosophers have yet to return to the nuclear field.)9 
Shockingly, nuclear ethics therefore has had almost nothing to say about 
strategy since 1990. Nuclear strategy was not abandoned in political 
science or international relations, but a decisive shift began in the 1990s 
away from strategy towards non-proliferation as the main area of study in 
the nuclear subfield. This overwhelming interest in limiting proliferation 
continues even today.10
Nuclear strategy had to face an additional, unforeseen, challenge in the early 
post–Cold War period: namely, the military significance of the so-called US 
‘unipolar moment’. With the fall of the USSR, the United States enjoyed 
unrivalled military prowess as the world’s only superpower. This prowess 
was on dramatic display both during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and later 
the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. US military technologies used in these 
operations, together with US work on missile defence in the 1990s, heralded 
a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). The RMA represented a major wake-
up call for some countries such as China, highlighting a serious gap in their 
advanced weapons capabilities relative to the United States.11 More crucially 
for nuclear strategy, unrivalled US  conventional military power reflected 
8  Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 1–3.
9  However, in the late 2010s there have been calls, led by Thomas E. Doyle III (‘Reviving nuclear 
ethics: A renewed research agenda for the twenty-first century’, Ethics and International Affairs 24, 
no. 3, 2010, pp. 287–308), for a return to nuclear ethics.
10  Academic interest in non-proliferation has benefited in particular from a broader turn towards 
quantitative methods in political science as well as an increasingly global study of nuclear proliferation 
history (beyond the United States and Soviet Union) since the 1990s. Work by the Wilson Center’s 
International Non-Proliferation History Project stands out in this regard, as does individual work by 
such academics as Matias Spektor on Brazilian nuclear history, for instance.
11  On this Chinese reaction, see Nicola Horsburgh, China and Global Nuclear Order: From 
Estrangement to Active Engagement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
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a new reality for the post–Cold War age: with advanced conventional 
superiority there was no need for the United States to be tied to the old logic 
of MAD.
Summarising, several developments in the early post–Cold War period 
shaped, either directly or indirectly, thinking about nuclear strategy. 
The first started with the end of the USSR, which led to a focus on non-
proliferation and a shift away from strategy. This shift away from strategy 
towards non-proliferation occurred in academic circles too. The second 
important change concerns US military power with the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrating two lessons 
for strategy: first, a glaring gap in capabilities between the United States 
and other states, and second, a growing role for advanced conventional 
technologies (as opposed to nuclear weapons) in military strategy.
The return of nuclear strategy
Nuclear strategy did not remain in the back seat for long.12 By the 
late 1990s,  a number of nuclear incidents pushed strategy back on to 
the agenda.  In 1998, India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices and 
refused to join the NPT. In July 1998, Iran launched a Shahab-3 missile 
and, in August, North Korea tested a long-range Taepodong missile. 
Terrorist threats also increased following attacks on US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania that year, and eventually the tragic 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in 2001. The United States 
in particular feared terrorist groups’ acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction, and this prompted Washington to emphasise counter-
proliferation and pre-emption, overshadowing its previous focus on safety 
issues and non-proliferation.13
Beyond these headline news events, there have been broader shifts 
underway in the global order with indirect implications for nuclear 
strategy. Two are explored here: (1) the rise of what Andrew Hurrell has 
12  This section draws significantly on Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, and an article 
I  co-authored: Nicola Leveringhaus and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, ‘Between conformity and 
innovation: China’s and India’s quest for status as responsible nuclear powers’, Review of International 
Studies 44, July 2018, pp. 482–503, doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000013.
13  Andreani, ‘The disarray of US non-proliferation policy’, p. 46.
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called ‘regional forms of nuclear order’;14 and (2) the security threat posed 
by rogue actors, especially North Korea and non-state actors such as 
al Qaeda.
The significance of the first shift for nuclear strategy requires some 
unpacking. The nuclear field has largely focused on strategy at a global 
level––that pertaining to rival great powers rather than a comparative 
study of regional-level nuclear strategies involving rising states.15 An 
exception is work cited here by Vipin Narang on South Asia more 
broadly,16 where the Indian–Pakistani rivalry has focused strategic 
thinking on confidence-building to reduce the likelihood of nuclear 
conflict. Yet the proliferation of regional forms of nuclear order is evident 
elsewhere too, such as the case of South America where rivals Argentina 
and Brazil cooperated in the 1990s to secure a nuclear order based on 
the goal of nuclear disarmament. In North-East Asia, continuing North 
Korean nuclear activities have moved the regional nuclear agenda towards 
non-proliferation and nuclear security as well as focusing on missile 
defence. Regional missile defence has proved especially relevant in shaping 
China’s restrained nuclear strategy since the 1990s. China, a rising power 
with a  small nuclear arsenal that is not on high alert, has focused on 
modernising its arsenal so that it remains secure and credible. Beijing has 
also sought to secure a role in the regional-ordering process by hosting 
the Six Party Talks and establishing a regional centre for nuclear security. 
What is a concern for this chapter is that these regional forms of nuclear 
order have their own sets of priorities and interests, to include rising or 
re-emerging powers eager to have a stake in the nuclear-ordering process.
To put it bluntly, regional forms of nuclear order have become increasingly 
powerful and distinct diplomatic platforms from which to manage nuclear 
weapons. They also condition the direction and depth of nuclear strategies. 
14  This specific term was used by Hurrell in a draft paper presented to the Global Nuclear Order 
workshop organised by the US Academy of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Oxford in 
September 2015. For more on regions and how they interact with global order, see Andrew Hurrell, 
On Global Order, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
15  In general, the nuclear field has shied away from comparative and regional studies. Exceptions 
include work by Etel Solingen, who compares regional cases of proliferation in her Nuclear Logics: 
Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007) as 
well as Robert Ayson’s article comparing institutions in the non-proliferation regime, ‘Selective non-
proliferation or universal regimes?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 
431–7. Doctoral work in 2012 by Francesca Giovannini at the University of Oxford specifically 
examined the role of regional nuclear politics.
16  For instance, see Narang’s Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, or the excellent work by Paul 
Kapur and Samit Ganguly on India and Pakistan.
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During the Cold War, the simpler (although perhaps far deadlier) nature 
of the nuclear game was that it existed largely at a global rather than 
regional level and was determined by two superpowers armed with nuclear 
weapons––namely, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two 
superpowers, together at times with the United Kingdom, spearheaded 
the development of major institutions and norms of the global nuclear 
order. However, since the 1990s, the task of managing these weapons 
has become more complex. Tackling nuclear proliferation crises—the Six 
Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula in the mid-2000s or the Iranian July 
2015 deal, for example—requires the participation of multiple regional 
stakeholders. Crudely put, the logic of MAD and superpower politics is 
no longer the glue that holds nuclear order together. In its place, we have 
regional forms of nuclear ordering (with specific interests and capabilities 
that might or might not converge with one another) competing with 
global norms, treaties and institutions established in the Cold War era.
The second shift—that involving rogue states and hostile non-state 
actors—has perhaps more evident implications for nuclear strategy.17 
These actors  arguably enhance the prospects of nuclear terrorism to 
a higher degree than during the Cold War. Rogue actors like North Korea 
and non-state terrorist groups like al Qaeda operate outside global nuclear 
institutions. In these circumstances, knowing how your enemy works and 
developing a strategy that is credible and easy to communicate becomes 
a practical challenge. These actors are also considered irrational, willing 
to endure higher costs and more likely to use the bomb if they manage 
to attain this capability. This presents real challenges for the nuclear 
strategist, begging the question: how can one credibly deter such an actor?
Racing towards credibility
The shifts above point to a common trend underlying post–Cold War 
nuclear strategy in the late 1990s, namely the pursuit of credibility. Apart 
from the United States, almost all the nuclear-armed states in the late 
1990s and early 2000s had their respective reasons for pursuing credibility. 
India and Pakistan, testing in 1998, had the most obvious reasons for 
seeking credibility. They were new nuclear actors and needed to come 
17  These actors present real concerns for proliferation as well, of course. They undermine non-
proliferation through participation in illicit nuclear smuggling, such as the infamous AQ Khan 
network uncovered in 2004.
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up with a nuclear strategy for the first time. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, China finally decided to embrace nuclear deterrence publicly 
(it had consistently denounced nuclear deterrence since testing in 1964). 
China’s modernisation program was also starting to bear more credible 
fruit from the early 2000s onwards. In particular, China secured its land-
based missiles (e.g. the DF-31 and DF-31A) by making them more mobile 
and made progress on a submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. 
Russia, having lost a significant portion of its Soviet nuclear arsenal at 
the end of the Cold War, as well as the economic resources to maintain 
it, had a credibility deficit too. This resulted in a number of changes to 
its nuclear strategy, including abandoning ‘no first use’ (NFU) in 1993 
and relying more on nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces in 
its military strategy in the 2000s.18 Israel, an opaque undeclared nuclear-
armed state, saw not the end of the Cold War but the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War as a turning point for its decision to pursue a more credible nuclear 
strategy, one less reliant on the patronage of the United States.
For India, China and Israel, a credible nuclear strategy has rested on 
the twin goals of retaliation and restraint. This entails securing largely 
rudimentary retaliatory capabilities not to be confused with a second-
strike capability (a Cold War concept). Unlike Cold War strategies, these 
basic retaliatory postures have regional rather than global force projections 
in mind. Important distinguishing elements of these postures include the 
prioritisation of (a) improving mobility for missiles, something China and 
India, as well as North Korea, have pursued to ensure their survivability; 
(b) ambiguity over the terms of use (first/no first use, alert status); 
and (c)  uncertainty over the numbers (and types) of weapons under 
development. For China and India, nuclear restraint and minimalism were 
promoted as important markers of their respective nuclear strategies based 
on NFU and a de-alerted small nuclear arsenal. Both countries sought to 
highlight their differences compared to the superpowers that had invested 
in developing vast arsenals in order to secure deterrence. For China and 
India, vast arsenals employing a Cold War–style triad (involving air, sea 
and land launch platforms) is not the goal. Instead, one or two platforms 
suffice.
18  The National Security Concept was released in 2000. Reliance on nuclear weapons until 
conventional weapons were modernised was reaffirmed in the report. See F. Umbach, ‘Russia’s changing 
threat perceptions’, International Politik 4, no. 1, 2003, pp. 53–7. See also Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russian 
nuclear strategy: Background, current status, future’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies presentation, 
www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Nikolai-Sokov-Russian-Nuclear-Strategy.pdf 
(retrieved 29 January 2018).
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The United Kingdom, like France, did not drastically alter its nuclear 
strategy in the 1990s and 2000s. Instead, it decreased its reliance on 
nuclear weapons with a vast reduction in the size of its nuclear arsenal 
throughout this period.19 France, for its part, sees credibility in more 
certainty regarding the terms of its nuclear use, stating it would use 
nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or non-nuclear attack. Russia and 
Pakistan place similar credibility in the first use of nuclear weapons.
The United States is the exception here. Since the 1990s, Washington has 
not sought credibility nor has it pursued old nuclear relationships built 
around MAD. Washington has instead focused on retaining the nuclear 
superiority it gained as the sole superpower after the Cold War. What 
precisely ‘retaining’ superiority means for US nuclear strategy seems to 
shift over time. Its first official outing was under President Clinton with 
a ‘Lead and Hedge’ strategy outlined in 1997.20 Since then, minimum 
and maximum versions of retaining nuclear superiority have emerged. 
A  maximum retaining capability (entailing more usable and accurate 
nuclear weapons teamed up with advanced conventional technologies such 
as missile defences) seemed popular following the 2001 nuclear posture 
review. At the time, in 2001, then President Bush stated that ‘Cold War 
deterrence is no longer enough … It is time for a new way of thinking’.21 
This included a need to ‘refashion the balance between defences and 
deterrence’.22 A minimum version of retaining nuclear superiority, which 
leaves more room for arms control and speaks to the aspirational and 
cooperative idea of a shared ‘strategic stability’ with Russia and China, 
emerged during the Obama Administration. Debates even took place over 
sole use in the run-up to the 2010 nuclear posture review. The retaining 
superiority debate in US nuclear strategy remains unresolved even today.
19  For the official UK nuclear policy on nuclear weapons since 2010 see UK Ministry of 
Defence, ‘2010 to 2015 Government Policy; UK Nuclear Deterrent’, www.gov.uk/government/
publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-nuclear-deterrent/2010-to-2015-government-
policy-uk-nuclear-deterrent (retrieved 4 March 2018).
20  Willian Arkin and Hans Kristensen, ‘Dangerous directions’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 52, 
no. 2, 1998, pp. 26–31.
21  George W. Bush, ‘Speech on missile defence’, at the National Defense University, Washington, 
DC, 1 May 2001, fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html (retrieved 29 January 2018).
22  Jim Garamone, ‘Rumsfeld details DoD goals, objectives in testimony’, Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC, 12 January 2001, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45149 (retrieved 
29 January 2018).
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In summary, shifts in global order, especially the emergence of regional 
forms of nuclear order and hostile non-state actors, have important 
implications for formulating post–Cold War nuclear strategy. The pursuit 
of credibility emerged as an urgent task for nuclear actors with the 
exception of the United States (intent upon maintaining nuclear 
superiority). For some nuclear armed states, credibility is based not on 
assured destruction or even second-strike capabilities, but on rudimentary 
retaliatory capabilities with regional projections in mind. For France, 
Russia and Pakistan, certainty over the use of force is more important.
Late 2000s: delegitimising and 
de‑emphasising the bomb
In the late 2000s, a number of global developments have, intentionally 
or otherwise, chipped away at the role nuclear weapons might play in 
future military strategy. Two will be discussed here. The first development 
refers to a series of high-level policy initiatives that reinvigorated the 
disarmament agenda and deliberately sought to delegitimise the bomb. 
The second development concerns discussions in military and strategic 
circles regarding ‘cross-domain deterrence’ and whether this formulation 
of deterrence might indirectly de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons 
in overall military strategy.
Momentum behind the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons began to 
build from 2009 onwards when US President Obama launched what 
has now become known as the ‘Prague Agenda’, a set of goals to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons worldwide and restart arms control, 
especially with Russia.23 Major aspects of this initiative included three 
important developments by April 2010: revised US nuclear ballistic 
missile defence and space posture reviews, a new START (Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty) between the United States and Russia, and the first 
global Nuclear Security Summit. Taken together, these initiatives signalled 
a possible return to arms control through strategic stability dialogues with 
Russia and China and the nuclear security summits. A second initiative, 
not to be confused with Obama’s Prague Agenda, also emerged in the 
late 2000s, one calling for a more transformative ‘nuclear weapons free 
23  Obama used the term in a speech in Prague on 5 April 2009.
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world’, or ‘Global Zero’.24 Around this time, a third initiative emerged, 
focused on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. Initially a fact-
based initiative, the Oslo Conference on Humanitarian Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons was held from 4 to 5 March 2013. Subsequent meetings in 
Mexico in February 2014 and Vienna in December 2014 have focused 
less on scientific studies of the humanitarian effects of these weapons and 
more on the pursuit of a weapons ban.
Of these initiatives, the Prague Agenda has had much wider global appeal 
among governmental elites in most nuclear weapons states than the 
campaign for a nuclear weapons–free world. The humanitarian impact 
agenda has become a popular venue for non–nuclear weapons states and 
especially non-government organisations, which have long campaigned 
for global disarmament. However, none of these initiatives have led to 
substantive change in terms of nuclear strategy; despite these efforts, 
nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of all nuclear-armed national 
security policies, including that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Even in the United Kingdom, where domestic debate has raged 
around renewing its nuclear deterrent Trident, there seems to be little if 
any prospect of disarmament.
The second development, which has some potential to transform nuclear 
strategy, is cross-domain deterrence. This concept was not unheard of 
during the Cold War, yet it has become more evident in the post–Cold 
War era. Strategists worldwide have been concerned about the implications 
of cyber- and outer-space technologies and how they can be combined 
with nuclear weapons to strengthen rather than undermine deterrence.25 
In the United Kingdom, discussions are going on around what it terms 
‘full spectrum deterrence’. The idea is to have dominance over a number 
of domains; not just cyber, space and nuclear but also international 
law, diplomacy and influence over the global economy. Outside the 
West, China is making significant inroads in developing cross-domain 
deterrence. According to Brad Roberts, cyber warfare is a key element of 
an overall ‘theory of victory’ in Chinese military strategy beyond nuclear 
24  George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, ‘Toward a nuclear-free 
world’, Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NSP_op-eds_final_.pdf?_= 
1360883065 (retrieved 29 January 2018).
25  Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009; on 
space deterrence, Robert Butterworth and John Sheldon, Deterrence in Space: Responding to Challenges 
to the US in Outer Space, George Marshall Institute, Washington, DC, November 2008.
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deterrence.26 Whatever China’s overall strategic goal, recent changes under 
President Xi Jinping, such as a new military force dedicated to cyber 
and space (the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force), 
suggest that it envisages scenarios in which cross-domain deterrence is in 
play. Ultimately, it remains unclear what this type of deterrence means for 
nuclear strategy. Does it render, or threaten to render, nuclear deterrence 
redundant, as some argue,27 or simply form part of a suite of deterrence 
capabilities? Whatever the answers, these domains are likely to matter 
because they have become more prominent than they ever were during 
the Cold War.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified a set of distinctive features in the post-1990 
environment that have directly or indirectly shaped nuclear strategy. 
Initially, at the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR and 
the threat of ‘loose nukes’ forced nuclear strategy to take a back seat on 
global nuclear agendas. The early to mid-1990s instead became a golden 
era for arms control and non-proliferation wherein several treaties and 
initiatives were established or strengthened. In academia, too, nuclear 
strategy lost favour, and studies turned to proliferation puzzles rather than 
questions of modern strategy. Even philosophers, no longer concerned 
about superpower nuclear war, abandoned the ethical dilemmas posed by 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, during this period, US conventional weapons 
and the so-called RMA—not nuclear weapons—were all the rage. US 
military capabilities on display in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and later 
the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis signalled a glaring gap in capabilities 
between the United States and other nuclear weapons states like Russia 
and China. More broadly, US military prowess sent a clear message for 
nuclear strategy: the days of MAD as a guide for strategy were over.
26  Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 2016, p. 165.
27  James E. Goodby, ‘The nuclear dilemma: Constants and variables in American strategic policies’, 
in The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, ed. George P. Shultz and James 
Goodby, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015, pp. 69–71, www.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/research/docs/goodby_shultz_-_the_war_that_must_never_be_fought_-_scribd.pdf (retrieved 4 
March 2018).
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Nuclear strategy had returned to national security agendas by the late 
1990s. Two important developments in the broader global order enabled 
and facilitated this process. The first development concerns ‘regional 
forms of nuclear order’. Regional nuclear orders have emerged with their 
own interests and capabilities, and this is a distinctive feature of the post–
Cold War environment. As a result, nuclear strategies have increasingly 
developed through a regional rather than global lens, as was the tendency 
during the Cold War. The second development relates to hostile non-state 
actors and rogue states. Deemed difficult to deter, they continue to pose 
a serious problem for modern nuclear strategy.
Eventually, the pursuit of credibility emerged as a key driver for nuclear 
strategy in the 1990s. Credibility has come in different forms for different 
nuclear-armed states. For some, such as China and India, strategies have 
been built around notions of restraint and minimalism, while others 
have moved towards more unilateral forms of deterrence. Russia, France 
and Pakistan increasingly rely on their nuclear arsenals; other nuclear-
armed states have sought to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. 
The United States is the exception. Rather than credibility, it has focused 
instead on retaining superiority in its nuclear strategy since the 1990s. 
Despite developments in the late 2000s around Global Zero and the 
humanitarian impact initiative, including efforts to pursue cross-domain 
deterrence, credibility remains the baseline for most nuclear strategies. 
Ultimately, nuclear strategy has come a long way since 1990. From the 
back seat of global agendas and intellectual disinterest, nuclear strategy 





The return of geography
Paul Dibb
The title of this chapter might suggest that geography has somehow gone 
missing in action as a body of strategic knowledge. While it is true that 
some theoreticians bought the superficial view at the end of the Cold War 
that geography had had its day, that was never the view of those of us who 
were senior defence policy officers. Strategic theories come and go, but 
the abiding nature of a nation’s geography remains a key defence planning 
tool. Indeed, I would agree with Australia’s greatest Secretary for Defence, 
Sir Arthur Tange, who said in 1986: ‘The map of one’s own country is 
the most fundamental of all defence documentation.’1 He also presciently 
asserted that the nature of Australia’s physical environment demands that 
maritime capabilities occupy a prominent place in defence.2
None of this is to argue that I am a geographical determinist, as some 
would have it. Geography clearly varies according to a nation’s strategic 
circumstances and, importantly, its perceptions of threat or the lack 
of one. Geography operates for Australia as a crucial consideration 
when it comes to the defence of the continent and the location of the 
archipelago to our immediate north. As Robert Kaplan argues in his 
book The Revenge of Geography, we all need to recover sensibility about 
the relevance of geography that has been lost in the current era when 
1  Sir Arthur Tange, Defence Policy Administration and Organisation: Selected Lectures 1971–1986, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1992, p. 90.
2  Ibid., p. 74.
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some commentators—such as the New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman—talk glibly about a flat world where geography no longer 
matters.3 As Kaplan notes, the end of the Cold War led to a mistaken view 
that globalisation and economic interdependence would inevitably lead to 
the end of geopolitical rivalries among great powers and to the emergence 
of a more enlightened liberal order.4 Others argue that modern military 
technology has effectively cancelled geography, which, as Colin Gray 
observes, has just enough merit to be a plausible fallacy.5 Despite trendy 
talk of a ‘borderless world’, the control of territory is still fundamental 
to world politics.
As the longest serving former Head of the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre (SDSC), I thought it appropriate for this 50th anniversary essay 
to address the role of geography conceptually in the following areas of 
my current work: first, the importance of geopolitics in Putin’s Russia 
and Moscow’s challenge to established borders in Europe; second, China’s 
territorial ambitions—especially in the South China Sea, which has been 
described by the Chancellor of this university as the most dangerous 
strategic issue in our region; third, the renewed importance of Australia’s 
geographical location and its relevance to the US ‘pivot’ to Asia. 
I see these three issues in the broader context of what I fear is a dangerous 
era unfolding strategically at the global level. In my view, we have two 
large authoritarian powers—China and Russia—challenging the liberal 
international order led by the United States and its democratic allies at 
a time when domestic politics in the West are in disarray over the impact 
of globalisation. Now is not the time for the West to be preoccupied 
domestically just when China and Russia are issuing challenges to the 
established order and flexing their military muscles.
Geopolitics and Russia today
First, then, let us turn to the geographic ambitions of a resurgent 
Russia.6 They exist at two levels: to reassert Russia as a great power 
(velikaya derzhava) and to recover lost territories. Putin is determined to 
3  Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, Random House, New York, 2012, p. xix.
4  Ibid., p. 4.
5  Quoted in ibid., p. 33.
6  For a more detailed exposition of these views see Paul Dibb, ‘Why Russia is a threat to the 
international order’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Strategy paper, June 2016.
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recover Russia’s standing in the Eurasian geopolitical space. As former 
British Ambassador to Russia Roderic Lyne explains, President Putin’s 
‘new model Russia’ is that of an independent great power resuming its 
geopolitical position on its own terms. Lyne states that this reflects a deep 
sense of insecurity and a fear that Russia’s interest would be threatened 
if it were to lose control of its neighbourhood.7 Putin speaks of Russia’s 
civilising mission on the Eurasian continent. He claims the right to 
a sphere of strategic interest in Russia’s neighbourhood in which Western 
influence and involvement would be limited. That sphere includes not 
only Crimea and Ukraine but also the Baltic countries, Belarus, Moldova 
and northern Kazakhstan. Putin’s Russia is set on a path of confrontation 
with the West and is now challenging the established post–World War II 
security order in Europe. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Joseph Dunford, has described Russia as presenting ‘the greatest 
threat to our national security’, and US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter 
has accused Russia of endangering world order and making threatening 
statements about its potential use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons now figures prominently in Russia’s new military 
doctrine.8 Moreover, Moscow is now capable of deploying 150,000 troops 
with little or no warning, probably under the disguise (maskirovka) of 
a  major exercise, into any of the countries of its near abroad. This is 
not to argue that Russia has recovered the military power of the former 
Soviet Union. It has not, but it needs to be remembered that, from Putin’s 
perspective, Russia faces a weak and divided Europe. And it is a fact that 
most Russians do not accept that there can be such an independent state 
as Ukraine.
Putin paints a picture of Russia as a victim and target of Western attack 
over the centuries with the West constantly trying to destroy it. Nikolai 
Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Security Council and a KGB veteran, 
accuses the United States of wanting Russia to cease to exist as a nation, 
and Sergei Naryshkin, a close Putin ally and speaker of Russia’s lower 
house of parliament, suggests that the United States is trying to goad 
Russia into war.9 These are obsessive assertions with little basis in fact 
and are more a reflection of centuries of Russia’s paranoia about the 
7  Roderic Lyne, ‘Russia’s changed outlook on the West: From convergence to confrontation’, 
in The Russian Challenge: Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
June 2015, p. 11.
8  Dibb, ‘Why Russia is a threat to the international order’, p. 11.
9  Ibid., p. 8.
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vulnerability of its borders and its insecurity as a nation-state. But we 
ignore them at our peril. And I am not one of those who accept that 
the weakness of Russia’s economy will make Putin more cautious—
rather the opposite. What we have been seeing of late are many highly 
disturbing incidents by Russia involving violations of North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries’ national airspace, narrowly 
avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs 
with nuclear-capable aircraft and other dangerous actions on a regular 
basis over a very wide geographical area, including the Baltic, Black and 
North Seas, the Arctic and along the US and Canadian borders. Moscow 
has used military force to recover territory in Georgia and Crimea and is 
destabilising Ukraine by its occupation of the Donbass. And in Syria, we 
saw in 2015 Russia’s first use of military power outside the former Soviet 
security sphere. This marked Putin’s reassertion of Russia’s military power 
and his retaliation for the expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders through 
his own use of military force in Syria on the borders of a NATO member, 
Turkey. Russia’s military intervention in Syria had a decisive effect and 
gained it a place at the negotiating table, ensuring that the United States 
can no longer ignore Moscow’s interests in the Middle East.
Many Western observers have consistently misread Russia and the way it 
is driven by its geography, history and culture. One of the problems here 
is that insufficient attention has been paid in the West to the evolution 
of Russian military thinking in the post–Cold War period. A recent 
Chatham House research paper states that Western policy-makers’ grasp 
of the Russian leadership’s motivations and decision-making processes, 
and especially in respect of military matters, has been degraded.10 Current 
Russian ambitions, followed to their conclusion, will inevitably lead 
to a more direct confrontation with the West. Russia’s political will to 
resort to force when necessary seems to be entirely absent in Europe these 
days. Managing the increasing threats Russia poses to international order 
is now arguably the most serious issue facing the West. This is not to 
underestimate the challenge emanating from a rising China, but China—
unlike Russia—does not pose a potential existential threat to world peace 
in the same way. 
10  Andrew Monaghan, ‘A new “Cold War”? Abusing history, misunderstanding Russia’, research 
paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme, May 2015, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham 
House, London, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/ 20150522 
ColdWarRussiaMonaghan.pdf (retrieved 21 January 2018).
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At the very least, Moscow’s attitude regarding the status of the 14 newly 
independent states formed out of the collapse of the Soviet Union is 
that they are intimately linked to Russia, are to a greater or lesser extent 
historically part of Russia and form Russia’s security perimeter. From 
Moscow’s perspective, they must therefore be recognised as within Russia’s 
sphere of strategic interest and must not be permitted to act in ways that 
are deemed to be contrary to Russia’s vital interests. Putin sees his country 
as facing a weak Europe, ineffective and leaderless, overwhelmed by a huge 
refugee problem, and with the United Kingdom’s exit from the European 
Union (EU) as heralding the unravelling of European unity.
The final issue I wish to raise about Russia pertains to some of the 
disturbing geopolitical propositions that have been gaining traction in 
Moscow. Most prominently, there is the idea of ‘Eurasia’, which Putin 
is proselytising. Starting with the Slavophiles in the 19th century, many 
Russian intellectuals saw Europeanness as the main problem of defining 
Russia’s nationhood. Since 1991, the terms ‘Eurasia’ and ‘Eurasianism’ 
have once again come to prominence on the post-Soviet political scene. 
As  Marlene Laruelle observes, this terminology suggests that Russia 
occupies a dual or median position between Europe and Asia.11 It rejects 
the view that Russia is on the periphery of Europe; on the contrary, it 
interprets the country’s geographic location as grounds for choosing 
a messianic ‘third way’. This doctrine is attractive to many Russian 
politicians because it helps them formulate an explanation for the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and to restore a sense of Russia’s continuity from 
its troubled past ‘by recasting it in spatial rather than temporal terms’.12 
In particular, the Eurasianists want to put an end to the post-Soviet elites’ 
mimicry of the West and to condemn the failure of communism as the 
end of a European idea.
Neo-Eurasianism has found its place within the new patriotic doctrine 
of Putin’s Russia, and the main proponent of the new geopolitical right-
wing is Alexander Dugin, who opposes US globalisation and describes 
his geopolitical doctrines as sacred geography (sacral’naia geografiia). 
In his book, Last War of the World Island, Dugin argues for Russia’s return 
to its geopolitical function as the continental Heartland—a  concept 
11  Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
Washington, DC, 2008, p. 1.
12  Ibid.
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he deliberately copies from Halford Mackinder.13 He identifies Russia 
as a ‘Civilisation of Land’ and believes that Russia’s occupation of 
the Heartland is the land-based (telluric) core of the entire Eurasian 
continent in what he describes as its unchanging geopolitical spatial sense 
(raumsinn). Dugin proclaims that Russia ‘is doomed to conflict’ with the 
Civilisation of the Sea (thalassic) embodied today in the United States and 
the unipolar America-centric world order.14 It should be noted that his 
books are assigned as textbooks at the General Staff Academy and other 
military universities in Russia.
How influential is Dugin? Laruelle believes he can be considered to 
represent the general evolution of the Russian nationalist milieu over 
the past two decades; she says he is one of the few thinkers to engage in 
a profound renewal of Russian nationalist doctrines.15 Mackinder’s concept 
of the Heartland was quoted approvingly in 2009 by Nikolai Patrushev, 
the secretary of Russia’s Security Council and former head of the Federal 
Security Service (FSB), which was the first time that this vocabulary had 
emerged in public at such a senior level.16 In 2013, Putin himself endorsed 
the Eurasian idea when he said that ‘Eurasian integration is a chance for 
the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global 
development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia’.17 
In May 2015, the treaty creating Putin’s ‘Eurasian Union’ was signed in 
the Kazakh capital, Astana, with Kazakhstan and Belarus as members.18 
Thus, Eurasia has become the officially sanctioned national idea of Russia, 
articulated by its head of state. It matches Dugin’s prognostication that 
Russia is different and unique and that, as  it is under  attack from the 
West, it must seek geopolitical strength in the Heartland.
13  Alexander Dugin, Last War of the World Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia, Arktos, 
London, 2015, p. 135.
14  Ibid., p. 10.
15  Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, pp. 141 and 143.
16  Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 2016, pp. 295–6.
17  Ibid., pp. 316–17.
18  Ibid., p. 330.
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China’s territorial ambitions
Unlike Russia, China has not yet used direct military power to assert its 
territorial claims, but it is using such harsh coercion that—like Russia—
it is causing extreme apprehension in its neighbourhood. China continues 
to assert the right to use military force to recover Taiwan and has built up 
powerful military forces opposite Taiwan specifically designed to retake 
the island. The key unknown is when will Beijing lose patience with the 
waiting process and judge that Washington lacks the fortitude to go to 
war with China over Taiwan. The Pentagon’s latest report to Congress 
makes it clear that China continues to focus on preparing for potential 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
is developing and deploying military capabilities intended to coerce 
Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary.19 However, the Pentagon 
report also observes that large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the 
most complicated and difficult military operations and that an attempt to 
invade Taiwan would strain China’s armed forces and ‘invite international 
intervention’.20
China’s territorial ambitions in the South and East China seas have been 
pursued with great belligerence in recent years, and they are the most 
likely source of miscalculation leading to direct military conflict with the 
United States and its allies. China is heavily dependent upon unhindered 
maritime traffic through the South China Sea, through which one-third 
of the world’s trade and 80 per cent of China’s oil imports pass. What 
President Xi Jinping terms China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’ has led him to 
propose a geopolitical alternative called One Belt, One Road (OBOR), 
which would see more secure Chinese transportation routes across the 
Indian Ocean—as well as through Central Asia—and avoid the strategic 
bottlenecks of South-East Asia. OBOR aims to replicate the domestic 
success of Chinese state capitalism over the last 25 years on a Eurasian 
continental scale.21 But it will take decades to implement and will face 
resistance to the heavy-handed way in which Beijing typically operates in 
foreign countries.
19  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, Washington, DC, April 2016, p. 87.
20  Ibid., p. 89.
21  Christian Dargnat, ‘China’s shifting geo-economic strategy’, Survival 58, no. 3, 2016, p. 71.
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Like Russia, China is a continental power with little historical experience 
of being a maritime power. Robert Ross has argued that China’s 
maritime power will be limited by the constraints experienced by all 
land powers, including the geopolitical sources of the repeated failure 
of land powers to secure maritime power.22 His main thesis is that land 
powers confront internal threats that impose severe resource constraints 
in developing maritime power, whereas the geographic circumstances 
of maritime powers  offer enduring border security and ready access to 
the sea. It is a  telling point, in this regard, that China spends as much 
on internal security as it does on its defence build-up. In the Cold War, 
another land power, the Soviet Union, practised the same sort of access 
denial capability to reduce the challenge of US carrier-based aircraft to 
its territorial security that China is now implementing. But China has 
a surface fleet without organic airpower and nuclear-powered submarines 
that remain relatively noisy. Its land-based air capabilities are insufficient 
to enable China to project decisive power in even the relatively near waters 
of maritime East Asia. China is not yet capable of successfully challenging 
US dominance of regional sea lanes or the security of the United States’ 
allies in East Asia.23 As the Economist observes, China needs Western 
markets; its neighbours are unwilling to accept its regional writ, and for 
many more years the United States will be strong enough militarily and 
diplomatically to block it.24
But that is by no means all the story about China’s territorial ambitions. 
It has played its cards craftily in the South China Sea by undertaking 
land reclamation, building infrastructure and introducing habitation on 
an incremental basis while at the same time avoiding the direct use of 
military force. It has persistently lied about not militarising these islands, 
rocks and reefs. China does all this while asserting that it has ‘indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters 
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as 
well as the seabed and subsoil thereof ’.25 On 12 July 2016, however, 
the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration rebuffed Beijing in a clear-cut 
ruling that concluded there was no legal basis for China’s claims regarding 
resources falling within the nine-dashed line and, moreover, that none 
22  Robert S. Ross, ‘China’s naval nationalism’, International Security 34, no. 2, 2009, p. 47.
23  Paul Dibb and John Lee, ‘Why China will not become the dominant power in Asia’, Security 
Challenges 10, no. 3, 2014, p. 18.
24  ‘What China wants’, Economist 412, no. 8901, 2014, p. 9.
25  Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General, May 2009, quoted in Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Security Strategy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, July 2015, p. 8.
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of the Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly chain could be classified 
as islands.26 This delivered a stinging rebuke to China. As might be 
expected, Beijing responded by rejecting the jurisdiction of the court as 
being ‘null and void, with no binding force’.27 Vice-Foreign Minister Liu 
Zhenmin was reported as proclaiming that China reserved the right to 
declare an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the entire South 
China Sea, and President Xi Jinping told visiting EU leaders Donald Tusk 
and Jean-Claude Juncker that China’s interest in the South China Sea 
would ‘in no circumstances be affected’ by the ruling of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. He stated that ‘[t]he South China Sea Islands have 
been China’s territory since ancient times’ and that ‘[w]e refuse to accept 
any claims or activities based on the arbitral ruling’.28 He said China 
was committed to settling through direct talks the disputes with fellow 
claimants Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, as well as the Philippines. In 
fact, Beijing has strung along the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) claimants for the last 14 years while supposedly negotiating 
a code of conduct in the South China Sea. So, while China claims it 
remains committed to resolving the relevant disputes through negotiation 
and consultation with the countries directly concerned ‘on the basis of 
respecting historical facts’, there can be no expectation of any resolution 
of this potentially dangerous territorial stand-off.
Tensions now seem likely to rise, but it remains to be seen what Beijing’s 
next steps will be. Australia’s former Ambassador to China believes that in 
the end all that is left is diplomacy and that negotiation between claimant 
states is the only path towards some sort of resolution.29 At the same 
time, he recognises that China’s leaders are now under enormous popular 
pressure to be seen to be standing up for China’s territorial sovereignty. 
Any sign of weakness in the face of what will be seen widely in China 
as a national humiliation will provide a legitimate opening to attack 
Xi Jinping. Beijing could respond belligerently to the arbitral finding by 
more aggressively building and militarising various structures, moving 
more oil exploration and drilling platforms into the area, and increasing 
26  Jane Perlez, ‘Tribunal rejects Beijing’s claims within South China Sea’, New York Times, 
12 July 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.
html (retrieved 21 January 2018).
27  Jingye Cheng, ‘Arbitration on South China Sea dispute fatally flawed’, Australian, 14 July 2016, 
p. 12.
28  An Baijie and Fu Jing, ‘Ruling “null and void”, with no binding force’, China Daily USA, 13 July 
2016, usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-07/13/content_26073364.htm (retrieved 26 August 2017).
29  Geoff Raby, ‘It’s impossible for Xi Jinping to give in to The Hague’, Australian Financial Review, 
14 July 2016, p. 47.
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its harassment of fishing boats from other claimant states.30 But the 
fact is that there is now a much greater chance of miscalculation or an 
accidental military confrontation. There are those who believe that China 
and the United States are now so intertwined economically that military 
conflict is out of the question and that now is the time for restraint. That 
might be true, but in my view the time has come when the United States 
and its allies—including Australia—will have to demonstrate to China 
that it cannot make unilateral territorial land grabs. That will involve us 
undertaking deliberate freedom of navigation operations in the South 
China Sea and conducting regular intrusive aerial surveillance.
There is one final Chinese territorial proposal that I need to address. 
In various regional forums, including my involvement on behalf of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) with the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, China is pushing the idea of the need for a comprehensive 
review of the regional security architecture. This includes examining the 
rationale for and ingredients of a new security order for the region at a time 
of major rebalancing between rising and established powers.31 The idea 
here is to revisit the existing security order critically, including the system 
of bilateral alliances. This is, of course, a ploy by China—supported by 
Russia—to get rid of the US alliance system as relics of the Cold War. It is 
a dangerous proposition because the collapse of the US alliance system 
would inevitably lead to a nuclear-armed Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
which would be against China’s national interests. Another concern is 
the argument of those who demand that the United States make strategic 
space for a rising China.32
It is not clear what is being proposed here: is it handing over a democratic 
Taiwan, and is the idea also to concede ownership of the South China 
Sea to Beijing? The central geopolitical question here for Australia is 
whether Beijing is aiming for a sphere of influence over South-East Asia 
as a collection of small countries effectively having subordinate status.33 
If that occurred, it would face Australia with a potentially hostile power 
based in its neighbourhood.
30  Ibid.
31  I represented Australia at the ninth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Expert and Eminent 
Persons meeting in Helsinki, Finland, on 12–13 March 2015, where this issue was canvassed and 
rejected.
32  Hugh White, The China Choice, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2012.
33  Former People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated at a July 2010 meeting with 
ASEAN, ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact’. John 
Pomfret, ‘US takes a tougher tone with China’, Washington Post, 30 July 2010, www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html (retrieved 20 January 2018).
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Australia’s new strategic geography
The United States’ ‘pivot’ to Asia, mainly to counter China’s rise in the 
region, has made Australia’s geographical location much more important 
than it was in the Cold War. In the Cold War, Australia was distant from 
the main theatres of military confrontation in Europe and North-East 
Asia. Its main strategic relevance to the United States was as ‘a suitable 
piece of real estate’, as Des Ball described it, for the location in central 
Australia of some of the United States’ most potent intelligence collection 
facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. Australia also conducted covert 
submarine intelligence operations against the Soviet Navy, as well as 
tracking Soviet nuclear submarines with P3 Orion reconnaissance 
aircraft. Now, however, Australia is critically located between the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans and relatively near South-East Asia and the South 
China Sea flashpoint. Former Defence Minister Kim Beazley has pointed 
out the relevance of Australia’s secure location for the United States in the 
southern hemisphere. Unlike US military forces stationed in Japan, South 
Korea and Guam, the south of Australia is not within range of China’s 
anti-access/area denial conventional weapons. Australia can offer the 
United States access to naval harbours and military airfields in the west 
and north of Australia so that it can project power into the eastern Indian 
Ocean and South-East Asian waters. The United States is increasing its 
footprint in Australia as part of its ‘rebalance’ to Asia. Australia’s northern 
military facilities already host on-rotation elements of a US Marine Air-
Ground Task Force of up to 2,500 personnel as well as the deployment 
of B-52 bombers to Darwin.
Australia should stand ready to provide more assistance to the US military 
given the growing strategic importance of and uncertain outlook in the 
region to our north. As already mentioned, South-East Asia is of critical 
importance to Australia’s security: it is a shield to Australia’s sparsely 
populated and resource-rich northern approaches. Australia would be 
concerned about the threat of a foreign military power seeking influence 
in South-East Asia in ways that could challenge the security of our 
maritime approaches. Such a military presence or lodgement has long 
been a concern in Australian defence planning.
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The 2016 Defence White Paper reflects serious concern in Canberra about 
China’s worrying military build-up and its flaunting of the established 
rules-based international order. In fact, the White Paper mentions 
Australia’s strong support for the ‘rules-based global order’ 54 times in 
a scarcely concealed allusion to the People’s Republic of China. It stresses 
that ‘the rules-based order is under increasing pressure and has shown 
signs of fragility’.34 However, although Russia and North Korea are 
cited specifically as being guilty of refusal to act in ways consistent with 
international law and standards of behaviour, China is mentioned only 
obliquely along the lines that ‘newly powerful countries want greater 
influence’, but they also ‘have a responsibility to act in a way that 
constructively contributes to global stability, security and prosperity’.35 
The White Paper does not contain more direct criticism of China’s 
repeated flaunting of international order and stability in the region. 
There is, however, a specific mention of China’s activities in the South 
China Sea, where it is stated that ‘Australia is particularly concerned by 
the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities’.36 
Predictably, this provoked an outraged response from Beijing.
The White Paper observes that Australia can expect greater uncertainty 
in its strategic environment over the next two decades as a consequence 
inter alia of ‘changes in the distribution of power’ in the Indo-Pacific and 
‘the modernisation of regional military capabilities’.37 It states that the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be better prepared to meet a broader 
range of security challenges in the coming years.38 Maintaining Australia’s 
technological edge and capability superiority over potential adversaries 
has been an essential element of our strategic planning now for more 
than 30 years, but the White Paper observes that Australia’s capability 
superiority in future will be challenged by military modernisation in 
the region.39 Classified concerns about China’s military build-up and 
its continuing provocations in the South China Sea caused the Defence 
34  Australian Government, 2016 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 2016, p. 45, www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-
Paper.pdf (retrieved 16 January 2018).
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid., p. 58.
37  Ibid., p. 32.
38  Ibid., p. 34.
39  Ibid., p. 16.
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White Paper to elevate the security of South-East Asia to Australia’s most 
important strategic interest after the defence of Australia and our northern 
approaches. The White Paper states:
The geography of the archipelago to Australia’s immediate north will 
always have particular significance to our security. Any conventional 
military threat to Australia is likely to approach through the archipelago.40 
It goes on to say: ‘Proximity and economic interests mean that instability 
in South-East Asia, whether internal to countries or between countries, has 
the potential to affect Australia’s security’,41 and it observes that ‘[a]s our 
near neighbour, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia is vital’.42
In addition to its heavy focus on maritime South-East Asia, the Defence 
White Paper revisits the importance of Australia’s military facilities in the 
north and west of the continent—some of which have been ignored and 
run down over recent years. The White Paper states that while there is no 
more than a remote chance of a military attack on Australian territory 
by another country, Australians rightly expect that our armed forces be 
capable of the self-reliant defence of our territory from attack or coercion 
by another country.43 Therefore, the government has committed itself to 
providing defence with ‘the capability it needs to be able to decisively 
respond to military threats to Australia, including incursions into our 
air, sea and northern approaches’.44 Investment in Australia’s northern 
military bases will now be increased substantially so that they can support 
new capabilities that will be used to defeat any attack on our territory. 
Investment in Australia’s national defence infrastructure will include the 
army, navy and air force bases in northern Australia, including in Townsville 
and Darwin as well as the air force bases in Tindal, Curtin, Scherger and 
Learmonth.45 This will enhance infrastructure in northern Australia to 
support the ADF’s strike and air combat capabilities, including Joint 
Strike Fighters, Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, and 
air-to-air refuellers.46 The Jindalee over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) radar 
network and other surveillance, space and air defence–related facilities in 
40  Ibid., p. 56.
41  Ibid., p. 57.
42  Ibid., p. 59.
43  Ibid., p. 71. An entire section of the 2016 Defence White Paper is devoted to northern Australia 
(pp. 103–4).
44  Ibid., p. 72.
45  Ibid., p. 72.
46  Ibid., p. 103.
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northern Australia will be upgraded over the next decade.47 There is also 
a commitment to upgrade the infrastructure on Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
in the eastern Indian Ocean to support flights by the new P-8A Poseidon 
maritime surveillance aircraft.48 The White Paper states that Australia’s 
maritime forces will become more potent through the acquisition of 
more capable submarines, ships and aircraft so that these forces will help 
to protect Australia’s maritime borders, secure our immediate northern 
approaches and proximate sea lines of communication, and enable 
Australia to project force in the maritime environment—especially our 
trade routes through the South China Sea through which nearly two-
thirds of our exports pass.49
All this amounts to a significant geographical refocusing of the ADF, 
which has been preoccupied over the last 15 years with almost continuous 
deployments to the Middle East and Afghanistan. The current geographical 
refocus on maritime South-East Asia and the complementary upgrading 
of military bases in the north of Australia, after years of lack of attention, 
marks a triumphant return of geography to Australia’s defence planning.
47  Ibid., p. 104.
48  Ibid., p. 103.
49  Ibid., pp. 89–90 and 57.
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Strategic studies in practice: 
An Australian perspective
Hugh White
Ours is a practical discipline. Our aim is, or should be, always to bring the 
virtues and strengths of scholarship to bear on the real and often urgent 
practical choices that nations—and especially their governments—face 
about strategic policy: about how we develop and use armed force to 
achieve national policy objectives. So it seems appropriate to mark our 
centre’s 50th anniversary by reflecting on the practical strategic policy 
choices that Australia faces today. That is what the Strategic & Defence 
Studies Centre (SDSC) has always done best and how it has made its 
most important contributions over the decades. I will try to do this here 
by reflecting a little on history, not just because this seems fitting for 
an anniversary but also because it is often the best way to address these 
practical questions in a scholarly way. Our focus should always be on 
the future because policy is always about the future, but the only way 
we can think seriously and systematically about the future is through 
a sophisticated understanding of the past.
So this chapter will explore something of Australia’s strategic past in 
order to illuminate the choices we face today about our strategic future. 
I shall try to sketch some long-running strategic questions that seem to 
be distinctively Australian because they spring from our specific—and in 
some ways unique—strategic circumstances. My hope is that reflecting 
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on how Australia has approached these questions in the past will help us 
to better understand the choices we face today about our strategic policy 
and posture in future.
Bob O’Neill last night at dinner mentioned the Seven Years War, 
reminding us that this was truly the first world war, fought not just in 
Europe but also in North America and Asia. It also marks in a very real 
sense the start of Australia’s strategic history because it created the strategic 
preconditions for British settlement of this continent. Britain defeated 
the French in the waters around India during the Seven Years War and 
thus became the primary maritime power in what we might now call 
the Indo-Pacific. Establishing an outpost at Sydney Cove became possible 
only once Britain had established this primacy, and the outpost in turn, 
once established, helped to make its primacy more secure.
More broadly, the global maritime preponderance that Britain won in the 
Seven Years War, and the economic revolution that it was both sustained 
by and helped to sustain, gave Britain the power to seize, hold, colonise, 
develop and populate our continent. Without the Seven Years War, 
this nation would not exist on this continent, and most of us would not 
be here.
This reminds us that strategic questions—questions of the role of force 
in international affairs—have been part of Australia’s story from the very 
beginning. There never was a time of pre-strategic innocence. We were, so 
to speak, born in strategic sin, a product of the extraordinarily dynamic 
power politics of the later 18th century as Europe’s strategic order was 
transformed by radical changes in the distribution of wealth and power 
and an accompanying revolution in ideas. We can see something of the 
intensity and global reach of the resulting rivalry in La Perouse’s remarkable 
appearance in Botany Bay just a couple of days after Arthur Phillip arrived 
with the First Fleet. Only four years later, Britain was plunged into the 
epic series of European wars that completed the destruction of the old 
European order and ushered in a new one. The establishment of British 
settlement in Australia thus took place against the background of a world 
in conflict, the biggest and most costly war in history up to that time, 
which profoundly touched every aspect of British national life. Although 
it does not feature much in our national narrative of those first decades 
of settlement, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars must have loomed 
very large indeed for the colonists in Australia in that first quarter-century 
of settlement.
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The outcome of those wars had a profound effect on the strategic setting 
of Australia’s first century and has perhaps shaped the way Australians have 
seen their security ever since. By 1815, Britain’s maritime primacy in Asia 
and globally was consolidated beyond serious challenge, so that British 
settlements in Australia enjoyed the luxury of being protected by a power 
that exercised complete command of the world’s oceans, including those 
that surrounded the continent and connected it with Britain and the rest 
of the world. Britain’s position in turn was protected by the Concert of 
Europe, which constrained strategic rivalry with its powerful continental 
neighbours and thus ensured that Britain’s strength globally, and in our 
region, was not be sapped by the need to meet major threats to its security 
in Europe.
It is therefore only natural that for about a century after they were 
established, the British settlements faced no specifically Australian 
strategic questions. We were embedded in a global empire with no serious 
rivals and with the capacity to deploy and sustain such overwhelming 
maritime force against any threat to us such that the risk of serious strategic 
challenge was negligible. There was therefore little reason for colonists to 
think about strategic questions. To the extent that they did, they thought 
about the empire’s security rather than Australia’s. I hope I do not have 
to labour the contemporary parallels.
One might say, then, that Australia was born in strategic sin but enjoyed 
a blissfully innocent strategic adolescence. That happy time came to 
a surprisingly abrupt end in the last quarter of the 19th century. By about 
1880, the economic preponderance that Britain had won with the 
Industrial Revolution and with which it had sustained its global maritime 
power was being challenged and even eclipsed by new rising economic 
powers—most obviously America and Germany but also France, Russia 
and—a little later—Japan. Moreover, some of these powers were starting 
to intrude into our neighbourhood. Australian colonial governments were 
plainly aware of the shifting distribution of power and started to worry 
about what these local intrusions could mean for their security. They 
sought a firm imperial response, for example to Germany’s occupation 
of northern New Guinea, and they did not get it. As the distribution of 
power shifted and pressure on the 19th-century European order grew, 
Britain had to balance much more carefully the interests of its empire 
against the overriding imperative to manage growing strategic risks 
in Europe.
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This presented Australian political leaders with a new situation—and 
they understood it swiftly. They could no longer assume that Britain had 
the power and the will to keep Asia safe for Australia. They could no 
longer assume that London’s strategic interests, objectives and priorities 
were identical with Australia’s. They had to start thinking for themselves 
and acting to pursue distinctly Australian policy responses to specifically 
Australian strategic imperatives. They soon came to understand the key 
features of Australia’s strategic situation, which remain with us today. 
On  the one hand, Australia is almost uniquely isolated from the main 
centres of power globally, and from the great and powerful friends on 
which we rely. On the other, we are deeply integrated into the global 
strategic system: we believe our security depends on the balance between 
the major powers in the key theatres of strategic rivalry because we believe 
that the active support of a global power ally is essential to our security.
This creates the perennial dilemma that has framed Australian strategic 
policy ever since the 1880s. We must depend on our allies because we do 
not believe we can defend ourselves independently, yet we cannot depend 
on our allies because we are so remote from them, and our most pressing 
strategic threats will always be different from theirs. For all the talk of shared 
values and culture, alliances are based on shared interest, and interests are 
deeply embedded in geography. This deep dilemma is inherent in our 
geographic circumstances, so it cannot be resolved or dissolved. It must 
instead be managed, as that first generation of Australian strategic policy-
makers very plainly understood. Managing it means asking and answering 
the great question at the heart of Australia’s strategic policy: how far do we 
depend on our allies, and how far do we try to fend for ourselves? How 
clear sighted and courageous that generation, led by Alfred Deakin, was 
in facing this daunting challenge. Of course they were people—men—of 
the Victorian era, to whom courage and enterprise and rapid change came 
naturally. To see that spirit at work we need look no further than Deakin’s 
remarkable contribution to the Colonial Conference in London in 1887, 
where he set out with startling clarity the strategic challenges that were 
to face the British Empire and its constituents over the coming decade.1
The key result of their work was, of course, Federation, which more 
than anything else was a response to the new strategic challenges that 
emerged in the late 19th century. On that foundation they built a quite 
1  See, for example, J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1965, pp. 95ff.
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sophisticated policy that balanced the opposing imperatives of alliance 
and self-reliance, between depending on others and fending for ourselves. 
Perhaps unavoidably, the principal weight lay with supporting our allies, 
in part because over coming decades those allies faced tests far bigger 
and more serious than anything Deakin and his colleagues could have 
imagined.
It is sobering and poignant to reflect on how Alfred Deakin and his 
contemporaries would have felt at the time of Federation had they been 
given a glimpse of the strategic challenges that lay ahead. The trends they 
had so presciently identified in the 1880s did indeed have far-reaching 
and disastrous consequences. In two world wars, British power globally 
and in Asia faced immense challenges and finally collapsed. US power 
rose to take its place, but it too faced major challenges globally and in 
Asia. Australia made huge sacrifices to help respond to these challenges 
in World War I, World War II, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam. The alliance 
with Britain did not survive, and its alliance with the United States suffered 
immense stress. By the mid-1960s, reliance on great and powerful friends 
seemed less and less credible as the long-term foundation of Australia’s 
security. It was time for a rethink.
There are good reasons why Australia’s first centre for the academic study 
of strategic and defence questions was founded in 1966. In part the timing 
reflected a wider trend: under the stresses of the Cold War, academic 
study of strategic questions had taken off in the United States, Britain and 
Europe during the 1950s, and a number of Australians—most notably 
our own Hedley Bull and Coral Bell—had played significant parts in that. 
It was natural enough that Australia would eventually follow this trend. 
But more important than this were the local circumstances. In 1966, 
Australia faced a remarkable, complex and momentous set of changes in 
our strategic circumstances comparable in scale and significance to the 
transformation of the last decades of the previous century.
By 1966, these changes were already undermining the grand strategy of 
Forward Defence, which had evolved to deal with the new and unfamiliar 
challenges of the Cold War in post–World War II post-colonial Asia. In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, it became increasingly clear that Australia 
could not rely on our major allies to help us deal with the challenges posed 
by the aggressive policies of Sukarno’s Indonesia. Geography ensured 
that they affected our strategic interests differently and more directly 
than our allies’. By 1966 Sukarno had fallen, but it was not yet clear 
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just how different Suharto’s Indonesia was going to be. And in order to 
buttress Washington’s support against Indonesia as well as respond to the 
wider threats that seemed to be posed by Maoist China, Australia had 
supported and indeed encouraged a deeper US commitment to Vietnam. 
Within a few years, the whole fabric of Forward Defence had fallen apart. 
Escalation and failure in Vietnam led to Nixon’s declaration in Guam in 
1969 of substantial US strategic retrenchment in Asia. The year before, in 
1968, Britain’s long and painful post-imperial decline reached the point 
that it could no longer sustain a strategic presence in Asia. Wilson’s ‘East of 
Suez’ announcement that year marked the end of any British commitment 
to help defend Australia or its interests in Asia. So, in SDSC’s first three 
years, Australia’s confidence in both of the great alliances on which its 
strategic policy was based had been undermined, and indeed overturned.
Today, we do not really recognise how shocking and disconcerting ‘East 
of Suez’ and ‘Guam’ were for that generation of policy-makers and analysts, 
and how fundamental they were to the defence policy revolution of the 
1970s, and hence to our defence policies now. That is in part because 
they were accompanied by other changes that, while not at that time as 
plain as the eclipse of our alliances, were in the long run more important. 
Alongside the bad news about our alliances there was a lot of good news 
about our region. Over the next few years, Suharto consolidated his New 
Order and transformed Indonesia into a bastion of regional order. South-
East Asia more broadly changed quite quickly from a major global trouble 
spot to become a model of progress and cooperation. The instability of 
the first post-colonial decades eased, and we saw real political, economic 
and social development in many countries. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as an effective foundation of regional 
stability. Most important of all, Nixon’s opening to China transformed 
the wider Asian regional order by eliminating—for a time—the strategic 
rivalry between these, the two strongest powers in the Asia-Pacific region. 
After 1972, the United States’ strategic position was uncontested by any 
major Asian power. Paradoxically, failure in Vietnam, far from destroying 
the United States’ position in Asia, immensely strengthened it. This 
marked the effective end of the Cold War in Asia and the emergence of 
the US-led regional order that kept Asia peaceful and prosperous for 40 
years, and kept Australia safe. Until the late 1980s, the United States still 
faced a bitter global rival in the Soviet Union, of course, but the later 
stages of the Cold War impinged surprisingly little on Australia’s sense of 
its security after 1972.
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All these tumultuous changes in the first decade of SDSC’s life—both 
the bad news and the good news—drove a radical rethink of Australia’s 
strategic and defence policy, causing it to involve new approaches to those 
old questions about how much we could depend on our allies and how 
far we should be able to fend for ourselves. Much of this was driven by 
some notable political leaders, including Gorton, Fraser, Whitlam and 
Barnard; by a remarkable group of public servants led by the redoubtable 
Arthur Tange; and including such figures such as Bob Hamilton and Bill 
Pritchett. But it did not all happen behind closed doors. From the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s, there was a remarkable efflorescence of public 
debate about how Australia should respond to the shifts in our strategic 
environment that everyone acknowledged were taking place and so plainly 
had big implications for defence and foreign policy. SDSC itself was at the 
very heart of this debate, which did a great deal to help build its position 
in the university, in Canberra and nationally.
Indeed, the origins of SDSC and start of serious public debate about 
Australia’s post–Forward Defence grand strategy can both be traced to 
the same event: the publication in 1965 of Tom Millar’s ground-breaking 
monograph on Australian defence policy, Australia’s Defence.2 Its theme 
was announced on the dustcover flap in bold type: ‘Can Australia Defend 
Itself?’ This simple, weighty question became the focus of the national 
defence debate over the next decade and beyond, and has in some ways 
remained the core focus of SDSC’s best work ever since.
The debate back then, however, had a distinctive tone. It was energised by 
the trauma of the Vietnam War, which made defence and strategic policy 
the most important and divisive issue in national politics throughout 
the later 1960s and early 1970s. It engaged strong arguments and deep 
emotions on both sides of politics, on both sides of the argument, and 
divided Australian society like no issue since. Moreover, it became a proxy 
for deeper questions about Australia’s identity, its relations with Britain 
and the United States, and its future in post-colonial Asia. These questions 
were debated with a vigour and brutal clarity that surprises us today. 
Few people now recall that Donald Horne’s Lucky Country—perhaps the 
most influential book ever written about the Australian identity—was an 
exploration of these questions. Writing in 1964, Horne conjured the idea 
that Australia is destined to be severed from our Anglo-Saxon roots and 
2  T.B. Millar, Australia’s Defence, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1965.
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instead ‘peopled from all over Asia’.3 No one then believed that Australia 
would not have to make some momentous choices as it adapted to life in 
a fast-changing Asia. To Horne and his contemporaries, today’s mantra 
of ‘we don’t have to choose’ would have seemed simply absurd.
Another factor that affected the tone and substance of the strategic debate 
at that time was the personal experiences of those who took part in it. 
Bob O’Neill again invoked that experience last night when he recollected 
listening around the family radio on 8 December 1941 to the news of 
Japan’s assault and the coming of the Pacific War. Likewise, Coral Bell’s 
brief memoir opens with her recollection of where she was and how she 
felt when she heard the news of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima that 
brought the war to an end.4 This generation—all of them—had direct 
personal experience of major-power wars in our region, of the stressing 
and collapse of regional order, and of direct threats to Australia by major 
powers. Many of them had of course served themselves in these wars. 
Perhaps most importantly, their direct experience of alliance failure 
was central to their understanding of strategic risks and strategic policy 
imperatives and shaped their ideas and debates in ways that we today seem 
too easily to overlook.
The result of this long, deep, serious debate against the background of the 
momentous changes taking place in our region and beyond was a very 
marked shift in the balance of Australia’s defence policy from alliance 
dependence to self-reliance. It took 20 years in all, with many important 
steps along the way, but as it happens this year (2016) marks notable 
anniversaries of the two most important of them. In 1976, 40 years ago, the 
Fraser Government released the first of Australia’s modern Defence White 
Papers, Australia’s Defence, which set out with great clarity the central idea 
that the principle purpose for which Australia’s armed forces should be 
designed and built was the self-reliant defence of our own continent rather 
than the support of allied operations beyond it. And in 1986, 30 years 
ago, the Dibb Review set out in great detail and sophistication how that 
should be done and what forces were needed to do it.
The ideas developed in these documents remain in many ways the 
conceptual foundation of Australia defence policy today, although they 
have often been rather poorly understood by many people both within 
3  Donald Horne, The Lucky Country, Penguin, Melbourne, 1964.
4  Coral Bell, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’, unpublished memoir, Canberra, 2012.
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the defence establishment and outside it. This is not the place to explore 
and correct the misunderstandings. Suffice it to say here that the ‘Defence 
of Australia’ policy, or DoA as it became known, both expanded and 
contracted the key purposes our forces were designed to fulfil. They were 
required to defend the continent independently, but only against the 
modest forces of a local regional power—Indonesia, in reality. They were 
not designed to fight the forces of a major Asian power either in the direct 
defence of Australia or to support allies in the wider region. That posture 
was credible only because we were confident that the United States 
would remain the uncontested primary power in Asia, thus precluding 
the possibility either of a major-power threat to Australia or of a major-
power challenge to the United States’ position serious enough to require 
Australian military support. It was the uncontested primacy of the United 
States in Asia that made Australia’s DoA policy possible.
This helps explain why, somewhat paradoxically, the era of self-reliance 
has become a golden age for Australia’s alliance with the United States. 
In the 1980s, the fierce contentions of the Vietnam era had fizzled and 
died. Fervent support for the alliance became universal across the political 
spectrum. And why not? With Asia stable and peaceful under uncontested 
US leadership, the strategic interests of Australia and the United States were 
clearly aligned and very cheaply achieved. Australia demanded nothing of 
the United States, and it demanded very little indeed of Australia. As the 
memory of the tough choices and hard debates of the 1960s faded, it was 
easy for the US alliance to become somewhat romanticised. It was even 
easier when the Cold War ended and the United States emerged as the 
global hyperpower of the unipolar era. Australia envisaged a flattering 
place for itself as the very closest ally of the world’s preponderant military, 
economic, political and cultural power. Not surprisingly, the uncertainties 
about the alliance that had driven the strategic debates of 50 years ago 
dropped away. It became easier and easier to assume that the United States 
would always, far ahead as we can see, have the power and the will to 
remain the dominant power in Asia and the sure protector of Australia’s 
security. Not surprisingly, our strategic policy swung back to depending 
on our allies rather than fending for ourselves.
‘Self-reliance’ has become an empty term, interoperability with US forces 
has become, it seems, the primary factor in capability planning, and the 
focus has swung sharply from conducting independent operations to 
contributing contingents to US-led coalitions. Australia today is more 
comfortable relying on our allies for our security than we have been at 
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any time since 1880. Indeed, in the post–Cold War era it has seemed as 
if Australia has returned to the happy situation that we enjoyed in our 
strategically innocent national adolescence before 1880 as a close strategic 
partner of the globally dominant Anglo-Saxon hyperpower that is the 
uncontested leading strategic power in Asia. Why then worry much about 
our own defence? Why fend for ourselves when we have such an ally to 
rely on?
Which brings us to today and what are surely the most important 
questions confronting Australian strategic policy-makers and analysts in 
the late 2010s. Can this last? Will the swing from fending for ourselves 
back to relying on our allies work for us in the coming decades? The 
answer in turn depends on some further questions. How confident can 
we be that the United States will in future still play the role in Asia and 
in Australia’s security that it has played over the past couple of decades? 
Above all, will it remain the uncontested primary power in Asia? And 
if not, what will happen to us, and what can we do about it? These are 
the biggest and most consequential questions confronted by Australian 
strategic policy since the great strategic upheavals at the time SDSC 
was founded 50 years ago. They arise today because of the immense 
shift in the distribution of wealth and power that has occurred as Asia’s 
economies have grown, especially with the rise of China. That, in turn, 
has fundamentally transformed China’s strategic objectives from those it 
adopted when Nixon met Mao in 1972. As a result, the United States 
no longer enjoys uncontested strategic primacy in Asia. Instead, we have 
seen, over about the past decade, a resurgence of strategic rivalry between 
the United States and China of a kind we have not seen since before 1972.
This is a fundamental shift in the position of our major ally in Asia and 
hence in our strategic circumstances. Australia’s strategic policy has yet 
to address it coherently. There have been three Defence White Papers 
since this shift became plainly evident, in 2009, 2013 and 2016. All of 
them show deep ambivalence and uncertainty about how to respond. 
All acknowledge, to different degrees, the scale of the shift in wealth and 
power that is reshaping our strategic circumstances in Asia. All nonetheless 
conclude that no basic change in Australia’s defence policy or broader 
strategic posture is necessary. All express confidence that the role of the 
United States in Asia and its support for Australia’s security will not change 
within the next three decades, if ever. All of them attempt to conceal these 
complacent conclusions by overhyping what are in reality modest and 
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very distant increases in naval capabilities. And, tellingly, each of these 
three documents has expressed more confidence about the future of US 
strategic leadership in Asia than its predecessor.
So we need to do better. That means addressing and debating more clearly 
and forcefully two big sets of questions. The first concerns the seriousness 
of the challenge to the US-led regional order on which our present 
policy so completely depends. That involves judgements about China’s 
intentions, its power and its resolve. It also involves judgements about 
US intentions, power and resolve. Too many of us for too long have been 
content to assume that the United States will always remain decisively 
more powerful than China and more determined to preserve the US-led 
order in Asia than China is to replace it. It has therefore been too easy 
to assume that China can easily be persuaded to settle for little, if any, 
change in its relationship with the United States or increase in its regional 
leadership role. Those assumptions now require very careful scrutiny.
The second set of questions concerns the consequences for Australia if 
the challenge to the US-led order does indeed prove to be more serious 
than most of us assume. We need to explore the different kinds of new 
order that might emerge to replace it, the consequences of different future 
orders for Australia’s security and prosperity, and the implications for the 
kind of order that we should be aiming to promote or avoid. The second 
concerns Australia’s options for positioning ourselves as well as possible 
in whatever new order emerges—whether or not it be one that suits our 
interests. This has big implications both for our diplomacy and for the 
way we develop our armed forces. It will involve a rethink of our foreign 
and defence policies comparable in scale to the one that occurred in the 
decades after 1966.
I fear that future historians will find it remarkable, and regrettable, that so 
little attention has been paid to these questions both within government 
and in the wider strategic and foreign policy community over the past 
decade or more as the trends driving fundamental strategic change in Asia 
have become clearer and clearer. I think they will judge that we have failed 
to address the second set of questions because we have not yet got past the 
first. We have been in denial about the dynamics driving strategic change 
in Asia even as we celebrate the economic transformation that underpins 
it. We have collectively acquiesced to the assumption that Asia can be 
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utterly changed economically yet remain quite unchanged strategically 
when any serious, historically aware study of strategy should warn us that 
this is most unlikely.
It seems likely that we have so readily acquiesced to the assumption 
because abandoning it implies such unsettlingly radical shifts in our 
foreign and defence policies. It suggests we must face up to choices we 
have no wish to make and that both sides of politics are equally unwilling 
to contemplate. In part that is because the practical, and particularly the 
fiscal, implications of some of those choices are so unwelcome. But more 
deeply it is because they go to questions of our national identity that we 
do not wish to expose and address. The questions Donald Horne raised 
back in 1964 remain difficult and sensitive ones for us today. For Horne 
and his generation, it was obvious that Australia did have choices to make 
between its history and its geography. Our generation welcomed John 
Howard’s assurance that this was not so. He persuaded us that the United 
States’ enduring preponderance meant that such choices need never be 
made. We have been reluctant to see the mounting evidence that he was 
probably wrong.
It has been easier for us to ignore this mounting evidence because our 
thinking about the alliance has been increasingly divorced from any 
historical context. This is not a failing in the areas of foreign and defence 
policy alone: Laura Tingle has written very tellingly about Australia’s 
broader problem of political and policy amnesia.5 But it is perhaps 
particularly serious in our field of policy where hard data is so scarce and 
the lessons we can glean from history are correspondingly more important. 
Today, our thinking about the future of our alliance with the United States 
and America’s role in Asia is hampered by the pervasive illusion that our 
allies and our alliance have always been just as strong and indubitable as so 
many of us imagine them to be today. We have forgotten Asia’s history of 
power politics and strategic rivalry. We have forgotten Australia’s history 
of alliance uncertainty and outright failure, including the fall of Singapore 
and the Guam Doctrine. We have forgotten too much of Australia’s 
history, and of SDSC’s own history, to see our future as clearly as we 
should if we are to sustain SDSC’s proud record of service to our country. 
We need to do better.
5  Laura Tingle, Political Amnesia: How We Forgot to Govern, Quarterly Essay, no. 60, 2015.
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Strategic studies in practice: 
A South‑East Asian perspective
Peter Ho
I begin this chapter with two disclaimers. First, I am not an expert on 
strategic studies. Second, I do not think that a singular and monolithic 
South-East Asian perspective on strategic studies exists. In this regard, 
as far as I am aware, in South-East Asia, there is only one institute that 
is properly focused on the full range of strategic studies, and that is 
Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, or RSIS.1
A personal history
My encounters with strategic studies have been tangential. My first 
encounter occurred when I was in military service and a student at our 
command and staff course in Singapore. The course introduced me to 
thinkers like Mahan, Douhet, Liddell Hart and, of course, Clausewitz 
and Sun Tzu. We studied strategic concepts like nuclear deterrence, great 
1  The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as 
an autonomous school within Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. Known as the Institute 
of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) when it was established in July 1996, RSIS’s mission is to 
be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the 
Asia-Pacific.
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power dynamics, liberation ideologies, Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, 
revolutionary warfare, counter-insurgency warfare, united front tactics, 
guerrilla warfare and so on.
For good reason, strategic studies were taught in tandem with military 
history. The orientation then, as now, was, not surprisingly, focused on 
the region, so the Malayan Campaign and the Malayan Emergency were 
dissected in some detail for the lessons that could be gleaned from these 
two upheavals. We were fortunate to have obtained the original manuscript 
of Masanobu Tsuji’s detailed account of the planning and execution of the 
Japanese invasion of Malaya. Tsuji was a colonel in the Japanese Army 
and, as a member of General Yamashita’s staff, planned the invasion.
Strategic studies and military history opened up an entirely new world 
for me. They provided insights into the past and, more importantly, 
an  understanding of present issues—such as the Cold War, which was 
then still the central geopolitical fact of life.
But over time, I lost my currency in the vocabulary and the details, 
even though I have retained my understanding of the broad concepts. 
Having said that, in my time, Singapore luckily faced no conflict to 
test my understanding of these ideas and concepts. Luckily for me too, 
I was never put to the test. I think I would have been proven to be not 
very competent—certainly in the academic minutiae and probably as 
a military commander.
Some years after I completed the command and staff course at Singapore’s 
Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College, I led a review of the 
college’s syllabi. The review, not surprisingly, asserted the importance of 
strategic studies and military history. So not only did strategic studies and 
military history remain at the core of the various programs run by the 
command and staff college, but a Department of Strategic Studies was 
also established.
Later on, in 1997, teaching of strategic studies and military history was 
outsourced to the new Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), 
which became a full school—RSIS—10 years later in 2007. This provided 
the Command and Staff College access to a team of experts whose primary 
business was strategic studies and military history, thus enhancing the 
quality of teaching in this important area. In return, it anchored strategic 
studies as a core capability of IDSS/RSIS.
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Why strategic studies?
At this point, it might be useful to ask a basic question: why is strategic 
studies important? I discovered its value later on in civilian life when 
I worked on plans and policy in the Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 
during my postings to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and when I was in 
charge of National Security and Intelligence Coordination (a department 
under the Prime Minister’s Office).
It was in these positions that the concepts and constructs embedded in 
strategic studies really came alive for me. They provided an important 
foundation to help me to understand the world, discover the drivers of 
grand strategy, uncover the impulses of foreign policy and develop an 
instinct about how nations and governments respond to challenges and 
how they interact with one another. They helped me to connect strategy 
to operations and plans, and to frame decisions in their conceptual, 
intellectual, historical and ideological contexts.
But I also found out that, as a discipline, strategic studies are largely based 
on hindsight and historical insight, while my experience in planning and 
policy-making taught me that things never follow a predictable trajectory, 
especially in the medium to long term.
Strategic surprise
When I became a planner and a policy officer in the Ministry of Defence 
in the early 1980s, it would have been difficult for anyone to grasp the 
concept of transnational terrorism that today preoccupies defence and 
national security planners and policy-makers. We were still in the throes 
of the Cold War, although hindsight now tells us that the war was then 
already waning. In those days, the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA)2 
and cyber warfare were concepts that we could only dimly understand. 
Today, they have become part of mainstream thinking.
2  ‘According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense: “A revolution in military affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of 
warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with 
dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally 
alters the character and conduct of military operations.”’ Lothar Ibrugger, ‘The revolution in military 
affairs’, NATO Parliamentary Assembly special report, November 1998, www.iwar.org.uk/rma/
resources/nato/ar299stc-e.html (retrieved 21 January 2018).
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Indeed, one of the foremost challenges facing anyone in the business 
of planning or policy-making is the challenge of strategic surprise.
Most of us have heard of black swans, a term coined by Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb.3 They are rare, hard-to-predict events that have a large, game-
changing impact. Later on, in 2002, the then US Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, introduced us to a close relative of the black swan, 
the unknown unknown. He said:
There are known knowns. These are things we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns. That is to say we know that there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the 
ones we don’t know we don’t know.4
When he said this, a lot of people poked fun at him. But notions of known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns reflect a serious concept. If you are 
in the business of defence, or if you are in the military, you ought to 
understand what known unknowns are and what unknown unknowns 
are, because you are going to be surprised by both every now and then. 
And it helps to understand the difference between them.
In Singapore, we have had encounters with black swans and unknown 
unknowns in recent years: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98; 9/11; 
the uncovering of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network in December 
2001; the global economic and financial crisis of 2008–09; the Arab 
Spring; the rise of ISIS or Daesh; Brexit; and so on.
The frequency of such strategic shocks seems to be increasing, and the 
amplitude of their impact is growing. Lenin explained why when he said, 
‘Everything is connected to everything else’. A few hundred years earlier, 
Leonardo da Vinci had said, ‘Everything connects to everything else’. 
Both might even have been aware that the ancient Chinese philosopher 
Lao Tzu had made much the same observation some 1,500 years ago, that 
‘everything is connected and everything relates to each other’.
3  A black swan is a metaphor for an event that comes as a surprise, has a major impact and is often 
rationalised after the fact with the benefit of hindsight. The theory was developed by Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb and described in his eponymous bestseller The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 
Random House, New York, 2010.
4  Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary of Defense, responding to a question at a Department 
of Defense (DoD) news briefing on 12 February 2002 about the lack of evidence linking the 
Iraqi Government with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. ‘DoD news 
briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers’, US Department of Defense, archive.defense.gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (retrieved 22 September 2016).
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Globalisation increases and intensifies these connections, as does the 
Internet. In such a connected world, what happens in one part of the 
world is going to affect other parts of the world—the so-called butterfly 
effect, which postulates that the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil can 
set off a tornado in Texas.5 The butterfly effect is the concept that small 
causes can have large effects. Events and actions in different parts interact 
with each other in complex, non-linear ways to produce effects that are 
difficult to determine ex ante. Instead, their behaviour is emergent. This is 
the defining characteristic of a complex system that today forms the basis 
of the new science of complexity.6
In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor in Tunis, set 
himself alight. He was upset by the lack of support from the Tunisian 
authorities. It was a terminal protest because he died from the self-
immolation. But that single act—a single event—triggered the Arab 
Spring. The consequences were dramatic. Governments collapsed in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Governments changed in Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Oman. A civil war broke out in Syria, and it is still raging six 
years after Bouazizi killed himself. It can be argued that these events set 
the stage for the rise of the Islamic State or ISIS or Daesh.
The most imaginative novelist could not have written the script for the 
Arab Spring. The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once said, ‘Life is 
understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards’.7 Encapsulated 
in this profound statement is the concept of retrospective coherence, 
otherwise known as hindsight. The current state of affairs always makes 
logical sense when you can look backwards in time. That is hindsight, and 
it helps us to understand why something happened. That is why strategic 
studies and military history are so useful.
5  Edward Norton Lorenz, an American mathematician, meteorologist and pioneer of chaos theory, 
introduced this concept in 1972. See Peter Dizikes, ‘When the butterfly effect took flight’, MIT 
Technology Review, 22 February 2011, www.technologyreview.com/s/422809/when-the-butterfly-
effect-took-flight/ (retrieved 21 January 2018).
6  Kevin Oliver, ‘Climate dynamics’, University of Southampton School of Ocean and Earth 
Science lecture slides, undated, slideplayer.com/slide/10423511/ (retrieved 21 January 2018). 
‘Complexity science is the scientific study of complex systems, systems with many parts that interact 
to produce global behaviour that cannot easily be explained in terms of interactions between the 
individual constituent elements.’
7  Søren Kierkegaard, Journalen JJ:167 (1843), Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, volume 18, Søren 
Kierkegaard Research Center, Copenhagen, 1997, p. 306.
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But hindsight is not necessarily able to tell you what is going to happen 
when you look forward in time. The current pattern is logical, but it is 
only one of many patterns that could have been formed, any one of which 
would have been equally logical. Where we are today is path-dependent,8 
and arises because of complexity. That is the problem. We cannot predict 
the future.
Singapore’s founding prime minister, the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew, said, 
‘The  past was not preordained, nor is the future. There are as many 
unexpected problems ahead as there were in the past’.9 It sounds like 
a truism, but it is the reality that governments have to deal with.
The black elephant
At this point, I would like to introduce another occupant of my menagerie 
of strategic surprise, the black elephant.
What is a black elephant? It is a cross between a black swan and the 
elephant in the room. The black elephant is a problem that is actually 
visible to everyone—the proverbial elephant in the room—but no one 
wants to deal with it so they pretend it is not there. It is seen to be an 
improbable event when actually it is not. When the problem blows up, 
everyone feigns surprise and shock, behaving as if it were a black swan.
All human beings have blind spots. The tendency of the human mind is 
to underestimate sudden crises, whether because of their own cognitive 
biases or because it is inconvenient to admit to the obvious.10 So initially, 
through hesitation and until events reach crisis proportions, nobody takes 
any action. This can lead to military failure—for example, the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
8  ‘Path dependence explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is 
limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be 
relevant.’ From Jay Barney and William Hesterly, Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage: 
Concepts, 2nd edn, 2007, Pearson, Upper Saddle River.
9  The then Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, speaking at his 60th birthday dinner on 
16 September 1983.
10  Cognitive bias: ‘Systematic error in judgment and decision-making common to all human 
beings which can be due to cognitive limitations, motivational factors, and/or adaptations to natural 
environments.’ (A. Wilke and R. Mata, ‘Cognitive bias’, Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, 2nd edn, 
vol. 1, ed. V.S. Ramachandran, Academic Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012).
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ISIS is arguably a black elephant. Then US President Barack Obama 
admitted in September 2014, ‘The United States underestimated the 
threat posed by ISIS fighters in Syria and overestimated the effectiveness 
of the security forces in Iraq’.11 Most recently, we were astonished to learn 
that the Treasury in the United Kingdom had made no contingency plans 
for Brexit.12 Neither had the British armed forces. In my view, these stand 
as examples of black elephants in our midst.
Strategic surprise and governance
One of the pioneer members of the Singapore Cabinet, Mr S. Rajaratnam, 
was a very forward-looking person with a strategic outlook. In 1979, 
he said:
There are practical men who maintain that such speculations [thinking 
about the future] are a waste of time. And they have no bearing at all on 
solutions to immediate day-to-day problems. This may have been so in 
earlier periods of history when changes were few and minute, and were 
spread over decades and centuries. But because we are not only living in 
a world of accelerating changes but also of changes which are global 
in scope and which permeate almost all aspects of human activity … and 
since change is about the future, then only a future-oriented society can 
cope with the problems of the 21st century.13
Mr Rajaratnam was talking about the operating environment of 
a globalised world in which the pace of change is accelerating. How do 
we cope with that? We must begin to learn to think systematically about 
a future that is inherently volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous 
(VUCA) just as we think about the past that is known or knowable.
Anticipating and preparing for change is a profound and critical strategic 
capability for any government, particularly for military and defence 
establishments but more generally for all parts of government. Here lies 
the conundrum that all planners and policy-makers face. How do you 
11  President Barack Obama in ‘60 Minutes’ interview on CBS, 26 September 2014, broadcast 
28 September 2014, www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-u-s-underestimated-rise-of-isis-in-iraq-and-syria/ 
(retrieved 30 January 2018).
12  Gemma Tetlow, ‘Treasury made no plans for Brexit, says new head, Tom Scholar’, Financial 
Times, 7 July 2016.
13  Speech by S. Rajaratnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Singapore into the 21st century’, seminar, 
Singapore Association for the Advancement of Science, Singapore Science Centre, 20 December 1979.
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make plans and policies for the long term, knowing that changes in the 
operating environment are likely to occur within a shorter time frame and 
that they will inevitably affect or even negate these plans? You make certain 
assumptions when you launch a big capital project such as a warship or 
an aircraft. But there inevitably will be changes in technology and the 
strategic environment. How do you factor these changes, many of which 
cannot be foreseen, into the planning for such projects that might have 
life spans for capital platforms of maybe 20, 30 or 40 years?
There is no way we can predict the future. If we could, many of us would 
be out of jobs. But we can adopt methods and processes that help us reduce 
the frequency of strategic shock and reduce its amplitude or intensity 
when the inevitable shock occurs. Strategic studies have an important role 
to play in each of these tasks.
Scenario planning
There are foresight methodologies—ways to think about the future 
systematically and ways that help to overcome some of our latent biases 
and inherent cognitive constraints. One of them is the famous scenario 
planning method, which was developed and pioneered by the oil giant 
Shell. In fact, in 2012, Shell commemorated 40 years of scenario 
planning.14 Shell famously avoided the impact of the oil shock in the 
1970s because of scenario planning. But I have not seen much evidence 
that strategic studies have adopted such tools, perhaps because these 
foresight methods are too unconventional and maybe because they are 
perceived to lack academic respectability.
Governments are less constrained, however, because they have to deal 
with the real world and their imperative is to deliver results. In Singapore, 
the Ministry of Defence made it an imperative to find ways to better 
anticipate changes in technology and the operating environment. In the 
late 1980s, it started using Shell’s scenario planning techniques. Then, 
in 1991, encouraged by Ministry of Defence’s positive experiences with 
scenario planning, a Scenario Planning Office (now called the Strategic 
14  Shell has been doing scenario planning since the 1970s to help its leaders explore ways forward 
and make better decisions. Scenarios ask ‘what if?’ questions, encouraging leaders to consider 
events that might be only remote possibilities, to stretch their thinking. Shell scenarios also help 
governments, academia and business to understand possibilities and uncertainties ahead.
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Policy Office) was set up in the Prime Minister’s Office to apply the 
technique to issues affecting the entire government, not just the defence 
and security agencies.
Today, scenario planning is a key part of the Singapore Government’s 
strategic planning process. National-level scenario planning exercises are 
run every few years and are even incorporated into the annual budget 
cycle. The resultant scenarios are used by ministries and agencies as a base 
reference for their own strategic planning. Apart from these efforts, which 
deal with issues on a national scale, focused scenario studies are also carried 
out on specific issues like climate change or when significant geopolitical 
change seems imminent.
In the Singapore experience, we have discovered that when scenarios are 
well crafted and articulate imaginative yet plausible ways in which the 
future could evolve, planners and policy-makers will move out of their 
comfort zones, begin to think the unthinkable, and more willingly explore 
fresh strategies. Scenario planning helps to inculcate an ‘anticipatory 
mindset’ in planners and policy-makers so that they instinctively raise 
‘what if ’ questions on the issues they deal with.
Beyond scenario planning
Notwithstanding these benefits, scenario planning also has its limitations. 
Scenarios alone cannot adequately reflect the complexity of the operating 
environment. Scenario planning also undervalues the impact of the 
irrational on future outcomes and, unfortunately, is not very useful in 
locating the black swans and the unknown unknowns. The Nobel laureate, 
economist and strategic thinker Thomas Schelling explained, ‘One thing 
a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis, or heroic his 
imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him’.
We have adopted other tools to address this deficiency in Singapore, 
even if partially. While scenario planning remains the base, a wider range 
of foresight tools, such as ‘horizon scanning’, ‘backcasting’ and ‘causal-
layered analysis’, are now deployed. These tools are collectively referred 
to as Scenario Planning Plus (SP+). They help planners to uncover and 
discover some—but certainly not all—of the black swans and unknown 
unknowns lurking beyond the horizon.
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Horizon scanning15 tries to identify the big game-changers by looking for 
emerging issues and trends and delving into them to see where the threats 
and opportunities are.
What are the big game-changers now? Some of them are to be found in 
the current wave of innovation taking place in information technology. 
This is not only about big data and data analytics. It also includes the 
Internet of Things, cloud computing, drones, robotics and 3D printing 
(also known as additive manufacturing).
There have also been significant innovations in other sectors. The shale 
gas revolution created by fracking technology is part of the reason why 
oil prices are so low and why the United States is a net exporter of 
energy. Until recently, many ignored fracking, associating it solely with 
its potentially negative environmental impact. However, in hindsight, 
it is clear that this technology has been beneficially disruptive. Massive 
reserves of shale gas can now be extracted from the ground in the United 
States through fracking.
But such disruption is not just about innovation and opportunity. There 
is also a substantial potential downside. Serious people like Bill Gates, 
Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned that artificial intelligence 
might pose an existential risk.
Cyber threats are now understood to be very serious. Two years ago, and 
just a few years after a sophisticated computer worm called Stuxnet was 
deployed to attack uranium enrichment centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear 
facility at Natanz, Iranian hackers infiltrated the control system of a small 
community dam less than 20 miles from New York City. Last year, three 
power grids in Ukraine were brought down by hackers using techniques 
similar to Stuxnet. But unlike in a traditional war, it is sometimes difficult 
to know where or even whether an opponent has struck.
Earlier this year, thieves siphoned US$81 million from Bangladesh Bank 
in a sophisticated cyber heist. This was neither the first time nor the last.
15  ‘Horizon scanning (or environmental scanning) is the systematic process of picking up weak 
signals and trends and monitor driving forces, potential discontinuities and emerging issues from 
regular scanning of diverse information sources.’ Centre for Strategic Futures and Civil Service 
College, ‘Foresight: A glossary’, Singapore, Centre for Strategic Futures, Public Service Division, 
Civil Service College, undated, www.csf.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/csf-
csc_foresight--a-glossary.pdf (accessed 18 June 2018).
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With artificial intelligence, drones can fly on pre-programmed routes and 
might even be able to choose their own targets. Newsweek declared, with 
some hyperbole, ‘Once drones get artificial intelligence, they’ll rule the 
world’.16
To top all this off, we see a growing ease of raising money for the new 
products from technological innovation. Crowdsourcing also made 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s War Vehicle prototyping 
process five times faster. Crowdsourcing means that a terrorist can apply 
online and receive what amounts to a certification to kill.
There are other big issues. Demographics is a perennial. Water is another. 
Many countries are going to face water shortages because they have 
carelessly drained their water tables. In other words, they have used up 
a non-renewable resource: underground water. Furthermore, many other 
countries are now facing the effects of climate change, such as changing 
weather patterns disruptions to rainfall. The resulting water shortages are 
not mere inconveniences. They are an issue of survival and therefore have 
huge security and strategic implications.
Such emerging strategic issues have the potential to become game-
changers. The question is which ones should we focus on. Which ones are 
going to evolve into big challenges and be big opportunities? Which others 
will fizzle out? Strategic studies, complemented by scenario planning and 
other foresight techniques, can help us to develop a deeper understanding 
of such issues and to separate the existential from the merely inconvenient.
Singapore’s Centre for Strategic Futures
In 2009, the Singapore Government set up the Centre for Strategic 
Futures (CSF),17 a think tank that promotes a whole-of-government 
approach to strategic planning. It identifies, adapts and develops foresight 
and futures thinking concepts and tools for the SP+ toolbox, as well as 
analysing emerging issues for the Singapore Government. Although a 
16  Kevin Maney, ‘Once drones get artificial intelligence, they’ll rule the world’, Newsweek, 
4 September 2016.
17  CSF’s mission is to position the Singapore Government to navigate emerging strategic challenges 
and harness potential opportunities by building capacities, mind sets, expertise and tools for strategic 
anticipation and risk management; developing insights into future trends, discontinuities and 
strategic surprises; and communicating insights to decision-makers for informed policy planning.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN STRATEGIC THINKING 2 .0
128
small outfit, the CSF is a catalyst for better foresight and futures thinking 
in the government and its agencies. Since the establishment of the CSF, 
several ministries and agencies of the Singapore Government have set 
up their own foresight or futures units. Giving a small group of people 
the latitude and the bandwidth to think systematically about the future 
is going some way to reducing the frequency of strategic surprise and 
mitigating the impact of such shocks.
Wicked problems and complexity
This growing network of foresight units has helped Singapore to deal, 
albeit imperfectly, with wicked problems,18 a term coined by design 
theorists Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber. Wicked problems are highly 
complex. Their causes and other influencing factors cannot easily be 
determined. Furthermore, they have multiple stakeholders who see these 
problems from different perspectives and who have divergent goals. This 
means there are no immediate or obvious solutions because nobody can 
agree on what the problems are in the first place, never mind what the 
solutions are.
Crises are usually wicked problems. Terrorism is a particularly wicked 
problem. Some of you might be surprised by this assertion because you 
would think that all of us want to get rid of terrorism—except of course 
the terrorists. But even if everyone agreed on how to distinguish terrorists 
from legitimate freedom fighters, and there was consensus that terrorism 
should be banished, it is not clear that the policy prescriptions would 
gain universal acceptance. If it were the case, then terrorism would not 
be the persistent problem that it is today and ISIS would not be such 
a serious threat.
We mostly work in organisations that respect hierarchy. This is how 
human systems work. But in a wicked problem where there are multiple 
stakeholders, more likely than not, there will be different organisations 
managing only parts of the larger problem. It should be an imperative 
18  ‘A wicked problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory 
and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. The use of term “wicked” here has 
come to denote resistance to resolution, rather than evil.’ (‘Rhetorical terms’, in Writing Across the 
Curriculum, Appalachian State University, undated, wac.appstate.edu/wac-glossary-terms/general-
writing-terms/d-rhetorical-terms (retrieved 21 January 2018, emphasis in original)).
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to be able to bring these different organisations together to address the 
wicked problem in its totality. In Singapore, we call this the ‘whole-of-
government’ approach.
Tackling the threat of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)19 has been a wicked problem 
for Singapore. It is not just about removing the immediate threat that 
the JI posed to Singapore’s security. It also requires engaging multiple 
stakeholders, including community groups. It means engaging the 
private sector to assist in developing protective systems, processes and 
infrastructure. This approach clearly needs not just many agencies of 
government coming together but also bringing in the people and the 
private sectors. In a way, it is not just a ‘whole-of-government’20 approach 
but also a ‘whole-of-nation’ effort. The Singapore approach is to fight 
the JI network with a ‘whole-of-nation’ network. This is because JI poses 
a multidimensional threat that requires collaboration not only among 
security agencies but also social agencies with oversight of issues affecting 
local communities. Recently, the Singapore Government introduced the 
SGSecure movement, which involves bringing together multiple sectors 
and players to collaborate and coordinate against terrorist threats.
In the context of strategic studies, efforts to understand our complex 
world often rely on an assumption: that what is complex can be reduced 
to simpler subsets that are easier to evaluate and that when reaggregated 
will produce results that approximate the real world.
This approach is reductionism.21 Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of 
modern political philosophy, argued that all phenomena, including human 
activity, could be reduced to bodies in motion and their interactions. 
This assumption gave birth to modern science. It led to the tendency to 
dissect the world and to favour explanations framed at the lowest level of 
scale. It is rooted in the belief that complex phenomena can be analysed 
in component—and simpler—parts. The assumption is that after these 
19  JI is a South-East Asian militant Islamist terrorist group dedicated to the establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate in South-East Asia. JI was responsible for the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002.
20  ‘A term used in the Singapore Government to describe a networked approach to governance, 
where officers in different parts of government are able to overcome intra-government differences, 
e.g. differences in individual agency priorities and tackle problems as a coherent and coordinated 
whole.’ (Centre for Strategic Futures and Civil Service College, ‘Foresight: A glossary’.)
21  The practice of analysing and describing a complex phenomenon in terms of its simple 
or fundamental constituents.
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parts have been analysed separately, it is then possible to understand the 
properties of the whole in terms of the properties and the interactions 
of these components.
But despite the enormous importance of this approach, it gives the false 
impression that investigating the features of things at a holistic level is less 
informative than investigating the properties of the components. I would 
argue that strategic studies have tended towards the reductionist approach 
rather than looking at situations in a more holistic manner.
Net assessments
A way to offset the problems inherent in the reductionist approach 
is to employ the net assessment approach, which is done very well in 
the Australian Office of National Assessments. In many ways, the net 
assessment approach, pioneered by the US Department of Defense’s Office 
of Net Assessment, which was headed for many years by the legendary 
Andrew Marshall, is analogous to the ‘whole-of-government’ approach.
Net assessment22 acknowledges that strategic interactions are shaped by 
the complex sprawling organisations that break big (and wicked) problems 
into manageable smaller ones. For example, one of the basic ways national 
security problems are broken down is departmentally between the military 
and the civilian intelligence community. Each jealously guards its role, 
and each is concerned about not revealing information that might help an 
opponent (also known as the doctrine of ‘need to know’). 
This compartmentalisation has had a significant influence on strategy. 
Problems can be broken down in different ways. For example, an obvious 
question to ask is whether the military and the civilian intelligence agencies 
look at an opponent in the same way. Do they see trends similarly? 
Such compartmentalisation creates a need for integration. At some point, 
information from these agencies has to be put together. But while many 
people assume that this happens automatically, those with a grasp of net 
22  Adapted from Paul Bracken, ‘Net assessment: A practical guide’, Parameters, Spring 
2006,  pp.  90–100, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/06spring/bracken.
htm (retrieved 13 March 2018).
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assessment—or of organisational behaviour—understand that nothing 
is automatic in big organisations, particularly if it involves sharing 
of information horizontally across vertical silos.
In net assessment, the imperative and the discipline is for information 
from all sources—and across disciplines—to be shared and evaluated 
holistically so that complex situations are studied as a whole and not in 
their parts. This approach helps connect the dots. By thinking broadly, 
by considering how different events, drivers and agents interact with each 
other, we can see the larger picture and obtain a better fix on the possible 
outcomes. In responding to wicked problems, such an approach is not 
just desirable—it is absolutely critical.
Interdisciplinary thinking
Net assessment and horizon scanning all require the ability to look at 
situations holistically. This is important because, as many have said, 
everything is connected to everything else. We will not see the wood for 
the trees if we look at each issue from a narrow perspective.
So this is also an argument for strategic studies to move beyond its 
traditional focus on politics and security and to enlarge its view of the 
world to see how economics, demographics, societal issues and issues of 
environment and of technology interact with each other to produce the 
complexities of the operating environment, a complexity that generates 
wicked problems, black swans and unknown unknowns. Strategic studies 
should move into a more interdisciplinary approach rather than study 
things in their separate domains. It is a counter-reductionist approach. 
In  a  research or an academic setting of strategic studies, this approach 
means that silos should be collapsed in favour of interdisciplinary 
collaboration.
But it is hard to counter the deep instinct in academia to focus on 
a single discipline bred out of centuries of reductionism and instead to 
move towards interdisciplinary collaboration. After all, there are Nobel 
Prizes for chemistry, physics, economics and medicine, but none for 
interdisciplinary collaboration.
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Nonetheless, interdisciplinary collaboration is imperative for solving the 
big challenges of today in science and technology, the social sciences, the 
economy, urbanisation and the environment. Why not in geopolitics, 
geostrategy and geoeconomics?
Competing and complementary geographies
As a penultimate point, I would like to return to the question of 
whether a South-East Asian perspective exists by pointing out that there 
is a difference in how people look at issues.
In his study of cultures, The Geography of Thought,23 Richard Nisbett 
identified a major cognitive difference between Western and Asian—
including South-East Asian—cultures. At the risk of oversimplification, 
after looking at a picture of, say, a horse, Westerners tend to remember 
the horse. But Asians (including of course South-East Asians) would also 
recall the background, whether there were clouds in the sky and whether 
the grass was green. The question is whether strategic studies can normalise 
this difference, perhaps by taking a more holistic, interdisciplinary and 
geographically diverse approach. In so doing, the discipline could create 
a better and a common understanding of the big challenges and issues 
facing the world.
Conclusion
Good plans and policies acknowledge the uncertainties and complexities 
of  the operating environment. Strategic studies should likewise 
acknowledge these uncertainties and complexities to embrace tools of 
foresight and futures thinking and look at issues holistically. From these 
they can derive new insights that can help to inform the work of planners 
and policy-makers.
23  Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … 
and Why, Free Press, New York, 2003.
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American grand strategy 
in the post–Cold War era
Hal Brands
I
The post–Cold War era has now lasted more than a quarter-century.1 
This period has been an eventful time in US grand strategy. The United 
States did not withdraw from the world after the Soviet collapse; 
rather, it recommitted to pursuing a globalism every bit as ambitious as 
during the  bipolar era. It is therefore worth considering what insights 
the experience  of the post–Cold War era have to offer at a time 
when the  international order is often thought to be reaching a new 
inflection point.
Unfortunately, discussions of the United States’ post–Cold War grand 
strategy are afflicted by three pervasive misconceptions: first, that with 
the end of the Cold War the United States broke dramatically with its 
previous grand strategic tradition and undertook a radically new approach 
to the world; second, that the United States’ post–Cold War grand strategy 
1  The ideas expressed in this chapter were originally published in Hal Brands, ‘US grand strategy: 
Not so bad after all’, American Interest 12, no. 3, 2017, pp. 6–17; and in Chapter 1 of Hal Brands, 
American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2018. 
I am grateful to Adam Garfinkle and the American Interest for granting permission to publish 
a modified version of that article here.
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has been ineffective and even quixotic; and third, that this period of US 
primacy is now over and that the United States has no choice but to 
retrench fundamentally as a result.2
All three ideas are more myth than reality. The United States did not 
embrace a radically new grand strategy after the Cold War; it simply 
adapted its long-standing, post-war grand strategy to a more favourable era 
of US dominance. That endeavour was hardly fruitless or self-defeating; 
on balance, it helped to ensure that the post–Cold War system has so far 
been more stable, liberal and congenial to US interests than many leading 
observers predicted a quarter-century ago. Finally, although Washington 
currently faces greater challenges to its international superiority than at 
any time since the Cold War, the age of US primacy has not yet passed. 
Accordingly, the time has not come for radical retrenchment; the proper 
course is rather to sustain the grand strategy that the United States has 
pursued, fairly successfully, for more than 25 years.
We often see the end of the Cold War as a fundamental point of departure 
in US foreign relations.3 Yet, in reality, the United States’ post–Cold 
War grand strategy is best seen as the logical extension of an approach 
that originated following World War II. For US officials, World War II 
demonstrated the basic interdependence of the world environment 
and the corresponding need to define national security in global terms. 
Accordingly, the post-war decades saw a sustained US activism meant 
to construct an overarching international order that would be congenial to 
the security of the United States as well as its liberal values.
Throughout the post-war era, US officials consistently promoted an open, 
liberal economy, and they sought to preserve a peaceful international 
environment in which democracy and human rights could flourish. 
They worked to create stability and security in key regions from Europe 
to the Middle East to East Asia and to prevent any hostile power from 
2  For works expressing some or all of these ideas, see Stephen Walt, ‘The end of the American 
era’, National Interest, no. 116, 2011, pp. 6–16; John Mearsheimer, ‘Imperial by design’, National 
Interest, no. 111, 2011, pp. 16–34; Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in 
the Post–Cold War Era, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016; Michael Mandelbaum, ‘America in 
a new world’, American Interest 11, no. 6, 2016; Christopher Layne, ‘The unipolar illusion revisited: 
The  coming end of the United States’ unipolar moment’, International Security 31, no. 2, 2006, 
pp. 7–41.
3  This is, admittedly, a view to which I contributed in an earlier book: Hal Brands, From Berlin 
to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post–Cold War World, University Press of Kentucky, 
Lexington, 2008.
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dominating these regions either by force or otherwise. They strove to 
maintain an overall global balance of power that favoured the United 
States and its Western allies and to contain and roll back the influence 
of aggressive authoritarian states. And in support of all this, the United 
States undertook global commitments—from security guarantees and 
overseas force deployments to leadership of international trade pacts and 
institutions—that were designed to project US influence around the 
world. During the Cold War, these endeavours helped foster a thriving 
international order in the West and to contain—and ultimately defeat—
Moscow’s rival order in the socialist bloc.4
When the Cold War ended, then, US officials did not have to chart 
a radical new course in United States’ foreign policy. Rather, they simply 
adapted the country’s successful post-war grand strategy to a new age of 
unipolarity. The United States emerged from the Cold War with clear 
military, economic and diplomatic primacy and at the head of a dominant 
Western coalition. In these circumstances, Washington effectively doubled 
down on its post-war statecraft.
The long-standing goal of maintaining favourable balances of power both 
globally and within key regions, for instance, became one of sustaining 
the remarkable US and Western overmatch that the Soviet collapse had 
produced. The goal of fostering an environment in which democracy 
could flourish evolved to include more actively promoting democratic 
institutions in countries around the globe. The goal of creating a robust 
liberal economy in the non-communist world became one of promoting 
deeper integration in the First World while spreading market institutions 
into the former Second and Third worlds. And the goal of containing 
and ultimately defeating the Soviet Union became one of preventing any 
new threat—from international terrorism to nuclear proliferation and the 
actions of aggressive ‘rogue states’—from rising to the level of the former 
Soviet menace or otherwise bringing the good times to an end.
In sum, the United States’ post–Cold War grand strategy focused on 
preserving US international primacy, deepening and extending the liberal 
order, and suppressing any dangers that threatened to disrupt this benign 
international environment. This strategy was first explicitly spelled out 
4  See, for instance, G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation 
of the American World Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.
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in the Pentagon’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance; it was subsequently 
adopted—with some variation in focus, tone and emphasis—by every 
post–Cold War administration that followed.5
This strategy, moreover, was pursued by concrete initiatives that also 
represented as much continuity as change. Every post–Cold War 
administration emphasised maintaining the United States’ globe-
straddling military posture as the hard-power backbone of the unipolar 
international order. Similarly, every post–Cold War administration 
preserved and even extended the United States’ Cold War–era alliances 
and security commitments to lock in stability and US influence in key 
regions, and to provide the security blanket that would help sustain and 
extend the liberal order. With respect to the global economy, every post–
Cold War administration continued to pursue international economic 
integration through institutionalisation of liberal economic practices, 
liberalisation of global currency and capital flows, and pursuit of free-
trade agreements from North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in the early 1990s to the Trans-Pacific Partnership today. And every 
administration continued to contain and confront aggressive actors that 
threatened the smooth functioning of the international system—from 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to a perpetually provocative North Korea—through 
economic, diplomatic and military means. Finally, even in those cases 
where US policy did become more assertive following the Cold War—
as in the case of promoting democracy—that policy followed essential 
precedents set by Cold War–era initiatives from the Marshall Plan to 
the encouragement of liberal political reforms by the Carter and Reagan 
administrations. US statecraft from the early 1990s onward did not break 
sharply with the past; it built upon foundations laid by a successful post-
war grand strategy.
None of this is to say that there was no change in US grand strategy 
after the Cold War or that there was perfect consistency across post–
Cold War administrations. The United States did undertake some new 
endeavours in the unipolar era, the practice of humanitarian military 
intervention—an unaffordable luxury during the Cold War—in countries 
from Somalia to Libya being perhaps the most notable. After 9/11, 
5  On post–Cold War grand strategy, see Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: US Foreign 
Policy and the Rise of the Post–Cold War Order, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2016; Peter Feaver 
and Stephen Biddle, ‘Assessing strategic choices in the War on Terror’, in How 9/11 Changed Our Ways 
of War, ed. James Burk, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2014, esp. pp. 29–31.
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moreover, the assertiveness with which the United States pursued many 
of its goals jumped significantly, as manifested most clearly in the invasion 
of Iraq. And from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama, US presidential 
administrations have differed on many things, from their rhetorical styles 
to their approaches to using force.
Yet focusing on these differences obscures the basic continuity of post–
Cold War grand strategy as well as the extent to which that grand strategy 
has been rooted in the broader tradition of post-war statecraft. In 1950, 
the authors of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) stated 
that efforts ‘to foster a world environment in which the American system 
can survive and flourish’ constituted ‘a policy which we would probably 
pursue even if there were no Soviet threat’.6 The trajectory of US grand 
strategy after the Cold War showed the truth of this statement.
II
A second myth regarding the United States’ post–Cold War grand 
strategy is that this strategy has been quixotic and even ‘disastrous’—that 
Washington has wasted its primacy by tilting at geopolitical windmills.7 
This verdict is influenced heavily by the United States’ long wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, embroilments that have ranged from unsatisfying to 
remarkably self-defeating in their effects. And throughout the post–Cold 
War period there have been mistakes of omission and commission, failures 
of conception and implementation, and examples of hubris and blowback 
in US policy. From the humiliating failure of US intervention in Somalia 
in 1993 to the fallout from an initially successful intervention in Libya in 
2011, there is plenty to lament and criticise.
Yet doing so risks missing the forest for the trees. Because, for all its 
travails, US strategy has played a central role in making the post–Cold 
War system more stable, more liberal and more favourable to US interests 
than it would have been otherwise—and certainly in producing a more 
benign global environment than many expert observers expected in the 
early 1990s. Indeed, just as it is now widely accepted that US Cold War 
6  National Security Council 68 (NSC-68), ‘United States objectives and programs for national 
security’, 14 April 1950, fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm (retrieved 30 January 2018).
7  Mearsheimer, ‘Imperial by design’, p. 16; also Barry Posen, ‘Pull back: The case for a less activist 
foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1, 2013, pp. 116–29.
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grand strategy was broadly successful despite the frustrations and failures 
that occurred along the way, when it comes to shaping the international 
system, the overall record of US post–Cold War engagement has actually 
been fairly impressive.
To grasp this point, think about some of the most prominent forecasts 
about the future of international politics made just after the Cold War’s 
end. There were, certainly, some very sunny predictions to emerge in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. But there were also some very pessimistic 
ones.
Most leading international relations theorists initially believed, for 
example, that the unipolarity the United States enjoyed following the 
superpower conflict was inherently unsustainable—that it would promptly 
cause renewed Great Power balancing and the rise of countervailing 
coalitions. Moreover, many such observers worried that the end of 
the Cold War would lead not to a stable, liberal peace but to vicious, 
multipolar instability. Bipolarity had suppressed sources of violence and 
anarchy in international affairs; bipolarity’s collapse would surely unleash 
these influences. A revanchist Japan and Germany, the emergence of 
sharp security competitions in Europe and East Asia, rampant nuclear 
proliferation and aggressive behaviour in the world’s key strategic theatres: 
these were among the pernicious phenomena expected to materialise after 
bipolarity’s demise. ‘We will soon miss the Cold War,’ John Mearsheimer 
warned. ‘The prospect of major crises, even wars … is likely to increase 
dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history.’8
Yet whatever the imperfections of the post–Cold War era, these dogs 
mostly did not bark. By most meaningful comparisons, the period since 
the Cold War has been a time of relative international peace, stability and 
liberal progress. Until very recently, for instance, Great Power tensions 
remained remarkably low compared to the Cold War, or to any period 
dating back to the Concert of Europe. Regions such as East Asia and 
Europe have been mostly free of interstate conflict, and German or 
Japanese revanchism has been conspicuously absent. Nuclear proliferation 
has occurred via rogue actors such as North Korea, but on the whole it has 
advanced much more slowly than many would have predicted.
8  John Mearsheimer, ‘Why we will soon miss the Cold War’, Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2, 1990, 
pp. 35–50.
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Meanwhile, democracy continued its advance after the Cold War with 
the number of electoral democracies growing from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 
the early 2000s.9 Economic integration and the spread of free markets 
continued, and global living standards kept rising. Not least, predictions 
of a rapid return to unstable multipolarity proved mistaken. Instead, 
the United States retained a vast economic and military lead over any 
competitor through the end of the millennium and beyond, and many 
of the world’s second- and third-tier powers generally sided with, rather 
than against, the world’s sole superpower. There remained opposition to 
US power, of course, some of it violent, and some of it encouraged by the 
United States’ own policies. And from catastrophic terrorism to ethnic 
violence, there remained significant sources of tension and conflict in 
international affairs. But relative to what might have been expected, the 
post–Cold War period was not half bad.
There were numerous reasons for this, of course. But international 
politics are prominently shaped by the policies of the system’s leading 
power, and after the Cold War the United States had as much capacity to 
shape the system as any other great power in modern history. And indeed, 
US grand strategy played an essential role in making the post–Cold War 
order as favourable as it has been.
The maintenance of US military presence and alliances in Europe and 
East Asia helped to tamp down potential instability, for instance, and 
keep historical powers such as Japan and Germany anchored firmly to the 
West.10 Likewise, the extension of US alliance commitments to Eastern 
Europe helped to smother incipient conflicts and security dilemmas 
following the breakdown of Soviet hegemony and reduced pressures for 
nuclear proliferation or major military build-ups by historically insecure 
states such as Poland or Romania. In the Balkans, the US-led military 
interventions that occurred in 1995 and 1999 were admittedly belated 
and hesitant. Yet they nonetheless helped to end ethnic cleansing in 
south-eastern Europe and to douse persistent conflicts before they could 
destabilise south-eastern Europe more broadly.
9  See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance, 2013, 
p. 29, freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013.
10  This is a point conceded by some leading critics of US policy. See John Mearsheimer, ‘Why is 
Europe peaceful today?’, European Political Science 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 387–97.
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Nor were these the only areas where US policy had such effects. 
In  the former Soviet space, proactive US diplomacy helped to achieve 
the denuclearisation of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and dramatically 
reduced the danger of ‘loose nukes’ by helping Russian officials secure 
poorly guarded nuclear materials. And in dealing with international 
outlaws such as Iraq or North Korea, US policy helped to keep rogue 
regimes in check, and prevented them from dominating or further 
destabilising key regions. In sum, US engagement suppressed renascent 
geopolitical competition and upheaval in key areas, and provided the 
reassurance that permitted global economic integration and other positive 
trends to continue pushing forward.
US policy affected the contours of the post–Cold War order in other ways 
too. Direct US engagement helped to create and strengthen international 
economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization, foster 
an array of regional and bilateral free trade pacts, and bring the single 
most important non-Western economy—China—into the international 
economic order to an unprecedented degree. In countries from Guatemala 
in the early 1990s to Georgia in the early 2000s, US support helped to 
strengthen democratic reformers and pressure authoritarian rulers. Finally, 
the fact that Washington maintained relatively robust military spending 
during the early 1990s and after helped to ensure that the international 
order did not swing back towards unstable multipolarity but rather 
remained distinctly unipolar into the early 21st century.
US policy was not solely responsible for these developments, but it was 
the common thread that tied them together. If the goal of US post–Cold 
War strategy was to sustain and deepen a stable, liberal order in which the 
United States enjoyed clear primacy, then that strategy would have to be 
considered—on balance—a success.
III
But does the United States still enjoy that primacy, and can it sustain such 
an ambitious strategy in the future? The answer one increasingly hears is 
‘no’—that the world is rapidly entering a new era of multipolarity, and 
that Washington has no choice but to retrench markedly as a result.11
11  Christopher Layne, ‘This time it’s real: The end of unipolarity and the Pax Americana’, 
International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1, 2012, pp. 203–13.
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This argument is not baseless, for the United States’ margin of superiority 
has slipped from its post–Cold War peak. In 1994, the United States 
accounted for roughly 24.7 per cent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) and 38.8 per cent of world military spending, rising to 25.2 and 
40.7 per cent respectively in 2004. By 2014, those numbers had fallen to 
22.4 per cent of global GDP and 33.8 per cent of world military spending. 
The share of global wealth and power wielded by the United States’ core 
treaty allies had also declined—from 47.1 per cent of global GDP and 
36.3 per cent of global military spending in 1994 to 39.3 and 25.9 per 
cent, respectively, in 2014—as that wielded by the chief challenger to 
US primacy had risen dramatically. In 1994, China accounted for just 
3.27 per cent of global GDP and 2.2 per cent of world military spending; 
by 2014, those numbers were 11.4 and 11.4 per cent.12
As the global power gap has narrowed, Washington has also been faced 
with more—and arguably more severe—threats to its position than at any 
time since the Cold War. Great Power competition has returned as Russia 
and China test the contours of an order that they never fully accepted and 
that they now have greater capacity to challenge. Moscow and Beijing are 
seeking to assert primacy within their own regions; they are probing the 
distant peripheries of the US alliance system; they are developing military 
capabilities that are threatening the United States’ ability to project 
power and uphold its security commitments in Eastern Europe and the 
western Pacific.
Meanwhile, the long-standing challenge of handling rogue actors has also 
become more difficult as those actors have become more empowered. 
North Korea boasts a sizeable nuclear arsenal and is reportedly developing 
an intercontinental strike capability. Iran is fanning sectarianism, fighting 
multiple proxy wars and destabilising an already disordered Middle East 
as it also emerges from punishing international sanctions. The Islamic 
State is losing ground militarily, but it has shown the capacity of non-
12  Defence spending figures in this paragraph are drawn from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute’s 
(SIPRI) annual data on global military spending. GDP figures are drawn from Economic Research 
Service, US Department of Agriculture (USDA), ‘GDP Shares by country and region historical’, 
www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-macroeconomic-data-set/ (retrieved 30 January 2018). 
Figures on US allies include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries plus US treaty 
allies in Asia and Taiwan (thanks to its quasi-ally status as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act). These 
figures were calculated at the time this article was initially published, in 2016; the SIPRI database has 
been periodically updated since then.
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state actors to sow chaos across a crucial region while also spreading and 
inspiring terrorism across the globe. In so many areas, the United States 
confronts rising challenges to the post–Cold War order.
The world ideological climate is becoming more contested as well. 
After being in retreat for decades, authoritarian regimes are becoming 
increasingly tenacious in pushing back against liberalising currents as the 
2008–09 global financial crisis and its aftermath have raised questions 
about whether democracies can deliver the goods. Russia, China and other 
authoritarian regimes have meanwhile re-entered the global ideological 
competition in more significant ways, touting the virtues of centralised 
control and ‘state capitalism’ and pushing back against Western concepts 
of political liberalism and human rights. Even countries that are part of 
the US-led alliance system have regressed politically; Hungarian prime 
minister Viktor Orban has proclaimed the rise of the ‘illiberal state’ as an 
antidote to the weaknesses of liberal democracy. As a result of all this, the 
advance of electoral democracy has largely stalled over the past decade, 
and some analysts contend that a ‘democratic recession’ is underway.13
Finally, there are questions about the trajectory of the United States’ own 
engagement with the world. The United States experienced significant 
real declines in defence spending from 2010 to 2017. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have fanned pro-retrenchment sentiment at home; Americans 
now seem less convinced of why the United States should retain such an 
assertive global strategy. According to one poll conducted in 2013, 52 per 
cent of Americans believed that the country should now ‘mind its own 
business internationally and let other countries get along the best they 
can on their own’.14 These factors have collectively fed into a narrative of 
national decline more pronounced than at any time since the 1970s.
Yet if this narrative is not baseless, it is badly overstated. For the idea 
that the era of US primacy has passed—and that we are now entering, 
or have already entered, a multipolar world—is far from being true. By 
virtually all key metrics, the United States still has substantial leads over 
its closest competitors. In 2015, the United States claimed a GDP of 
nearly $18 trillion, which was roughly $7 trillion larger than China’s, and 
13  Larry Diamond, ‘Facing up to the democratic recession’, Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1, 2015, 
pp. 141–55.
14  Paul Lewis, ‘Most Americans think US should “mind its own business” abroad, survey finds’, 
Guardian, 3 December 2013.
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it possessed a per capita GDP roughly four times that of China. In the 
military realm, US annual defence spending was still nearly three times 
that of China.15
In fact, the United States’ global lead is probably far more significant than 
simple numerical measures like GDP and percentage of global military 
spending indicate. GDP is a commonly used but highly problematic way of 
comparing US and Chinese economic strength. This is because it is merely 
a snapshot rather than a fully satisfying measure of how wealth accrues over 
time because it does not account for such factors as the damage that China 
is doing to its own long-term economic potential through the devastation 
of its natural environment, and because it understates important US 
advantages, such as the fact that US citizens own significant shares in foreign 
corporations. By a more holistic measure of national economic strength—
‘inclusive wealth’, which takes account of manufactured capital, human 
capital and natural capital—the United States was still roughly 4.5 times 
wealthier than China as recently as 2010.16
The US military lead is even more extensive. As one detailed study by 
William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks concludes, although China’s 
continuing military build-up presents significant regional challenges for 
the United States, at the global level there is simply no comparison. The 
United States possesses massive advantages in high-end power-projection 
capabilities such as aircraft carriers, fourth- and fifth-generation tactical 
aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines and the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS). These advantages have been amassed over 
decades, and so it will take decades—if not longer—for China to come 
close to matching the United States. These metrics, moreover, do not reflect 
other, more intangible US advantages: the years of recent operational 
experience, the extraordinarily high levels of human capital, and others. 
As Brooks and Wohlforth write: 
Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, 
everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States 
remains the sole superpower for decades to come.17
15  For these figures, see World Bank, ‘GDP (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
MKTP.CD (retrieved 30 January 2018); World Bank, ‘GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)’, 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (retrieved 30 January 2018); also the SIPRI 
military spending data referenced above.
16  Stephen Brooks and Willian Wohlforth, ‘The rise and fall of the great powers in the twenty-first 
century’, International Security 40, no. 3, 2015–16, pp. 7–53, esp. pp. 31–2.
17  Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘The once and future superpower: Why China won’t 
overtake the United States’, Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3, 2016, pp. 91–104, esp. pp. 91–2.
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Finally, any consideration of global power dynamics must consider the 
role of allies; namely, the fact that the United States has dozens whereas 
challengers like China and Russia have few, if any. The United States’ 
allies give it geopolitical leverage, diplomatic influence and military access 
that other countries can only envy; they add enormously to the overall 
weight of the Western coalition. As of 2014, the United States and its 
core treaty allies in Asia and Europe accounted for roughly three-fifths of 
global wealth and global military spending—a share that was moderately 
diminished compared with two decades earlier but still enormously 
impressive.18
In sum, US primacy might ultimately vanish, but that day is still a long 
way off. So, rather than abandoning a grand strategy that has worked 
fairly well, the United States should instead work to sustain that grand 
strategy for a period in which its primacy remains impressive, if more 
contested than before.
IV
Doing so requires embracing five basic principles. First, American officials 
and public observers need to scope the grand strategy debate right. Every 
four years, there is a flurry of proposals for some ‘new grand strategy for 
America’. Yet the United States does not need a fundamentally new grand 
strategy. It already has one that has worked fairly well and remains broadly 
consonant with global power realities today. The focus of the debate, then, 
should be on adapting a generally successful approach at the margins 
rather than coming up with something radically new from scratch.
Second, and more specifically, the United States will need to shore up the 
military foundation of its grand strategy by reinvesting in defence. Military 
power is hardly the only tool of US policy, but US military dominance 
has been a fundamental enabler of US global influence and international 
stability over the past quarter-century. And for all of the United States’ 
globalist ambitions, maintaining that military dominance has actually 
been quite affordable during the post–Cold War era. At the peak of the 
superpower contest, US military spending consumed 10–12 per cent of 
18  See the SIPRI and USDA statistics for 2014 cited in footnote 12.
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GDP; since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 
4  per cent. In a relatively benign environment, Washington has had 
primacy on the cheap.19
Today, however, the United States is reaching the limits of this approach. 
At present, the demands on US defence dollars are becoming greater than 
at any time in the post–Cold War era. Yet US defence dollars became 
scarcer after 2010 as defence budgets fell towards 3 per cent of GDP.20 
Even the more recent increases in the defence budget under the Trump 
Administration are unlikely to fully correct this earlier decline. These 
trends of increasing threat and insufficient resourcing are ultimately 
unsustainable—at some point, they will erode the military foundation 
of US grand strategy and undercut the credibility of US commitments, 
thereby jeopardising the stability and influence that US strategy has 
provided. Put another way, the United States can probably preserve an 
acceptable level of military primacy if it is willing to spend 4 per cent of 
GDP on defence and to focus that spending on investments such as the 
anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD)–busting capabilities that are needed to 
preserve US deterrence and power projection in increasingly contested 
regions. It probably cannot do so at 3 per cent of GDP or below.
Third, and related, the United States needs to firm up the coalition 
aspect of its grand strategy by getting more out of—and diversifying—
its relationships with allies and partners. Its post–Cold War primacy has 
always rested on its leadership of a community of capable, like-minded 
nations. Yet, as noted previously, the share of global wealth and power 
held by the United States’ core treaty allies has fallen over the past two 
decades, from 47.1 per cent of global GDP and 36.3 per cent of global 
military spending in 1994, to 39.3 per cent and 25.9 per cent, respectively, 
in 2014.21 US primacy might be intact, but the overall relative strength 
of the US-led coalition is slipping.
19  See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy during the Cold War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 393; World 
Bank, ‘Military expenditure (% of GDP)’, data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS 
(retrieved 30 January 2018).
20  Loren Thompson, ‘Pentagon budget headed below 3% of GDP as warfighting edge wanes’, 
Forbes, 2 February 2015.
21  These figures are drawn from the SIPRI and USDA data cited in footnote 12.
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There are two principal pathways to addressing this challenge. One is 
by getting more out of existing US allies, by pushing them to embrace 
policies that will stretch resources further. Encouraging greater defence 
specialisation and resource-sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), pushing Asian and Eastern European allies to 
adopt more cost-effective defence strategies based on anti-access/area 
denial, and fostering greater multilateral ties between allies (particularly in 
Asia) all represent ways of getting more allied bang for the buck. Likewise, 
as Washington increases its own commitments to Europe and the Asia 
Pacific, it should make clear that additional US activity is contingent 
upon US allies doing more too.
Equally important, the United States should offset the relative decline 
of some traditional allies by building and deepening newer partnerships. 
Global power is not just shifting to rivals of the United States—it is also 
shifting to states that are formally non-aligned but are nonetheless willing 
to work with Washington and its allies on critical international issues. 
India, Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates are just 
a few of these countries; they have forged deeper ties with the United 
States on issues ranging from counter-terrorism to maritime issues to 
regional security in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. By building and 
improving flexible partnerships with such states, the United States can 
position itself to sustain a global imbalance of power in support of key 
aspects of the international order.
Fourth, even as the United States focuses on shoring up the partnerships 
and power that make its grand strategy possible, it must also show great 
discipline in employing that power. US strategy has arguably been most 
successful when it has focused on preserving the basic stability and well-
being of the international system and creating broad conditions in which 
political and economic liberalism can advance. Conversely, the United 
States has got into trouble when its immense power has encouraged 
strategic indiscipline via the overestimation of its ability to transform 
foreign societies rapidly or overreach in the use of military force. Such 
strategic indiscipline is invariably punished through unforeseen and 
unwelcome geopolitical consequences abroad and diminished public 
support for robust US internationalism. At a time when the US margin of 
superiority has eroded from its post–Cold War peak, strategic profligacy 
is a luxury that Washington can no longer afford.
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To be clear, maintaining strategic discipline does not mean foreswearing 
all uses of force. Nor does it mean forsaking the active promotion of 
democracy and human rights. For there are occasions in which limited, 
coercive uses of force are appropriate to protect US interests in key 
regions—think of the Balkan interventions during the 1990s. There are 
cases in which threats to the international order can be met only by force—
think of the Islamic State more recently. There are alliance commitments 
that must ultimately be backed by force when necessary. Finally, the non-
military aspects of democracy promotion will have a key role to play in 
the more competitive ideological environment that is now emerging.
But being disciplined does require a sense of limits and humility. 
It requires recognising the limitations of military force as a tool of political 
transformation in historically illiberal societies. It requires accepting that 
there are problems and injustices that not even a superpower can solve, 
and that wisdom lies in discerning where US interests are most implicated 
and where US power can make the critical difference. Great power must 
be rationed as well as exploited if it is to be effective and enduring; 
acknowledging this point represents a fourth principle for US strategy. 
Fifth and finally, sustaining the United States’ post–Cold War strategy 
entails persuading the American public to recommit to that strategy. 
The state of US opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data 
indicates that public support for most key aspects of US internationalism 
has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13 and is again at or 
near post–World War II averages.22 But the 2016 election cycle revealed 
strong support for candidates who have advocated rolling back key 
elements of post–Cold War (and post–World War II) grand strategy, from 
free trade to US alliances.
Sustaining US grand strategy will thus require more intensive political 
efforts. US leaders will need to take up more strongly the case for 
controversial but broadly beneficial policies such as free trade. They will 
need to articulate more fully the underlying logic of alliances and other 
commitments whose costs are often more visible than their benefits. 
Not least, they will need to make the case that the burdens the country 
has borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of 
bearing far heavier burdens if the international scene returned to a more 
22  Chicago Council on Global Affairs, America Divided: Political Partisanship and US Foreign 
Policy, October 2015.
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tumultuous state. The success of US statecraft is often reflected in the 
bad things that do not happen as well as the good things that do. Making 
this point is essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in 
the future.
V
Contrary to the common caricatures, the United States’ post–Cold War 
grand strategy has not marked a radical departure from the country’s 
previous statecraft; it has not been a catastrophic failure, and it has not 
been irrevocably overtaken by global power shifts. Rather, the United 
States’ post–Cold War approach has been rooted firmly in its successful 
post-war strategic tradition, and it has been broadly effective in moulding 
the international system to Washington’s liking. Moreover, while the global 
environment is becoming more contested today, that grand strategy can 
still be sustained if US officials embrace the proper principles. Of course, 
adapting an existing model is less exciting than forging a wholly new one. 
But this is nonetheless a worthy endeavour in view of the pretty successful 
record of US grand strategy over a quarter-century.
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The future of strategic studies: 
Lessons from the last ‘golden age’ 
Hew Strachan
In 1945, as World War II ended, Bernard Brodie was aged 35, a young 
scholar newly employed at Yale’s Institute of International Studies. 
He had  completed a doctorate at Chicago, published Sea Power in the 
Machine Age in 1941, and in the following year followed it with a brief 
introduction to the subject: A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy. Brodie 
prefaced his second book with a combative introduction:
We are being told on every hand that we must repudiate all the ideas 
of the past and develop a whole new strategy overnight … But what 
is required is an attitude of fine discrimination and adjustment, not 
nihilism. The war of to-day is being fought with new weapons, but so was 
the war of yesterday and the day before. Drastic change in weapons has 
been so persistent in the last hundred years that the presence of that factor 
might be considered one of the constants of strategy. Only those to whom 
the study of war is novel permit themselves to be swept away by novel 
elements in the present war.
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He went on to refer to the titans in the field of maritime strategy: Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett and Raoul Castex, ‘the underlying value’ 
of whose teachings ‘is still largely intact’.1 In this approach, Brodie followed 
that adopted by Edward Mead Earle of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced 
Study under whose tutelage he had adapted his thesis for publication 
and to whose wartime seminar series on the making of modern strategy 
Brodie contributed. In 1943, those seminars (albeit not Brodie’s) were 
published by Earle in The Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought 
from Machiavelli to Hitler.2 Earle’s book remained the standard text on 
the evolution of strategic thought well into the 1970s, and was finally 
supplanted only in 1986 when Peter Paret published a new and updated 
version.3 So pervasive was Earle’s influence that he has recently been 
credited with the establishment of security studies in the United States, 
and by implication with being present at (and possibly even the author 
of ) the dawn of the ‘last golden age’ in the study of strategy.4 Yet, like 
Brodie’s own works on maritime strategy, the content of The Makers of 
Modern Strategy is overwhelmingly historical, and indeed it looks the 
more dated (and often simply wrong) the closer it gets to its own times.5 
In other words, Earle, like Brodie, looked backwards to think forwards.
On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima. The next day, Brodie tells us, he was travelling in a car with 
his wife when he stopped to buy a copy of the New York Times. He read 
the report of the attack and then turned to his wife to say, ‘Everything 
I have ever written is obsolete.’6 Like so many renderings of damascene 
moments, Brodie’s story probably improved with the telling. Any student 
of Brodie’s subsequent writings on strategy has little difficulty in tracing 
the continuing influence of his early education beyond 1945, not least in 
1  Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy, Oxford University Press, London, 1943 
(first published Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1942), pp. viii–ix. This essay develops themes 
that will be familiar to readers who have read my book, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in 
Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. I am arrogant enough to believe 
that they need repetition but modest enough to recognise that they also need development.
2  Edward Mead Earle, Gordon Alexander Craig and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: 
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, New York, Atheneum, 1967.
3  Peter Paret, with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
4  David Ekbladh, ‘Present at the creation: Edward Mead Earle and the depression-era origins 
of security studies’, International Security 36, no. 3, 2011–12, pp. 107–41.
5  Michael P.M. Finch, ‘Edward Mead Earle and the unfinished Makers of Modern Strategy’, 
Journal of Military History 80, no. 3, 2016, pp. 781–814.
6  Barry Scott Zellen, State of Doom: Bernard Brodie, the Bomb, and the Birth of the Bipolar World, 
Continuum, London, 2012, pp. 24, 27–30.
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his last published work, the guide to reading Clausewitz’s On War, which 
appeared as an appendix to Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation 
in 1976 and which too many harassed students have used as a substitute 
for reading the real thing.7
In the short term, however, Brodie followed his shocked response to the 
advent of nuclear weapons by unravelling the reasons for his instinctive 
reaction. The result, published in 1946, was The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Peace and World Order, which declared, ‘Thus far the chief purpose of 
our military establishment has been to win wars: from now on its chief 
purpose must be to avert them’.8 For most students of strategy, The Absolute 
Weapon is a better marker than Earle’s Makers of Modern Strategy for the 
arrival of the ‘golden age’, the moment when civilians began to take over 
the study of strategy and when its purpose became the avoidance of war 
through deterrence, not its conduct through fighting.
It would be patently absurd to argue that the ‘golden age’ was constructed 
without a backward glance to history. When the news of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki broke, Basil Liddell Hart was reflecting on the experiences of 
World War II for a book that was already called The Revolution in Warfare. 
He did not jettison his conclusions, which he had already written and 
which began by stating that ‘the future is moulded by the past’, and averred 
that ‘the best promise for the future lies in understanding, and applying, 
the lessons of the past’. Liddell Hart added an epilogue on the atomic 
bomb after the book’s completion, but it did not lead him to withdraw 
this statement. Instead of becoming a summons to avoid all war, 
The Revolution in Warfare reasserted the need to understand and apply the 
principles that would limit it.9
Over the next decade, both currents would develop in strategic thought—
one seeking to prevent war and one seeking to recognise wars would 
happen but had to be contained. However, neither current rejected the 
idea that 1945 was a caesura: as the Cold War took hold, that seemed to 
apply to the international system as a whole, and it was easy, if lazy, 
to relate it to strategic studies specifically.
7  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, commentary 
Bernard Brodie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
8  Bernard Brodie, ‘The absolute weapon’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds), 
Strategic Studies: A Reader, Routledge, London, 2008.
9  B.H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, Faber, London, 1946, p. 76. For a revised attempt 
at the same points, see the US edition, published by Yale University Press in 1947.
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The study of strategy was presented with a disciplinary crisis. It no 
longer rested primarily on the history of war. Brodie’s supervisor at 
Chicago, Jacob Viner, was an economist, not a historian, and that was 
before the bomb was dropped. The strategist of the nuclear age whose 
influence has been most persistent, particularly when judged from a 
post–Cold War vantage point, is probably another economist, Thomas 
Schelling. Schelling brought to strategy the perspectives of social science, 
game theory and mathematics.10 The study of strategy moved from 
being heavily experiential (meaning based on experience rather than on 
scientific experiment) to being heavily theoretical. From having turned 
overwhelmingly to the past for its inspiration, it turned disproportionately 
to the future. These new trajectories were entirely positive in themselves, 
but they had a  displacement effect. History was dismissed too readily 
and completely from the study of strategy in the ‘golden age’, and that 
provides an object lesson as we address lessons for the study of strategy in 
the future.
Strategic thought until 1945 had sought continuities. It was a dialogue 
between the present and the past. It gave context to current conflicts 
by setting them against those that had gone before. It assumed, as 
Clausewitz did, that war had a universal nature and that, while its study 
was informed by current experience, the immediacy of the present could 
be given meaning only by comparing it with the past. Moreover, when 
handled well, it did not stop at demonstrating continuity. It recognised 
that any soldier is powerfully shaped by his own experience. War is 
intense, demanding and potentially overwhelming. However, one person’s 
adventures are not necessarily typical, although of course they can be, and 
so individual experience, however formative, is not in itself sufficient for 
the making of strategy. History is required in order to understand what 
is really new, what has changed and what seems to be new but might not 
be. History enables us to discriminate between what might be exceptional 
and unique in personal experience, what might be fundamentally new 
and perhaps lasting, and what is already familiar.
This was exactly how Jomini and Clausewitz had approached the study 
of Napoleonic strategy. They used the Seven Years War as a benchmark 
against which to comprehend better the wars of their own times, and it 
was how Mahan and Corbett used Britain’s 18th-century conflicts the 
10  See Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science, Frank Cass, 
London, 2004.
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better to understand naval war at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
The dramatic and seemingly ‘revolutionary’ changes of World War I 
might have been expected to rupture strategy’s relationship with history. 
Giulio Douhet certainly said as much in Command of the Air in 1921, 
but in practice he referred back to the war to make his argument and so 
made his case for change by using the past. As others reflected on World 
War I, J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart in Britain, Raoul Castex and Henri 
Mordacq in France, and A.A. Svechin and V.K. Triandafillov in the Soviet 
Union all used history to show what was typical and what was new as they 
framed their analyses.
This is not to deny that the use of history in these ways was not challenged, 
even before 1914. Mahan and Corbett—although better known today 
than their rivals (and that itself makes the point)—were locked in deep 
debate with a materialist school that pointed to the dramatic change in 
sea warfare effected by steam and armour. From the mid-19th century, 
history’s primacy was under challenge because technological innovation 
presented war with perpetual innovation from the ground up. This was 
why so many of the strategic thinkers who followed Jomini and Clausewitz 
had to defend the role of history in the study of strategy, as Brodie himself 
was to do in 1942. In land warfare, industrialisation did more than shape 
battlefield tactics; through the railway, the internal combustion engine and 
the aircraft, it changed the core relationship in the conduct of operations: 
that between time and space. 
Strategy as defined by Clausewitz and his generation was about the use of 
the battle for the purposes of the war: manoeuvre brought about battle, 
and exploitation used its outcome for strategic effects. The use of the 
nuclear weapon in 1945 elevated the impact of technology to a yet higher 
level, away from tactics and even from strategy in its operational setting, 
to its ability to change the relationship between war and policy itself. 
That, after all, was Brodie’s fundamental insight on 7 August 1945.
In the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s, history was relegated for 
three reasons of which the first was the most blatant and understandable. 
Strategy is a pragmatic business orientated towards future action. In order 
to do that, it begins, in its more grandiose moments, not with the present 
but with some point 30 or 40 years hence and then reverse-engineers 
back to the present, using this imagined future to shape current policy. 
For those who think historically, this is not unlike the use of counter-
factual narratives: the ‘virtual’ histories that imagine events that did not 
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happen or forks in the road that were not taken. So Niall Ferguson can 
imagine that if Britain had not entered World War I in 1914, Germany 
would have won the war, and the result would have been a more benign 
European Union than the New Order imposed by the Nazis, and one 
delivered sooner and at less cost than that put in place since World War II. 
The trouble with this sort of speculation is that once one brick in the 
structure is moved, another shifts. It does not follow that if Britain had 
not entered the war in August 1914 it would have stayed out thereafter. 
It could have been forced in later and on even less advantageous terms, 
especially if France had been overrun.11 Better to have entered the war 
in 1914 with a ready-made continental foothold than to have entered 
a year later.
Strategic thought that is solely projected on some future scenario has to 
be similarly selective, or is normally so, not least in its need to attract the 
attention of politicians whose outlooks are naturally framed by present 
concerns or, at best, by election cycles. In the Cold War, this single 
scenario focused—for understandable reasons—on an all-out nuclear 
exchange. The Cold War did not end in a hot war conflagration. Today’s 
technological equivalents are cyber war or unmanned conflict, both driven 
by the advent of fresh technologies, but both tending to privilege the 
game-changing and unique features of those technologies by dismissing 
others and by divorcing them from war’s contingent and political 
contexts.12 Those that do make allowance for political change are similarly 
monocausal in their predictions, albeit for different reasons. They do at 
least start from the present, but then they project forward from those 
trends, making insufficient allowance for contingency or shock. So today 
debates revolve around continuing US global dominance or its alternative: 
the continuation of China’s rise to the point where it supplants the United 
States. Both are feasible, and both have current political traction and 
importance. But those who use them think selectively to show how they 
can come about. History has no obvious role in any of this.
11  Niall Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History: Alternatives and Counter-factuals, Picador, London, 1997. 
The argument about 1914 is made in Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War, Allen Lane, London, 1998. 
Richard J. Evans, in Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History (Little, Brown & Company, London, 
2016), attacks Ferguson’s approach.
12  For example, P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, 
Penguin, London, 2009.
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The second reason for history’s relegation has been a direct result of the 
growth of university departments of politics and international relations. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, departments of international politics flourished 
on the back of World War I and the sense that it might have been avoidable. 
They often (as at Oxford) ousted history degrees as the choice for putative 
or aspirant statesmen, but they still used history as a core discipline; today 
they do not. Theory dominates in most, and often theory so abstract that 
at times its proliferation can seem to be in inverse ratio to its capacity to 
contribute to public policy.
For the historically trained, this puts the cart before the horse. History 
can be the basis for theory, not least in relation to war and strategy, as 
Clausewitz above all demonstrated. But now theory is dominant to the 
extent that history is either regarded as a quaint form of storytelling, 
or—when used—becomes self-selecting to prove the theory. For much 
political thought, history appears as a single and particular case study and 
is treated as though that is adequate to sustain a more general and universal 
argument. It is also frequently presented in forms that are unrecognisable 
to historians, relying solely on secondary sources and often on ones that 
historians would regard as out of date.
The origins of World War I as used by political science present instances 
of such selectivity. Historians’ criticisms of Fritz Fischer’s interpretation of 
Germany’s responsibility for the war’s outbreak, adumbrated in the 1960s, 
began immediately with fierce opposition in Germany itself. Ultimately—
say, by 1990—Fischer came out on top within his own country, but 
by then scholars outside Germany were using Fischer’s arguments to 
re-examine the responsibility of other powers. What emerged was a more 
nuanced and complex story than that of simple German guilt. For several 
decades, international relations theory paid no attention to such doubters 
despite using World War I as an exemplar for the outbreak of major war. 
It took the success of Christopher Clark’s book, The Sleepwalkers (2012), 
to popularise such approaches and for any modification to occur. Even 
then the challenge of dispensing with well-embedded theory could prove 
greater than that of coming to terms with history itself.13 
13  See, for example, Richard Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller (eds), The Next Great War? The Roots 
of World War I and the Risk of US–China Conflict, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2015.
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Totally unaffected by recent thinking has been the role accorded to 
general staffs and military thought in the war’s outbreak. Most historians 
today—and both Clark’s and Margaret MacMillan’s books are cases 
in point—pay much less attention to their part in the war’s immediate 
origins as opposed to its conduct in the opening weeks.14 The reverence 
accorded to an important book in its day (and important for historians 
as well as for political scientists), Jack Snyder’s Ideology of the Offensive: 
Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914,15 continues unabated 
in the international relations literature despite the revisionist scholarship 
on the subject since. A book conceived in the context of the Cold War, 
it fails to distinguish between the advocacy of the offensive at the tactical 
level and its place at the strategic or political (if any), and as  a  result 
simplifies a much more complex story.16
Third, and most insidious of all, there are those students of strategy who 
stress the value of history but do so in ways that misunderstand the business 
of history. Those who have vaunted history have too often worked on the 
basis of a one-sided premise: that its use is to explain continuity. Lawrence 
Freedman begins his history of strategy with the proposition ‘that there 
are elemental features of human strategy that are common across time and 
space’.17 Colin Gray has been particularly vociferous on this point: ‘There 
is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because 
nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes’.18 He is 
not alone among professors of Reading University. Another, Beatrice 
Heuser, begins her history of the evolution of strategy with a section on 
the ancient and early modern worlds called ‘long-term constants’, even if 
she concedes in her conclusion that ‘the broad picture that emerges is one 
of fluctuations, not constants’.19
14  Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, Allen Lane, London, 
2012; Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First 
World War, Profile, London, 2013.
15  Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1984.
16  For example, Dimitry Queloz, De la manoeuvre napoléonienne à l’offensive à outrance: La tactique 
générale de l’armée française 1871–1914, Economica, Paris, 2009; Terence Zuber, Inventing the 
Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871–1914, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; and for 
the debate that Zuber generated, not least in War in History, see Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans and 
Gerhard Gross, Der Schlieffenplan: Analysen und Dokumente, Schöningh, Paderborn, 2006.
17  Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 3.
18  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 1 (emphasis in the 
original).
19  Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 504.
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A pioneering case study in this approach was Edward Luttwak’s Grand 
Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976). At the time, Luttwak was director of 
the Center for Foreign Policy Research at Johns Hopkins University and 
a consultant to the US Secretary of Defense. The book, very largely based 
on secondary sources, advanced the argument that Rome held its empire 
through what he called ‘defensive imperialism’. This concept had current 
application in a United States recovering from the Vietnam War. ‘We, like 
the Romans, face the prospect not of decisive conflict, but of a permanent 
state of war, albeit it limited’, Luttwak wrote in his introduction. He went 
on: ‘Above all, the nature of modern weapons requires that we avoid 
their use while nevertheless striving to exploit their full diplomatic 
potential.’ He found similar attributes in the Romans, who possessed, 
‘whether by intellect or traditional institutions, an understanding of all 
the principles of deterrence’.20 In 1976, this made little sense to ancient 
historians, although today, in an example of a reverse flow, they are more 
accommodating of the incursion of what were effectively 20th-century 
ideas into the conceptual framework of the Roman empire. A similar point 
might be made of Christopher Clark, who also admitted the influence 
of international relations theory in The Sleepwalkers. In 2009, Luttwak 
followed his book on Rome with The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine 
Empire, which was less focused on its contemporary resonances and more 
circumspect in its claims for its implicit assumption: that grand strategy 
was a concept consciously articulated in Byzantium.
Even more revealing is the love affair between contemporary strategic 
studies and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. The use 
of classical authors in the study of war has a distinguished pedigree. 
Machiavelli took the Roman republic (not the empire) as a departure 
point, and it is his Discourses on Livy that contain the bulk of his military 
thinking. During the Enlightenment, the bedrock of professional military 
education was provided by the classics, including especially Caesar, 
Polybius and Xenophon.21 Thucydides was there but not in the front 
rank, although that might have been because the focus was on  tactics, 
on the debate between the line and the column, rather than on strategy.22 
20  Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1976, pp. xii, 3.
21  Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 7.
22  Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics 
in Eighteenth-century France, Columbia University Press, New York, 1957.
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In the 1890s, Hans Delbrück, as professor of world history at Berlin 
University and the founding father of academic military history, raised the 
level of the debate on strategy. Although the argument between him and 
the historians of the Prussian general staff focused on whether Frederick 
the Great had preferred a strategy of attrition or a strategy of annihilation, 
for Delbrück himself its origins were Thucydidean, as he made clear 
both in his preliminary essay on the subject in 1890 and in his magnum 
opus, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte 
(1900–04).23 In 1926, following World War I, Basil Liddell Hart wrote 
on Scipio Africanus both because ‘the art of generalship does not age’ 
and because Scipio was strategically ‘modern’: the servant of a republic 
who had ‘to study and understand the interplay of the military, economic, 
and political forces, which are inseparable in strategy’.24 And after World 
War II, J.F.C. Fuller, who throughout his career had stressed the didactic 
purpose of military history for the contemporary soldier, wrote one of his 
last books—on the generalship of Alexander the Great in 1960—precisely 
because he believed that ‘war is an art which, whatever be the period in 
question, is based on the same principles’.25
All the major US war colleges today, led by that of the US Navy, begin 
their study of strategy with Thucydides. The association of Athens 
in the Peloponnesian War with the United States of today is easy, if 
superficial: the latter is, as the former once was, both a naval empire and 
a democracy. It is wonderful that senior officers are receiving a rounded 
education, and that the complaints of classicists about the decline of their 
subject are answered by such a response. In 2006, two Greek political 
scientists, Athanassios G. Platias and Constantios Koliopoulos, wrote a 
book, Thucydides on Strategy: Athenian and Spartan Grand Strategies and 
Their Relevance Today, which rested on their belief that ‘the writings of 
Thucydides and the grand strategies contained therein are as relevant 
today as they were in the past and there is no reason to believe that 
their relevance shall diminish with time’. They quote with approval the 
statement of Louis Halle, that: 
23  Hans Delbrück, Die Strategie des Perikles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen, 
Reimer, Berlin, 1890. A French translation by Joël Mouric is available: La stratégie oubliée: Péricles, 
Fréderic le Grand, Thucydide et Cléon, Economica, Paris, 2015.
24  B.H. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus, Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1926, 
pp. vii–viii.
25  J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 
1960, p. 306.
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Thucydides, as he himself anticipated, wrote not only the history of the 
Peloponnesian War. He wrote the history of the Napoleonian [sic] Wars, 
World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.26 
This sort of hyperbole is catching. Williamson Murray, a military 
historian primarily of the 20th century whose career has embraced a deep 
commitment to professional military education, has studded his recent 
history of the American Civil War with Thucydidean references, describing 
their author as ‘that greatest of all strategic and military historians’.27 In an 
essay on the value of studying the past, he used what he acknowledged 
to be an anachronism, describing Thucydides as ‘the  Clausewitzian 
historian’.28 
As with the Luttwak example, reverse-engineering is also going on here as 
paid-up historians reflect on to the past the thoughts planted by modern 
strategic thinkers. A great ancient historian, Donald Kagan of Yale, has 
deployed his expertise on the Peloponnesian War for contemporary 
and trans-historical effect, especially in On the Origins of War and the 
Preservation of Peace (1995). Kagan contributed the chapter on Thucydides 
to Makers of Ancient Strategy (2010), edited by another ancient historian, 
Victor Davis Hanson. Compiled in deliberate emulation of Earle’s Makers 
of Modern Strategy and its 1986 successor edited by Peter Paret, Hanson’s 
introduction to the book makes clear that his aim is to stress continuity 
and the enduring relevance of classical thought to strategy.
Many (probably most) of those who use Thucydides as a way into current 
strategy read the English translation by Richard Crawley. The Landmark 
Thucydides,29 the text most used in the war colleges and edited by Robert 
Strassler, still uses the Crawley translation. First published in 1876, it is 
couched in the language of the late 19th century, when the use of the word 
‘strategy’ had become current. That had not been true, either a century 
earlier in English or in Greek in the 5th century BC. The standard Greek 
dictionary, that by Liddell and Scott, dates the first use of the abstract 
26  Athanassios G. Platias and Constantios Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy: Athenian and 
Spartan Grand Strategies and Their Relevance Today, Eurasia, Athens, 2006, p. 12.
27  Williamson Murray and Wayne Wet-siang Hsieh, A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil 
War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, p. 3, and see p. 1 for the point about an underlying 
continuity.
28  Williamson Murray, War, Strategy and Military Effectiveness, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011, p. 52.
29  Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert 
B. Strassler with introduction by Victor David Hanson, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1998.
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noun for generalship, στρατηγια, to the 6th century AD, a millennium and 
more later. This begs the question of whether Thucydides had a concept of 
strategy at all and, if he did, what he thought it meant. Clausewitz defined 
strategy as the use of the battle for the purposes of the war, a definition too 
narrow and operational for those who would use Thucydides to elucidate 
‘grand strategy’.30
Ironically, therefore, if we follow the proponents of continuity, what we 
would now see as a dated and overly restrictive view of strategy as used 
in the early 19th century, that of Clausewitz, could be of more recent 
coinage than understandings of grand strategy, whose origins the above 
authors implicitly attribute to the ancient world. However, it required 
the impact of World War I to give currency to the concept and to the 
phrase ‘grand strategy’ in the modern world, and the experience of World 
War II and the Cold War to embed it. Are we in danger of reading into 
Thucydides an idea he did not have, or should we use his vocabulary rather 
than ours, the better to capture his concerns? In trying to understand our 
own times, are we wilfully misinterpreting his? Even if we are not, will we 
not deepen our understanding of the use of military power if we refuse to 
gloss over etymological and conceptual distinctions and differences, which 
might be awkward and complicated, but which could serve to deepen 
our understanding? Paul Rahe, in an essay on Thucydides as educator, 
eschews any reference to strategy or grand strategy but concludes—
when addressing his current relevance—that ‘there is no substitute for 
what Thucydides instils: the capacity to reflect, to deliberate, and, more 
generally, to think’.31
None of these observations is designed to contradict the case for 
continuity in itself or to deny the value of engaging with history the 
better to understand present predicaments, but continuity is only half 
the historian’s task, and the easier half. The other half is to understand 
change; in other words, to grapple with contingency and shock, those 
very phenomena against whose comprehension the stress on continuity in 
strategic thought militates.
30  Clausewitz, On War, p. 128.
31  In Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds), The Past as Prologue: The Importance 
of History to the Military Profession, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 95–110. Rahe 
has used the phrase ‘grand strategy’ himself in the title of his book, The Grand Strategy of Classical 
Sparta: The Persian Challenge (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2015), but without any attempt to 
explain or justify the term.
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Marc Bloch, the great French economic and social historian and 
co-founder of the Annales school, was also a soldier who fought in two 
world wars, both in the successful defence of France in 1914 and in its 
humiliating defeat in 1940. In 1942, Bloch, a Jew from Alsace, joined the 
Resistance and was captured and executed by the Gestapo in 1944. He left 
behind his explanation for this turn-around in France’s military fortunes, 
L’étrange défaite: Témoinage écrit en 1940, posthumously published in 
1946. Focusing his attention on the army in which he had twice served, 
Bloch accepted that the Ecole de Guerre had to use military history to 
teach what he called the ‘military art’. But Bloch knew, as all professional 
historians know, that history does not repeat itself, and that to defend its 
study on those grounds is both superficial and stupid: ‘It [history] knows 
and it teaches that it is impossible to find two events that are ever exactly 
alike, because the conditions from which they spring are never exactly 
alike.’ Bloch, like the strategic thinkers referred to above, was deeply 
interested in the longue durée of history; indeed, it was his calling card.
But the lesson it teaches is not that what happened yesterday will 
necessarily happen tomorrow, or that the past will go on repeating itself. 
By examining how and why yesterday differed from the day before, it can 
reach conclusions which will enable it to foresee how tomorrow will differ 
from yesterday.32
During the ‘golden age’ the stress on theory, perhaps precisely because it 
disregarded history, had the effect of de-emphasising change, of privileging 
the present as though it was the future. As the Cold War lengthened, 
deepened and stabilised, it became dangerously radical to suggest that its 
foundations might shift, and when they did many strategists were keener 
to embed the past than to embrace the new. Even in the late 2010s, new 
circumstances prompted by the behaviour of Putin’s Russia were put into 
old bottles as a ‘second’ Cold War. Commentators are fond of quoting the 
opening line of The Go-Between, L.P. Hartley’s novel set in rural England 
before 1914 and published in 1953: ‘The past is a foreign country: they 
do things differently there.’ But they rarely act on Hartley’s observation. 
The outbreak of World War I represented profound change for Hartley. 
That is why historians still feel the urge to account for it and why they 
also cluster around the other great divisions in historical narratives: 1789, 
32  Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940, W.W. Norton, New York, 
1999, pp. 117–18.
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1917, 1933, 1989. They might end up explaining even dramatic change 
by reference to continuity, but they are still grappling with what Bloch 
called difference.
Strategists in the ‘golden age’ faced a particular challenge because Brodie 
was—broadly speaking—proved right: strategic studies were no longer 
focused on the waging of war but on its avoidance. War has an enormous 
capacity to effect change, including revolution; by contrast, peace—
and especially the peace after 1945, which was characterised as liberal, 
democratic and capitalist—sanctifies stability and order. Strategy came to 
be about the avoidance of threat and risk, not about their exploitation. 
Strategic thought’s neglect of war itself meant that those who had to 
address its conduct, the armed forces, turned to the operational level of 
war to do so. In the 1980s and 1990s, doctrine became the vehicle for 
lessons drawn from history, some of them almost contemporary, such as 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but most derived from the ‘last’ great war, that 
of 1939–45. Partly because Germany was now an ally, partly because the 
putative enemy—the Soviet Union—had been Germany’s actual enemy, 
and partly because the potential theatre of war remained a European one, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrines at the operational 
level focused on the Wehrmacht of 1939–41. This trend ignored the fact 
that although the German army had proved extraordinarily successful in 
individual campaigns, it had lost the war. Staff colleges revived the post-
1945 memoirs of generals who had an axe to grind, like Heinz Guderian, 
Hans von Luck, Erich von Manstein and Friedrich von Mellenthin, just 
at the point when scholars in Germany were exploring the role of the 
German army in the atrocities that those same officers had attributed to 
the regime. The writings of Basil Liddell Hart, discredited in part precisely 
because he manipulated those same generals in order to revive his career, 
found fresh readers.33 And operational thought constructed a link between 
pre-war German military thought and initial success in 1939–40 in a 
figment of the historical imagination called Blitzkrieg.34 
If the Wehrmacht ever planned a Blitzkrieg campaign, it was Operation 
Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Based on hope and 
hubris, as well as strategic incoherence at the institutional level (between 
Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
33  John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Brassey’s, London, 1988), stated the 
case for the prosecution most explicitly.
34  Standard works here are James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German 
Military Reform, Kansas University Press, Lawrence, 1992; Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: 
Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–39, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1999.
163
12 . THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES: LESSONS FROm THE LAST ‘GOLDEN AGE’ 
(OKW) and Hitler himself ), it failed. Instead, military thought looked to 
the fall of France in 1940, neglecting the facts that Germany’s success was 
improvised and that the campaign’s outcome was as much of a surprise to 
the victors as it was to Frenchmen like Bloch.35 Thus, ‘manoeuvre warfare’, 
the central pillar of operational thought in the 1980s, established its own 
historical pedigree—its own continuity.36
Operational thought used history in the same way as strategic thought 
did: as a source for arguing about continuity more than about addressing 
the problems of change. The effects survived the end of the Cold War. 
From the 1990s, actual war (as opposed to deterrence) forced its way 
back up the agenda. One effect by the early 2000s was to expose how 
impoverished strategic thought had become and how inadequately it had 
failed to adapt to post–Cold War circumstances. Operational thought 
remained the prism through which actual war was addressed, and those 
who did so to best effect did not vaunt the revolutionary effects of 
technological change but stressed continuity. When General James Mattis 
dismissed so-called effects-based warfare in 2008, he called for a ‘return 
to time-honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in 
the crucible of battle and that are well grounded in the theory and nature 
of war’.37 A year later, in 2009, General Vincent Desportes expressed 
similar frustrations: 
For centuries we have had the feeling that we are fighting new wars, 
unrelated to previous conflicts, [but] with the benefit of hindsight it is 
surprising to see the stability of the general characteristic of conflicts, 
their unchanging logic and the error that could have been avoided if the 
‘trendsetters’ of the period had simply had longer memories.38
So history returned to strategic thought through the operational level of 
war. The rediscovery of counter-insurgency warfare provided its principal 
engine. France, prompted partly by Desportes, rediscovered the colonial 
legacy of Gallieni and Lyautey and read the work of another Frenchman, 
35  Follow the sequence of orders in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Dokumente zum Westfeldzug, 
Musterschmidt, Göttingen, 1966. The book that makes these points most forcefully is Karl-Heinz 
Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1996.
36  Richard D. Hooker (ed.), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Presidio Press, Novato, 1993), 
provides examples.
37  James Mattis, ‘US JFCOM’s guidance for effects-based operations’, Parameters 38, no. 3, 2008, 
p. 18, www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA490619 (retrieved 1 February 2018).
38  Vincent Desportes, Tomorrow’s War: The Art of War in the Modern World, Economica, Paris, 2007 
(English edition, 2009), p. 115.
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David Galula, published in English in 1963–64, but not translated into 
his native language until 2008.39 In 2006, the US Army Field Manual 
3-24 on counter-insurgency cited Galula and drew on the examples of the 
French in Algeria and the British in Malaya to make its points. In seeking 
principles, counter-insurgency stressed continuity, and it did so in ways 
that could prove doubly counter-productive.
First operational thought, like Clausewitz’s definition of strategy, links 
back to tactics: it sees strategy as lying within war more than as a link to 
policy. So it resurrects an older body of thought about strategy without 
making that reversion obvious. Over the decade from about 2005, 
operational thought in the shape of counter-insurgency doctrine became 
a substitute for it, although it was not strategy in the sense used in the 
‘golden age’. The stress on continuity impeded the need to recognise 
change at the economic, social and political levels. A body of military 
thought that had been developed in the era of empires, whether to aid 
conquest or to facilitate withdrawal, was not necessarily suitable to 
coalition interventions in others’ sovereign territories unless it was subject 
to major adaptation driven by fresh strategic—not operational—thought.
This difference—both in Bloch’s sense of change over time and between 
operations and strategy—produced a major divergence in practice. 
Operational success failed to deliver good strategy or recognisable 
political success in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya. Generals reported constant 
‘progress’ and used the metrics of towns secured or insurgents killed to 
prove it. They railed at politicians who would not give them the tools 
to finish the job, and the politicians increasingly lost faith in their soldiers. 
The consequence was strategic failure and a reluctance to see war as having 
political utility even when faced with a humanitarian disaster in Syria or 
when confronted with unfinished wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. The ends 
of these conflicts were defined as ‘exits’, not as victories, and the latter 
word was effectively driven from military vocabulary.
The point here is the need for a much more creative engagement with 
the past, to recognise that the function of history in strategic studies is 
to encourage understanding, not to stress continuity or to show that 
39  David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, Santa Monica, California, RAND, 1963; 
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger 
Security International, 1964.
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history repeats itself (which it does not). This chapter has already quoted 
Paul Rahe to make that point in relation to Thucydides, so let it end by 
reverting to Clausewitz.
On War, especially in the translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 
gained purchase in the later Cold War precisely because it was rendered 
in fluent contemporary English with military terminology that possessed 
contemporary resonance. It spoke of ‘operations’ and ‘total war’ when the 
German did not, and many read and valued it for those very reasons. But 
the success of the Howard and Paret translation in the 1980s rebounded 
after the end of the Cold War, when the ‘golden age’ of strategic studies 
waned. Clausewitz was attacked in the early 1990s not least because those 
efforts to make him relevant in 1976 looked dated two decades later. 
It required a return to the historical Clausewitz to liberate him from Cold 
War captivity and war college dogma. The result has been a more subtle 
and differentiated reading that is both located in Clausewitz’s own times 
and—ironically—more flexible in relation to his current applicability. 
On War achieves this for two reasons, both of which have the capacity to 
frustrate the very students of strategy who profess the value they derive 
from both Clausewitz and history.
First, Clausewitz uses history to show differences and contradictions, 
to show that what is generally true in war is not universally so. He explains 
that, because war is a reciprocal business that rests on a clash of wills, 
a strategic plan is not the same as strategy. A plan does not, as Moltke 
the Elder pointed out, survive the first contact with the enemy. In other 
words, strategy must adapt and change.40
Second, Clausewitz says almost nothing about the future and so offers no 
hostages to fortune. Instead of trying to link the present to what might 
happen through speculations on coming technologies or generalisations 
about the pace of change, On War remains firmly preoccupied with the 
relationship between the present and the past. It is engaged in a constant 
debate at the theoretical level, but the debate is secured by more certain 
foundations than studies of strategy, which address the relationship 
between the present and the future. The latter immediately inject 
disproportionate uncertainty into the equation, thereby expanding theory 
beyond the bounds of what it can deliver. Of course, the study of history 
also carries a risk: that we shall be captured by the past, not liberated by it. 
40 von Moltke, Helmuth, Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, Grosser Generalstab, Prussian Armee, 
1880.
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It was precisely because of that danger, that of imprisonment in our own 
myths, that in the 1820s Clausewitz repeatedly turned back from theory 
to history the better to test his own hypotheses.
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An Asian school of 
strategic studies?
Amitav Acharya
I have been asked to comment on the topic: ‘An Asian school of strategic 
studies?’ I understand this question as asking whether there can be 
a  school  in Asia that represents or reflects a distinctive approach to 
strategic studies like the English school on international relations theory 
or the Copenhagen school on security studies. I am glad that there is 
a  question mark with the topic, because one could have some serious 
doubts about such an idea. Posing the question is very useful for provoking 
a discussion about some of the big challenges and questions that confront 
the development of strategic studies in Asia or the Asia-Pacific to which 
the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) has made a very significant 
contribution. Let me raise five supporting questions and challenges; the 
first three are familiar and perhaps not really critical. I  mention them 
briefly. The last two are really crucial.
First, which region? What or where is Asia? We all know that Asia is 
not a given or fixed concept but one rather malleable as befits an area of 
multiple contested histories and, more importantly, of immense physical, 
cultural and political diversity.1 Regional naming keeps changing. New 
names keep popping up like a fashion statement. In the past three decades, 
we have seen an institutional naming shift from ‘Asia Pacific’ to ‘East Asia’ 
1  Amitav Acharya, ‘The idea of Asia’, Asia Policy, no. 9, 2010, pp. 2–39.
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as evident in the shift from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
in 1989 to East Asia Summit in 2005. We have seen the emergence of 
‘Indo-Pacific’ in the past few years, although there is no institution as 
yet to celebrate it nor agreement on its merit.2 Regional naming is itself 
a very political affair as it decides which country or subregion is included 
or excluded and what kind of security issues become the organising theme 
for a school of strategic studies. It also begs the question: who is to name 
the region? In the past, region-naming has been done mostly by great 
powers. British hegemony is associated with the term ‘Far East’ while the 
United States is associated with ‘the Pacific’ or the ‘Pacific Rim’. Who has 
the power to rename it now? Perhaps China, which is reviving the Sino-
centric idea of the Silk Road as part of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative. But this is not going to be acceptable to Asia’s other leading 
powers, notably India and Japan.
Second, strategic studies or security studies? There has been much 
redefinition of the concept of security since the end of the Cold War. 
Strategic studies is mainly concerned with the use and threat of use of 
military force. Security studies is much broader and embraces non-
traditional security and human security. While strategic studies is criticised 
for being too narrow, security studies is often accused of becoming too 
broad to have coherence or utility. Lately, there has been a good deal 
of talk about the ‘return of geopolitics’. In a 1991 essay, Stephen Walt 
spoke of a ‘renaissance’ of ‘security studies’.3 Might there now be a similar 
renaissance of strategic studies, especially after the election of Trump and 
his threat to start a new nuclear arms race? Surely military threats have 
not disappeared. Yet security is in the eyes of the beholder, and the idea of 
comprehensive security has roots too deep in Asia to be sidelined in favour 
of military strategic studies.
Third, who is to lead or anchor an Asian school? Where might the 
intellectual  leadership and institutional anchoring of an Asian school 
come from? Can Australia and The Australian National University’s 
SDSC provide such leadership now? For some time, it has been the 
premier institution providing de facto leadership in the academic 
2  For contrasting views on the utility of the Indo-Pacific as a concept, see Rory Medcalf, ‘The Indo-
Pacific: What’s in a name?’, American Interest 9, no. 2, 2013; and Andrew Phillips, From Hollywood 
to Bollywood? Australia’s Indo/Pacific Future in a Contested Asia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
Canberra, 12 October 2013.
3  Stephen M. Walt, ‘The renaissance of security studies’, International Studies Quarterly, no. 2, 
1991, pp. 211–39.
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training for strategic studies in the Asia-Pacific region. But to do so 
overtly now might be controversial politically and impede much-needed 
indigenisation—or the need for more local Asian voices and scholarship. 
But are institutions and scholars from the region up to the task? What 
about universities or think tanks in Japan? China? India? South-East Asia? 
Singapore? Each is problematic, although for different reasons, ranging 
from lack of resources to lack of academic freedom.
It is revealing that some of the best strategic/security studies experts from 
Asia do not live and work in Asia but in the United States, Europe and 
here in Australia. Sometimes this is not from choice or for lack of resources 
but because of a lack of hospitable academic environments and academic 
freedom in Asian countries.
Although the above three questions are important, addressing them 
depends on how one deals with the last two questions. One is an 
intellectual question. The other political.
First, a school needs a core thematic focus and a set of generalisable 
concepts and methods. It is the idea of a society of states and a whole range 
of concepts built around it for the English school. For the Copenhagen 
school, it is the idea of securitisation and desecuritisation.
What could be a comparable focus for an Asian school? Could it be culture 
or strategic culture? I am reminded of Desmond Ball’s seminal article, 
‘Strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific region’.4 It identified distinctive 
aspects of strategic culture in Asia, some of which are:
• an Asian way of war, with less emphasis on holding territory than 
other forms of military, economic and cultural hegemony
• informality of policy-making structures and processes
• consensus over majority rule
• pragmatism over idealism
• a comprehensive approach to security.
But putting culture at the heart of strategic studies brings back bad 
memories such as ‘Asian values’, the ‘Asian view of human rights’ or Asian-
style democracy. These ideas were criticised as being too ‘relativist’ and, 
4  Desmond Ball, ‘Strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific region’, Security Studies 3, no. 1, 1993, 
pp. 44–74.
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even worse, as a justification for authoritarianism in such Asian countries 
as Singapore, Malaysia and China. At the very least, they smacked of 
too much reification, which could not be supported in view of Asia’s 
political diversity.
To be sure, each country or region is distinctive. All theories and schools 
of international relations or strategic studies reflect a national or regional 
context. But they must do more. I have a simple test for any national or 
regional school: it must explain not just what happens in that country 
or region. A school must also generate ideas that can travel beyond them. 
It must have a general or universal applicability.
Take for example the English school or the Copenhagen school. To be sure, 
both can be viewed to some extent as being rooted in and reflecting the 
distinctive historical and political context of Europe. I suspect the former 
(especially its early version) might even reflect a nostalgia about Europe’s 
lost empires and what it saw as Europe’s largely benevolent contribution 
in creating a rule-based international society (albeit with European rules). 
Similarly, the Copenhagen school and its securitisation theory cannot be 
delinked from continental Europe’s own intellectual traditions, including 
post-structuralism or discourse analysis.
But the concepts and methods from both the English and Copenhagen 
schools have a general universal applicability, however limited and 
contested. They have been usefully applied to East Asia and other parts 
of the world. What might an Asian school of strategic studies offer in 
this area?
Take for example the Chinese school of international relations, perhaps 
the most prominent of the emerging national approaches to the study 
of international relations and strategy in Asia today. So far, much of the 
Chinese school is based on the Chinese culture, worldview and foreign 
policy behaviour—past, present and future. Moreover, a good deal, if not 
all of it, seems like a legitimisation of the Chinese official foreign policy 
ideology such as the Tianxia (‘all under heaven’) and the ‘peaceful rise’ of 
China. It has yet to offer a set of concepts and approaches that can travel 
beyond China or its immediate East Asian regional environment and be 
used to study international relations in general or in other regions of the 
world. So it has yet to pass my aforementioned test of a valid national 
or regional school.
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The last but most important challenge is what we might call the ‘Hedley 
Bull test’ for the relations between academics and governments. This was 
contained in an essay by Bull in 1972 when he was still teaching at The 
Australian National University. Here Bull wrote:
The academic International Relations specialist … should not be a servant 
or agent of his government … There is a need on both sides for exchange 
of ideas and mutual criticism between academics and officials in the field 
of foreign policy and defence … But inquiry into International Relations 
is a different activity from running the foreign policy of a country and 
necessarily clashes with it.5
Bull further held that:
International Relations specialists in universities and in governments 
should talk to each other but should remain themselves … It is only if 
they remain themselves that academic students of International Relations 
are likely to have anything distinctive to contribute to the discussion 
of foreign policy problems.6
Bull could not have missed the fact that strategic studies everywhere had 
always been policy-oriented and enjoyed close proximity to governments. 
The distance is quite blurred in the United States, so much so that 
there is a veritable ‘revolving door’ between the world of academia and 
officialdom. Ironically, there has been some concern of late in the United 
States about an alleged academia–policy gap7 or the lack of adequate 
interaction between the academic and policy worlds. But as I have argued, 
the situation is the reverse in Asia: the relationship is too close and goes 
too far.8 How many scholars in Asia, especially those working in think 
tanks, but also many in the universities, would meet this Hedley Bull test? 
Not many, in my view.
I would add a corollary to the Hedley Bull test. This is called ‘entrapment’, 
a concept outlined in an essay I published in 2011 based on more than 
a decade of experience in developing strategic studies and international 
5  Hedley Bull, ‘International relations as an academic pursuit’, Australian Outlook 26, no. 3, 1972, 
pp. 251–65.
6  Ibid.
7  Nicholas Kristof, ‘Professors, we need you’, New York Times, 15 February 2015.
8  Amitav Acharya, ‘Narrowing the academia–policy divide in international relations’, East Asia 
Forum, 20 May 2014, www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/20/narrowing-the-academia-policy-divide-
in-international-relations/ (retrieved 1 February 2018).
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relations in Asia.9 Entrapment occurs when scholars, after having provided 
intellectual input at an early stage of policy-making in a particular area, 
remain beholden to the choices made by officials and thereby become 
unwilling to or incapable of challenging officially sanctioned pathways 
and approaches for fear of losing their access and influence. Although that 
essay focused on regionalism, it is also true of security and strategy. The 
danger of entrapment is present universally where scholars and policy-
makers interact in a close and sustained manner.
This has unfortunate consequences, especially for the academic 
development of strategic studies and international relations. As I observed 
during my long association with Asian think tanks and universities, too 
many well-trained scholars are unable to avoid the temptations to become 
involved in policy work and thereby lose their academic edge. This in 
turn has been a major cause of the absence or underdevelopment of 
theoretical work, which is required for the emergence of any credible and 
sophisticated Asian school of international relations and strategic studies 
(whether at national or regional levels). Hence my argument was and 
remains that in Asia the academia–policy gap in strategic studies needs to 
be widened, not further narrowed.
Why do Asians fail the Hedley Bull test? Why does entrapment occur? 
To begin with, the primary stakeholders and consumers of strategic 
studies knowledge in Asia are governments, not the academic community 
or civil society. In fact, strategic studies in Asia is dominated not by 
universities but by think tanks that are closely tied to the governments 
or establishment forces (including some placed at universities deliberately 
to draw in academics and sometimes to control or entrap experts in 
strategic studies). Some examples here would be several members of 
the ASEAN-ISIS (Association of Southeast Asian Nations Institutes of 
International and Strategic Studies, a group of think tanks and institutes 
from each of the ASEAN countries, some but not all of which are based in 
universities); the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at the 
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; the Institute of Defence 
9  Amitav Acharya, ‘Engagement or entrapment: Scholarship and policy-making in Asian 
regionalism’, International Studies Review 13, no. 1, 2011, pp. 12–17. The author was Deputy Director 
and Head of Research of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore between 
2001 and 2007. IDSS became the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in December 2006 
and remains Asia’s largest university-based think tank and school in strategic studies, although its 
scope extends to other areas of international relations, including political economy and international 
relations.
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Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in India; the Korean Institute for Defence 
Analysis (KIDA) in South Korea; and the National Institute for Defence 
Studies (NIDS) in Japan. There are also numerous such thinks tanks and 
research institutes in China that do research on strategic studies, such as 
the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the China Institutes 
of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China Institute for 
International and Strategic Studies (CIISS), and the various centres and 
Institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), to give but 
a few examples. Many of these strategic studies think tanks are extensions 
of defence or foreign ministries and/or directly funded by them and 
run by retired or seconded bureaucrats. University-based or genuinely 
independent research centres on strategic studies in Asia are rather few 
and far between. Even these are often subject to government control and 
manipulation, overtly or indirectly, either through funding, fear or both, 
especially in Asia’s authoritarian countries. Some of these institutions 
are ranked very highly, such as in the ‘Global Go To Think Tank Index’ 
produced by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) at the 
University of Pennsylvania, despite having little or no academic freedom 
or having a record of actively suppressing it. Apparently, academic freedom 
or freedom of expression is not taken into consideration in the TTCSP’s 
rankings (or in the university league tables), which means think tanks and 
universities from well-resourced but highly authoritarian states can secure 
high ranking and thus legitimise themselves.10
As noted, one consequence of government or stakeholder interference 
is the discouragement of high-quality theoretical or conceptual work. 
Many policy-makers in Asia see conceptual/theoretical work or academic 
training in international relations and strategic studies as irrelevant or 
a  waste of time for foreign policy-making. Yet such work is crucially 
needed for broadening policy choices and developing alternative ideas 
without which strategic studies would be impoverished.
10  In the 2015 ‘Global Go To Think Tank Index’, the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR), a think tank directly under China’s State Council, was placed at 
number 6 in the ‘Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks’ category ahead of the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (United States) and International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS; United Kingdom), while the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 
was at 28. James G. McGann, 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, University of Pennsylvania 
Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, 9 February 2016 (see p. 87), repository.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=think_tanks (retrieved 1 February 2018). The Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was named the top think tank in Asia by Foreign Policy magazine 
for 2009. ‘The Think Tank Index’, Foreign Policy, undated, web.archive.org/web/20090119095446/
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4598&page=3 (retrieved 1 February 2018).
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In Asia, a key function of strategic studies think tanks is to engage in 
Track-II activities, in which academics and policy-makers in their private 
capacity exchange ideas and develop policy directions. As Professor Stuart 
Harris from The Australian National University wrote in 1994, Track-
II dialogues in Asia are dependent ‘upon the consent, endorsement and 
commitment, often including financial commitment, of governments’.11 
One might add to this the frequent presence and dominance of government-
linked scholars or retired government officials in such dialogues. While 
they are supposed to speak in their private capacity, most often they end 
up presenting their government’s line. At the same time, non-conforming 
social movements and independent academics are general excluded from 
Track-II dialogues in Asia.
Another problem is the influence of generalists in Track-II strategic 
dialogues, those who lack expertise in specific issue areas such as maritime 
or environmental protection. And there is much generational gatekeeping 
in these dialogues or the failure to bring in new faces or new blood. 
The  result is that Track-II dialogues in Asia are unable to rise above 
national interests and present alternative understandings of strategy 
and foreign policy. They are unable to call for fundamental reforms and 
transformation in the region by overcoming the trap of nationalism, state 
sovereignty and non-intervention.
What is to be done, if anything? Instead of an Asian school, I would 
call for more networking—especially among universities and think 
tanks in Asia, the Asia Pacific, Indo-Pacific or wherever—with a view to 
exchanging ideas, information and solutions to common problems. This 
can be done at multiple levels. Track-II can be one of them. It is here 
to stay. But clearly there cannot be a credible Asian school of strategic 
studies that relies primarily on policy think tanks. Other initiatives are 
needed. One such initiative can be among students, like Evelyn Goh’s 
graduate network.
11  Stuart Harris, ‘Policy networks and economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific’, Pacific Review 7, 
no. 4, 1994, p. 390.
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A fitting model is the now defunct Canadian Consortium for Asia-Pacific 
Security (CANCAPS), which emerged in the 1990s.12 Although funded by 
Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, renamed 
now as Global Affairs Canada, it was led and managed by academics. 
The venues of its conventions changed across Canada. Participation 
was open to all and mainly consisted of academics. But  government 
officials participated in droves and with enthusiasm but without any 
effort to control the flow of opinion. It functioned more as a professional 
association for scholars and policy-makers interested in security issues in 
the Asia-Pacific.
In developing any strategic or security studies network, it is important 
to develop some core themes, especially non-traditional security (NTS). 
NTS could bridge the gap between traditional strategic studies and 
a more expansive notion of security studies. Another key area would be 
negotiations and conflict resolution, which have not been developed well 
in Asian universities and think tanks.
It is crucial for strategic studies scholars to engage in historical and 
theoretical research, not just policy research. To quote Hedley Bull again: 
The test for an academic contribution to International Relations is that it 
should have either historical or theoretical depth. Academic work which 
consists simply of the retailing of information about international affairs, 
or of ad hoc comment of policy polemic, does not meet the test.13 
Again this is lacking in Asia, where policy-makers distrust or disparage 
theoretical work and academics working within different incentive 
structures find no benefit from it.
Finally, strategic studies institutions and scholars should engage in genuine 
policy debates and explore alternative ways of promoting security. The role 
of strategic studies in many, if not all, think tanks in Asia is limited largely 
to providing background information to policy-makers rather than 
debating and advocating different policy positions or publicly contesting 
government positions. This should change if strategic studies is to have 
a modicum of credibility, even as a mainly policy-oriented enterprise.
12  The author served as one of the directors of CANCAPS. For an example of its work, see 
Marius Grinius, ‘Canada and Asia: Prosperity and security’, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 
policy paper,  June 2015, d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/569/attachments/original/ 
1436386569/ Canada-Asia_Prosperity-Security.pdf?1436386569 (retrieved 1 February 2018).
13  Bull, ‘International relations as an academic pursuit’, p. 264.
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To sum up, the development of strategic studies in Asia must add 
independent and critical perspectives. This would require rising above 
national positions and perspectives in Track-II dialogues and debates. 
It would also require the emergence of genuine epistemic communities 
in functional areas organised around knowledge rather than official 
connection, and greater sensitivity to dissent and alternative voices from 
social movements. It demands nurturing and co-opting new generations of 
scholars. There is also a need for scholarly associations of Asian academics 
who study regionalism and are independent of government sponsorship. 
What the region needs is a free flow of policy ideas and agenda-setting for 
truly transformative cooperation.
Notwithstanding my reservations about an Asian school, let me conclude 
by stating what I consider to be the exemplary combination of academic 
rigour, scholarly independence and policy relevance that can serve as 
the inspiration for Asian security studies experts and scholars, and even 
a school, should there be an effort in that direction. One needs to look 
no further than the work of Desmond Ball, who passed away shortly after 
the SDSC 50th anniversary conference. Des Ball’s work was scholarly 
at the highest level, especially his contributions first to nuclear strategy, 
then to Asia-Pacific regional security. It is also striking that his early and 
pioneering  work on national security and nuclear strategy, especially 
on the  US military bases on Australian soil, was extremely critical of 
the US  and Australian government policies. Indeed, it was a  bible for 
a generation of peace activists in Australia, as I knew personally when 
I was a student in Perth in the 1980s. This suggests his integrity and 
independence. As the Cold War ended, Des Ball’s work shifted to 
Asia-Pacific regional security issues. This corpus of work provided an 
invaluable contribution to the thinking and approach of governments and 
of the policy community of the region as they embarked on initiatives 
to build new regional cooperative security institutions, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum.14 Despite this, Des Ball continued to assert his 
independence, challenging and embarrassing governments that he saw as 
perpetrating oppression (as in Myanmar and Indonesia) or failing to offer 
public transparency and accountability, as seen with the revelations about 
14  I was fortunate to be a collaborator in Des Ball’s work on Asia-Pacific multilateralism, especially 
that on preventive diplomacy. See Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds), The Next Stage: Preventive 
Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, 1999.
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US military bases in Australia and later (in 2001) Singapore’s alleged 
intelligence operations in Australia.15 If Asian scholars can achieve this 
sort of intellectual courage and integrity against the backdrop of engaging 
in outstanding scholarship, I will withdraw my reservations on an Asian 
school of strategic (or security) studies.





The future of strategic studies: 
The next golden age
Robert O’Neill
It was stimulating to receive the organisers’ challenge to discuss the future 
of strategic studies rather than the past. It is so much easier to be wrong 
about the future than about the past—and it matters a lot if you are 
wrong in our profession! Think of all the bad strategic plans that have 
been hatched by supposedly excellent professionals, such as the Schlieffen 
Plan, Fall Gelb—the German General Staff’s plan for the invasion of 
France, which was discarded by Hitler due to Manstein’s persuasion—
and Operation Barbarossa, which was not discarded by Hitler but should 
have been.
Now, maybe it is better to have a bad strategic plan than no plan at all. 
At least it creates a framework for the design and development of armed 
forces and focuses the minds of those who might have to implement them 
on the intelligent use of the forces available to them. Personally, I doubt 
this—the combination of strategic plans and forces to implement them 
does create a temptation to use them—such as that which overcame Kim 
Il-Sung’s judgement in 1950 in invading South Korea, or that of the 
Chinese in going to war against the Vietnamese in 1979, administering 
what Deng Xiaoping described to President Jimmy Carter as ‘a slap to 
a naughty child’. Strategic plans, if we have them at all, need to be very well 
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conceived and controlled at both political and operational levels. And this 
is where policy research institutes such as the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre (SDSC) have an important national and international role to play.
I have been invited to forecast the next ‘golden age’ in strategic studies. 
This implies that there are non-golden ages in our field, even ‘dark ages’. 
So let me say at the outset that I prefer an output of steady daylight to 
alternately baking under the golden rays of a midsummer sun and then 
freezing in wintry darkness. My remarks therefore are aimed at achieving 
the best performance by our strategic thinkers over most of their working 
lives. That approach will do more to maintain our societies and our planet 
intact and at peace than occasional flashes of inspiration born of a terrible 
time of death and destruction.
What are we aiming at?
Tasks for the 21st century
So here we are, in the late 2010s, with many of the dangers of the 21st 
century already apparent. Let me run through the most serious of them:
• the proliferation of nuclear weapons
• the development of tough, strongly motivated ‘terrorist’ forces
• climate change leading to a rise in sea levels and mass movements 
of displaced persons from low-lying areas
• acute food shortages in badly governed regions, especially in Africa 
and the Middle East, leading to further waves of distressed people 
moving into Europe
• accommodation of a more powerful and assertive China
• increasing world population coupled with inadequate quality 
of government at national, regional and global levels.
They are diverse—much more diverse than planners and thinkers have 
had to address in previous centuries. Clearly we have a lot to do, and 
many agencies will have to be involved in developing policies for handling 
these threats. Military force remains important, but inputs need to be 
made from most areas of government and expertise outside the realm 
of government, particularly those of a large university.
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The security policy dialogue in Australia
Our national record in the past for developing strategic policies has not 
been a distinguished one. Australia’s role until 1942 was essentially that 
of providing auxiliary forces to Great Britain. We had sketchy plans 
from the early 1930s but lacked the substantial forces that they required 
for implementation. The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and Malaya 
in December 1941 suddenly brought awareness that we are ultimately 
responsible for our own security. We needed plans plus forces. I recall 
a  conversation in 1974 with General Rowell, who was Deputy Chief 
of the General Staff in 1941–42. Rowell was asked in January 1942, 
by a visiting American officer, what he would do if the Japanese landed 
a force of two divisions on our north-western coast. ‘I’d run for the salvage 
corps,’ Rowell replied. It was a flippant response, but it showed that as 
far as realistic defence plans and actual capabilities were concerned, our 
cupboard was bare.
In the early 1970s, when I was beginning to write the official history of the 
Korean War,1 I wondered how our plans and policies to address the needs 
of the Cold War were developed between 1945 and 1950. Rowell walked 
me through the unrecorded details of our strategic planning for the period 
1946–50. The cupboard was still fairly bare, and the size and capacities of 
our armed forces were low—not to match our plans but to save money. 
For a while our regular army consisted of two battalions of infantry. Then 
came the Korean War, and we increased it to three battalions. A national 
service scheme was developed, but the period of service required was very 
brief. The navy acquired an aircraft carrier, and the Royal Australian Air 
Force was upgraded from World War II Mosquitoes to Meteors and then 
Sabres. We entered into a closer association with Britain in the Australian, 
New Zealand and Malaya (ANZAM) linkage, and of course we were part 
of the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty, 
not to mention the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
Defence planning and strategy rested largely in the hands of the Joint 
Planning Committee. They, three officers of the rank of colonel or 
equivalent, reported to the Defence Committee, which was composed 
of the three chiefs of staff and chaired by the widely feared Secretary of the 
1  Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, vol. 1: Strategy and Diplomacy, and vol. 2: 
Combat Operations, both Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1981 and 1985, respectively.
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Defence Department, Frederick Shedden. It was interesting for me to 
trace the origins of policy initiatives from the drafts produced by a major 
in army headquarters, flowing on to his lieutenant colonel superior, then 
through the Joint Planning Committee and the Defence Committee 
to the Cabinet. Sometimes not a lot was changed on the way through. 
It must have felt good to have been one of those majors on the planning 
staff in those days.
An important thing to note about our first national defence planning 
system is that there were few, if any, external inputs. I saw no evidence that 
anyone inside the defence establishment took any notice of journalists, 
academics or even diplomats. That last element changed in the mid-1950s 
as Arthur Tange became Secretary of the Department of External Affairs 
and joined the Defence Committee as a member in his own right. Tange 
made contribution with characteristic vigour and cutting power. Soon, as 
Peter Edwards has related, Tange was complaining that Defence was using 
External Affairs to do its thinking as well as its own.2
Political contributions to the shaping of defence planning were largely 
confined to the domain of resources—by stating what could be afforded 
and what could not. I must make an exception here for Percy Spender, 
who always saw a clear strategic reason for our becoming involved in the 
Korean War: the gaining of a military alliance with the United States. 
But  this idea did not emerge from his own department nor from the 
Defence Committee! It was his personal contribution, which not even 
his prime minister thought achievable when Spender first mentioned it 
as a war objective.
The roots of the SDSC
Gradually, in the 1960s, the generation of Australian ideas on international 
security and defence strategy became more open to outside influences. 
There were the out-and-out critics active in the universities and the 
newspapers. They did not achieve much influence. And there were the 
critics who stood on respected ground, and here I refer particularly to 
Tom Millar, Alan Watt, Bruce Miller and Hedley Bull. They all were given 
an audience by those on high in the government and in the Departments 
2  Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2006, Chapter 6.
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of External Affairs and Defence. They were not given an easy ride. Because 
Tom and Alan had served in the army and the foreign service respectively, 
there were questions of ego to be faced on both sides in making the 
dialogue work. Hedley, who had made his reputation on the other side of 
the world in a field most Australians knew nothing of—arms control—
did not face personal hostility, but he still had to get his message across, 
which was in part to stand up to the great powers, especially our allies, and 
in part to view nuclear weapons as a global problem that required a global 
solution. He exerted a useful influence in persuading key people in the 
Department of External (and then Foreign) Affairs to develop a positive 
approach to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bruce’s connections 
were stronger on the side of the Department of External Affairs than that 
of the Department of Defence, but he used them skilfully and built up 
the Third Monday Group, which flourished from the late 1960s through 
to around 1973, bringing together government department heads and 
deputy heads with relevant Australian National University specialists 
once a month. The growth of tensions over the Vietnam War led to this 
arrangement breaking down, and it ceased to function in the dying days 
of the McMahon Government.
During the late 1960s, the newly founded centre was taking its first 
tentative steps forward in offering advice, public and private, on national 
and international security issues. We were lucky in that Tom, Hedley 
and Bruce all had experience of working at and with the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London. That experience gave them 
several advantages: a broader approach to international security than just 
that of a national perspective; experience of working as academics with 
members of the government community, both civil and military; personal 
networks of expert people around the world, both in government and 
outside; standards in assessing ideas and writing; and knowledge of how to 
fund such an operation without allowing the resulting work to be skewed 
by the funders. All this knowledge and experience helped the Strategic & 
Defence Studies Centre get off to a good start. It was an early ‘golden era’ 
both for the field internationally and here in Canberra. These elements 
remain very important for the Centre’s future standing and the quality of 
its work.
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Necessary ingredients for strategic studies
Let me now review what I think are the necessary ingredients for the 
flourishing of strategic thought today. First are the people: expert, 
accomplished or promising to be so; second, a breadth of expertise from 
the military field through social politics, economics and international 
relations to peace studies; third, a supportive institution such as ANU 
to have as a base; and fourth, national and international perspectives in 
its work.
People to shape the dialogue
Probably the most important element in shaping the dialogue in the future 
will be the quality of the people who are conducting it. And probably 
the most significant factor to look for and nurture here is intellectual 
quality, especially the ability to think outside the box and to resist being 
co-opted by a dialogue partner who is hierarchically organised. We have 
been lucky to date with our range of contributors, beginning in the 1970s 
with two young men in their 20s, Des Ball and Ross Babbage. Many more 
have come on since then, from a wider range of home institutions and 
agencies, including the armed services.
They do not all need to be offered a tenure track position because many 
of them will be needed in their own agencies where they worked before 
coming to the Centre. The Centre’s continuing semi-permanent and 
permanent staff will be relatively small. They should come in at a range 
of points in early and mid-career to keep things on the boil and cross-
fertilise from different vantage points. The three-person team we had in 
Des Ball, Ross Babbage and Jol Langtry is a good case in point. All the 
staff members need to be not only very bright but also producers. They 
need not only to write easily but also to be good conference and discussion 
group members. They not only need to make their own contribution but 
also allow others to influence them. They need to know how to develop 
and sell an idea, but not to oversell it.
Breadth of experience required
Because the range of problems that needs to be tackled in strategic policy 
analysis is so broad, we need people from a variety of disciplines and work 
areas, not to mention both genders. I have not mentioned science and 
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engineering as necessary inputs yet, because it can be very difficult to find 
the right people from those quarters to take part in the work of a larger 
team that is focused on wider objectives and composed largely of others 
whose backgrounds lie in political science, international relations, 
geography and history. Nonetheless, we have to accept the challenges and 
bring more technological expertise into the debate.
As someone who has been mentored by Michael Howard and Basil 
Liddell Hart, I cannot omit mention of the importance of history as 
a major area of expertise in the field of strategic studies. Hew Strachan has 
already made reference to this point, so I shall not labour it too heavily. 
However, history is important for several reasons in the making of good 
policies for future use. History offers a scale of known facts against which 
the consequences of new policies can be assessed. Knowledge of history 
enables clouds of illusion to be dispersed. History brings a spotlight to 
shine on the personal factors that can do so much to make or mar an 
intense, dangerous activity such as a war or a conflict. History also reveals 
the recurring but deceptive traps into which government leaders and 
force commanders can fall so easily, such as overoptimism, technological 
limitations and imperfections, the role of public opinion and the 
limitations on what both civil populations and armed forces are willing to 
bear. The Centre has been well served by David Horner, Joan Beaumont 
and many other people with historical expertise.
Strategic policy is, in the final analysis, a political business. It therefore 
needs the contribution of political wisdom if it is to have a sound purpose 
and remain within the confines of available resources. From where do 
we acquire political wisdom? Journalists are one obvious source. Another 
is rising members of parliament. A third is political staffers. These are all 
bright people who have to think about defence and foreign policy issues 
and commit themselves to opinions on them. Many of those who take part 
in this political discussion of security policy are very aware of the limits 
of their knowledge. They need help, and this can be another important 
contribution that the Centre can make and has done in the past. Politicians 
are extremely busy people with all kinds of pressures on their time and 
energy. Therefore any assistance offered must be well focused and address 
their needs without wasting any of their precious time.
It is important to balance political connections. It would be a big mistake 
for the Centre to gain the reputation of being the think tank of one party 
or another. Fortunately, there has not been a fundamental division on 
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security policy issues between the major parties for quite some time, and 
it is possible to work with both sides without becoming compromised. 
Another set of opportunities lies in speaking publicly or semi-publicly 
at party conferences and lesser gatherings and appearing before relevant 
parliamentary committees.
A related group of people that the Centre needs to have a good relationship 
with is the public service—a huge repository of relevant knowledge and 
expertise, not to mention thinking and debating capacity. Without some 
working connection with people who work in Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Prime Minister’s, Treasury and some other departments of state, the 
external debate in research institutes might well be duplicating or even 
trailing behind the debate taking place within the halls of government. 
Not everyone in the government’s employ will want to work with 
outsiders. There are obvious risks in such connections for both sides. But 
quite a lot are keen to be engaged, if properly asked, and they add a huge 
amount to academic capacity because they have substantial resources at 
their command, they know what politicians think, and they have great 
connections. My own early visits to Moscow and Beijing were greatly 
facilitated by Paul Dibb, who provided me with access to an array of 
his best contacts in those capitals of enigma. Later, when I was at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), I found that a high 
proportion of our best contributions in debate, in conferences and in 
advice generally came from the civil service of the United Kingdom, other 
European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states, the United 
States and Canada.
Another important resource is the diplomatic corps in whatever capital 
city one happens to be working. As in dealing with the public service, care 
in selection of contacts is necessary, and you should not believe everything 
you hear. But in terms of getting the best value from dollars spent on 
international travel, good diplomatic contacts are one of the best aids 
that one could have. That means reciprocal care of them on one’s home 
base also.
Although we were deeply involved in the Cold War in the 1970s, we were 
able to have a relatively friendly relationship with the staff of the Soviet 
Embassy. There is no doubt that at times they became bored with having 
to propound their official line on everything. Sometimes they might relax 
a little and let me see what was really on their minds, whether it was on 
arms control policies or on social conditions at home. There were risks in 
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this semi-public relationship, of course. After one conference, which had 
been attended by a mid-level Soviet diplomat, Peter Samuel, a well-known 
journalist, published a newspaper article headlined ‘The SDSC—Where 
ASIO meets the KGB’. Samuel had recognised a senior ASIO member in 
the audience as well as the Russian. That afternoon, after the paper had 
appeared, the Russian came urgently into my office, saying: ‘Bob! Bob! 
I am not KGB!’ I could have said: ‘No, Yuri, you are GRU!’ but I forbore. 
I was glad that the Soviet Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, thought 
we were sufficiently relevant to be worth keeping an eye on.
Finally, let me mention another important group that has a major 
contribution to make to strategic studies: the armed services. I would not 
have said this so confidently 40 years ago, but times have changed. The 
armed services themselves see much more to be gained from education, 
debate and post-graduate qualifications than in the 1960s when I was 
a  member of the Australian Army. The idea of the Joint Service Staff 
College, with which several of us became involved in the 1970s, has 
blossomed into the Australian Command and Staff College, which has its 
own highly qualified faculty as well as a considerable body of students 
drawn from around the world.
Given the nature of recent major wars, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, 
it is very important that we know more about what is happening at the 
coalface. What works, and what does not? The people who are actually out 
there, boots on the ground, exposed to death and injury by improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), mines, sniper shots and assassin groups, are best 
equipped to give a verdict. Then their judgements need to be picked up, 
brought home and considered. I applaud the work that my former doctoral 
students John Nagl, Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston have done and 
continue to do in this regard, but we need more of them as well as from 
them. This kind of warfare, which is wider than ‘counter-insurgency’, 
looks as though it will be with us for a long time. We need to keep lifting 
the standard of our effectiveness to bring conflict under control and keep 
it moving towards an end that we will be happy to accept.
A strong institutional base
If the Centre is to continue to flourish, it needs a strong resource base to 
support its work and to give it the strength to exert an influence. In the 
1970s it was not at all clear that the resource base would be adequate, but 
thanks to the good efforts of Des Ball and Paul Dibb as Centre heads, the 
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necessary resources were found. Over the past decade, the resource base 
provided by the university has grown. Now under Brendan Taylor,  the 
Centre is at a level of strength that has not been exceeded previously. 
The level of support offered to strategic studies has been increased with the 
addition of the National Security College and the sharper focus given to 
the work of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.
Of course nothing should be taken for granted in the turbulence of 
university politics, but given the widely accepted importance of the 
subject and the many ways in which the world is getting into increasing 
difficulty, I am tempted to say that the resource base will be adequate 
provided that the Centre continues to produce good work. Having 
worked for several years outside the university framework, let me say that 
this is a great advantage. Supplementation by grant funding and contract 
work in teaching and supervision can be added to the mix, provided it 
is done without compromising the Centre’s independence, both actual 
and perceived.
National and international cooperation
However, let us not think too much in a Canberra mode. The work 
of the Centre is, of its very nature, international and interdisciplinary. 
Fortunately, its influence is enhanced through the presence in Canberra 
of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the Australian Command and 
Staff College and the Australian Defence Force Academy. Then there 
is the wider layer of institutions that work in our field in nearly every 
Australian state. Here I think particularly of the Lowy Institute in Sydney, 
the Australian Institute of International Affairs nationwide and the Perth-
based think tank Future Directions International. There is a lot of good 
work being done right around Australia, and thanks to the Internet it is 
being made available to all those who are interested and able to tunnel 
their way through the various websites involved. However, all this work 
needs to be brought together, assessed and the best of it disseminated 
more widely. There is a role for a national leadership team!
Looking further out across our national borders, we have a good tradition 
of regional cooperation with the principal research institutions of South-
East Asia, South Asia and East Asia. They offer a vital range of inputs, 
and they are also a discriminating group of assessors of work done in 
Australia. The Centre needs to look to its reputation among this group, 
which embraces both first- and second-track connections.
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On the other side of the Pacific, we see the strongest national powerhouse 
of ideas in our field in the United States. We have strong links with 
US research institutes and universities. For decades we have gone there 
and worked our way around. Now it is good to see them come to us, as 
the RAND Corporation has done recently. The United States is in itself 
going to be a particularly interesting place to observe and analyse in the 
era of President Donald Trump. We know from the recent debate that 
a substantial slice of the American electorate is not willing to support 
‘free-riding’ allies. Wars that result in substantial human casualties are 
not supported by public opinion unless the stakes are very high. The US 
armed services (and their personnel) remain very technologically oriented. 
How does this equip them for gaining the friendship and cooperation of 
largely pre–information technology people who are apprehensive about 
the consequences if they and their societies ascend the technological 
ladder? There are many problems of this kind and uncertainties regarding 
the future policies and capabilities of our major ally for us to think about.
Globally, let us not forget the capabilities and connections of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its size, scope and breadth of 
its membership are unique. It was a dominant part of my life for 20 years, 
and it is pleasing to see Tim Huxley of its directing staff here today. 
I hope the IISS and the SDSC will continue to work fruitfully together 
in coming decades.
New conditions of the 21st century
Moving from the mid-20th to the early 21st century, there are several 
relevant differences that I should note.
First, until the British referendum of 2016, international boundaries 
were becoming less significant than they were in the mid-20th century. 
Cooperation in strategic thinking between nations, groups of nations 
(especially alliances) and globally has become a much more common 
and natural process. It is hard now to imagine millions of young men in 
Europe reporting to mobilisation depots on a few days’ notice from their 
national capitals. Western powers simply could not do it, although a few 
non-Western states probably could. We can still blow each other to pieces 
with nuclear weapons, and subnational groups may be able in future to do 
so. We live in a very different context of public opinion from that of the 
early and mid-20th century. Hatred still exists between nations, but it is 
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more confined than it used to be and most governments find it a problem 
rather than an advantage. However, conversely, international flows of 
refugees are strengthening the significance of national boundaries. How 
do we keep them effective in this sense without encouraging hostilities?
A second difference, reinforcing the power of the first, is the Internet 
and the huge array of devices that work through it, ranging from the 
personal computer and iPad to the smart phone and ‘social networks’. 
These are major new factors with strategic relevance. They threaten the 
power of authoritarian and weak governments. They enable insignificant 
individuals and groups to become significant actors. They threaten to 
undermine traditional authority structures, including political parties, 
government departments, armed services and police. They will need to be 
taken into account as never before. As the use of the Internet has grown, 
so has the power of the hacker and the spy. I shall not go into further 
detail on these forms of warfare because they are already under attention 
by the cyber-security community. They are becoming more important as 
we come to rely more heavily on information technology, and we must 
take them more into our own thinking.
On looking forward into the coming century, it is obvious from events 
in Africa and the Middle East that we need to focus more closely on a 
third set of issues—namely, the ‘quality of government’. This is one of 
the key elements in what we have called over the past 60 years ‘counter-
insurgency’. Of course counter-insurgency also requires specialised 
military capabilities, including the ability of counter-insurgent forces, 
especially when they come from afar, to relate to and become friends 
with the people they are trying to help. Also the counter-insurgents need 
in-depth knowledge of the country or region in which they are operating.
Fourth, we can expect to see less of major conventional warfare than in 
the era of the world wars, but I do not expect to see it disappear, except 
possibly among the major powers. At that level it is simply too destructive 
an option to take up against each other, although that does not mean that 
they will not ever use it. Therefore, conventional warfare will remain an 
important element of strategic studies.
Fifth, as the use of the seas grows in intensity, there are going to be more 
maritime disputes covering such issues as national sovereignty, Law of the 
Sea, control of refugees and access to minerals. Similarly, we can expect 
a growth of air-related problems as ground-launched missiles become 
191
14 . THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES: THE NExT GOLDEN AGE
more readily available, terrorists work out more ingenious ways for taking 
control of aircraft for their own purposes, and aircraft can be coupled with 
information technology to give a new dimension to espionage.
We are all aware of the increased salience of economic factors in national 
and international security. We will need to pay greater heed to the quality 
of national government economic management in states of interest to 
us, the effects of uneven distribution of resources within societies, the 
interdependence of states for access to critical materials—from foodstuffs 
to fuels—and the management of the huge costs of defence and 
security policy.
I should mention in passing the issues of the use of space for travel, 
communications and exploration. At present, we have a network of 
treaties and agreements that make it difficult for one state to threaten 
another from space, but those agreements can always be infringed. We are 
also sending off a series of probes and broadcasts designed to attract the 
attention of anyone ‘out there’. It seems to be assumed by the scientists 
responsible for these missions that the creatures whose attention may be 
drawn to us will be pleasant and well behaved when they come to inspect 
us. We need to probe that question a little more deeply too!
Conclusion
While I have focused these remarks on the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre, I think they have application to research institutes in the field of 
strategic studies the world over. And that is important—we have a tough 
set of global problems to deal with. The set of challenges that I laid out at 
the beginning of this chapter will have to be dealt with on a global basis 
rather than just a national or even a regional one. We need to assemble 
a widely composed team of national and international institutions to 
grapple with and hopefully solve them. I think Australia is ready to play 
a part in meeting this challenge, and doubtless others are too. Let us all get 
working and keep the sunlight pouring down to help us solve formidable 
problems. Another dark age, at the world’s current level of population and 




Conclusion: What is the future 
of strategic studies?
Paul Dibb
Strategic studies in Australia seems to be undergoing a period of 
introspection about what to focus on, with concerns about whether it is 
still relevant to a greatly expanded agenda of ‘national security challenges’. 
There is the further issue of whether strategic studies should be separate 
from the study of international relations. Then there is the long-standing 
debate about whether the label ‘strategic and defence studies’ is a 
proper area for academic study, given its concern with military matters. 
All these issues have been touched upon—to a greater or lesser extent—
in these chapters, themselves based on the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre’s 50th anniversary conference in July 2016.
The purpose of this conclusion is to discuss the foregoing issues, analyse 
the pros and cons of particular areas of enquiry by strategic studies, and 
identify future priorities for research from an Australian perspective. 
My aim is to open up an important area of scholarly discussion about 
the direction of strategic studies in the second decade of the 21st century. 
Let  me begin, however, by reflecting on some of the earlier challenges 
facing  strategic studies as an academic discipline and the lessons 
we can learn.
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Strategic studies and its critics
Concern about the appropriateness of strategic studies as an academic 
discipline is not new. In 1968, Hedley Bull wrote an article in the journal 
World Politics called ‘Strategic studies and its critics’, and, in 1981, 
Robert O’Neill wrote an SDSC paper called Strategic Studies and Political 
Scientists: Strategic Studies and Its Critics Revisited.1 These two papers aimed 
to answer the critics of strategic studies in two very different eras. Hedley 
Bull was writing in the midst of the Cold War about moral questions 
surrounding the issue of nuclear war, whereas Bob O’Neill wrote at a time 
when the Vietnam War—which ended in 1975—was still fresh in the 
minds of Australians as a highly contentious military intervention with 
our US ally.
Let me turn to Hedley Bull’s line of reasoning and its relevance to the 
current debate. First, I shall address what he meant by the term ‘strategic 
studies’. He begins by proposing that strategy in its most general sense 
is the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field 
of conflict. But he goes on to argue that in the narrow sense in which he 
is using it, the sense in which ‘strategy’ is interchangeable with ‘military 
strategy’, it is ‘the art or science of exploiting military force so as to attain 
given objects of policy’.2 Elsewhere, he argues that ‘the military balance is 
itself the most important source of security’.3 It should be noted that he 
was arguing this in the context of the central nuclear balance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. My own view is that strategic studies 
essentially deals with the role of force in international society. However, that 
definition is to be interpreted broadly: it should study how military forces 
are used both directly and indirectly, including for coercion, deterrence 
and what Coral Bell would have called signalling. This use of force may 
be present or potential, direct or indirect, short or long term.4 I recognise 
that strategic studies in the current era must go well beyond such a rather 
1  Hedley Bull, ‘Strategic studies and its critics’, World Politics, July 1968, pp. 593–605; reprinted 
in Hedley Bull on Arms Control, ed. Robert O’Neill and David N. Schwartz, St Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1987, pp. 11–24; and Robert O’Neill, Strategic Studies and Political Scientists: Strategic Studies 
and Its Critics Revisited, SDSC Working Paper No. 40, Canberra, 29 April 1981.
2  Bull, ‘Strategic studies and its critics’, p. 11.
3  O’Neill, ‘Arms control and the balance of power’, in O’Neill and Schwartz, Hedley Bull on Arms 
Control, p. 55.
4  See Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives, September 1976, in A History of 




narrow definition. For example, there are issues to do with soft power 
for coercive ends and new challenges such as the strategic implications 
of climate change. There is also important interaction between military, 
economic, political and other factors shaping the international strategic 
environment.
Hedley Bull listed the distinguishing features of what was then the new 
style of strategic analysis as follows:
• Strategic thinking was no longer exclusively concerned with the 
efficient conduct of war and the preserve solely of the military.
• Strategic thinking was necessarily abstract and speculative in character 
because there had not yet been a nuclear war.
• A characteristic of strategic thinking at that time was its sophistication 
and high technical quality because the ‘intellectual resources now being 
devoted to strategic studies are without precedent’. This had resulted 
in a literature of higher technical quality and a discussion of a higher 
standard of sophistication than had existed before.5
These views might seem a little strange from our present-day perspective, 
but it needs to be remembered that this was during the Cold War, and 
strategic studies had had a difficult and contentious birth. This is reflected 
in Hedley Bull’s detailed rebuttal of the critics of the work of civilian 
strategists, including accusations that they leave morality out of account 
and are indifferent to the moral standing of the causes for which war is 
undertaken. His response to this was that strategists as a class are neither 
any less nor any more sensitive to moral considerations than are other 
intelligent and educated persons in the West.6 Additional accusations—
and Bull’s responses—included:
• Strategists ‘take for granted the existence of military force and confine 
themselves to considering how to exploit it, thereby excluding a whole 
range of policies such as disarmament or non-violent resistance’. Bull’s 
response to this was that strategists take the fact of military force as 
the starting point because the capacity for organised violence between 
states is inherent in the nature of man [sic] and his environment.
• Strategists ‘are inclined to make unreal assumptions about international 
politics … that simplify and distort political reality and do not allow 
5  See Bull, ‘Strategic studies and its critics’, pp. 11–14.
6  Ibid., pp. 15–24.
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for change’. Bull acknowledged that this was a complaint with a great 
deal of force because the technical rigour and precision of much 
strategic analysis had been achieved ‘at the cost of losing touch with 
political variety and change’.
• Civilian strategists ‘are pseudo-scientific in their methods; the 
specialist techniques they employ—such as game theory, systems 
analysis, simulation and the writing of scenarios—are bogus when 
used to arrive at strategic decisions and serve to give an air of expertise 
to positions arbitrarily and subjectively arrived at’. His retort to this 
was to recognise the limits of rigour and precision and to be on guard 
against their misuse rather than abandoning rigour and precision in 
favour of something else. He observed, in his well-known trenchant 
manner, that the strategist cannot be held responsible for the use that 
others make of his ideas.
• The strategist ‘is detached and aloof, but he has no right to be’. 
The strategists, ‘who have the ear of the powerful, might accomplish 
great things if they abandon the strategic mode of reasoning for the 
conscientious, but instead they are collaborators in the system and 
are speeding up its movement toward catastrophe’. Bull replied that 
civilian strategists have at least charted some reasoned course where 
otherwise there might well have been only drift. This has provided 
some solid intellectual fare that subsequent generations are likely to 
recognise as a serious attempt to come to grips with the problem. 
He concluded that it was difficult to escape the conclusion that even 
though the civilian strategists have sometimes committed errors, 
‘they have served us well’.
What strikes me in all of this is just how defensive Hedley Bull had to be 
in justifying the legitimacy of the intellectual role of civilian strategists, 
particularly in the new field of arms control and the central nuclear 
balance. Robert O’Neill has told me that in 1968 one had to be on one’s 
guard when writing about strategic studies because the academic culture 
was unsympathetic—more so in Australia than in the United Kingdom.7 
Bull’s intellectual challenges remind me more of the era immediately 
after the end of the Cold War than any challenges we might be currently 
experiencing. As I have recorded elsewhere, with the sudden collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, SDSC had to adjust dramatically to an altered 
international strategic environment and to new subjects for strategic 
7  R.J. O’Neill, personal communication (email to author), 2 September 2016.
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analysis.8 We had entered a new era with Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of 
world history’ thesis and the need to retool traditional strategic studies 
to our region. Those of us who had spent most of our careers focusing 
on the USSR and the risks of nuclear war between that country and the 
United States suddenly had to reinvent ourselves. The end of superpower 
confrontation meant that much more attention could now be paid to the 
question of improving regional security dialogue and developing a new 
security architecture. A whole new range of issues surfaced in the regional 
strategic agenda, including major challenges that changes in the nature 
of conflict presented to many nations in the development of their armed 
forces as well as an increased demand for high-level education on strategic 
and defence policy issues in an era with no clear threats.
As it so happened, Australian strategic thinkers were well prepared for the 
latter challenge because of pioneering work on concepts for the defence 
of the Australian continent and how to structure a defence force without 
an identifiable military threat. SDSC’s research on regional security, for 
example, was expanded to include the effect of population movements, 
security problems caused by environmental concerns, the relevance 
of the Revolution in Military Affairs to regional countries, regional 
defence decision-making, the US–Japan relationship, Indonesian defence 
developments, China’s foreign and defence policies, and developments in 
North Korea as well as terrorism and transnational crime.9
SDSC has adjusted quite well to the new security challenges in the 
post–Cold War era and established a reputation for being the leading 
academic authority in Australia on Asia-Pacific regional security issues. 
So the question facing us now is more what to do with our rapid growth 
and success in the last decade or so. SDSC now has 27 members of staff 
compared with only five in the mid-1990s, when it had almost ceased to 
exist, not least because of reduced Australian National University (ANU) 
priorities for our research on defence-related issues. Now, the challenge 
facing us is an ever-expanding strategic studies agenda and teaching load 
and determining what direction and priorities should drive us. We must 
not allow strategic studies to become paralysed by the endless range and 
scope of potential issues to study that face us.
8  Paul Dibb, ‘SDSC in the nineties: A difficult transition’, in A National Asset: Essays Commemorating 
the 40th Anniversary of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ed. Meredith Thatcher and Desmond 
Ball, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2006, 
pp. 84–7.
9  Ibid., p. 86.
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Whither strategic studies?
The first question to address is whether strategic studies should be separated 
from international relations and such disciplines as international political 
economy. Hedley Bull did not believe that it was desirable to separate 
strategic studies from the wider study of international relations, although 
he said it could be argued that it compares very favourably with some 
other branches of political science, both in its moral and social relevance 
and as an intellectual discipline.10 He acknowledged the emergence of 
strategic studies as an appropriate subject for inclusion in university 
curricula. And he observed the fact that strategic expertise had come 
‘to have a political function as an ideology is inevitable and, I believe, 
by no means wholly regrettable’.11 This was quite a remarkable and bold 
observation to make at that time. I have experienced remarks in the past 
that SDSC would be more appropriately located not in a university but 
in a defence college because of moral and ideological concerns. However, 
we certainly have not known the hostility that SDSC faced during the 
Vietnam War and the sort of baseless moral suspicions that Bob O’Neill 
experienced.12 Nevertheless, my view is that the nexus between strategic 
studies and international relations has drifted further apart since Bull’s 
time as international relations has become more theoretical in its analysis. 
Strategic studies is now firmly established as a separate academic discipline, 
less preoccupied with theory and more practical in its application. 
But, needless to say, sound strategic analysis should be founded on an 
intellectually rigorous conceptual base. Moreover, we should continue 
to have a close relationship with international relations departments on 
international political issues. In the end, there will always be inevitable 
tension between ideas of strategy and ideas of security more generally and 
how Australia might respond to them, as I will argue below.
Second, proposals have been raised recently for SDSC to be moved out 
of  the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs to become part of the 
Crawford School of Public Policy at ANU. In my view, that proposal 
is to be strongly rejected. It is crucial that we stay in close contact with 
particular parts of the College of Asia and the Pacific because of their 
knowledge of key countries in Australia’s strategic environment—especially 
10  Bull, ‘Strategic studies and its critics’, p. 14.
11  Ibid., p. 21.
12  O’Neill, Strategic Studies and Political Scientists, p. 5.
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South-East Asia (particularly Indonesia), the South Pacific (particularly 
Papua New Guinea) and North-East Asia (especially China and Japan). 
These are countries that define Australia’s strategic neighbourhood and 
where Australia has particular responsibilities and concerns. Little of this 
expertise exists in the Crawford School of Public Policy.
Third, unlike 20 years ago when I headed the Centre, SDSC faces an array 
of competing organisations that have specialised in particular areas. The 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (founded in 2001) focuses heavily 
on defence policy from a practical perspective, offering alternative policy 
advice to the government from that of the defence organisation. Then 
there is the Lowy Institute (founded in 2003) with its wide international 
political mandate, the National Security College (founded in 2010) with 
its focus on national security issues and the education of public servants, 
and the US Studies Centre (founded in 2006) with its concentration 
on the United States and Australia’s relations with it. There are other 
organisations that cater for a broader audience, such as the Kokoda 
Foundation (now renamed the Institute for Regional Security), as well 
as a growing number of university departments studying and teaching 
international strategic subjects. 
All this has encouraged SDSC to focus more on what should be its primary 
educational purpose, which is to teach strategic studies and defence policy 
at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. As a result, there has been 
a huge expansion in the Centre’s teaching responsibilities with a master’s 
program at ANU numbering about 70 students and an undergraduate 
program currently involving some 280 enrolments, as well as a highly 
successful master’s program for the Command and Staff College course 
at the Australian Defence College. The size and diversity of this teaching 
program is without parallel anywhere else in Australia. It gives SDSC the 
opportunity to train the next generation of strategic thinkers nationwide, 
and we need to pay more attention to this goal and developing strong 
alumni linkages.
At the same time, the Centre needs to think carefully about the quickly 
growing number of new national security issues that are being raised 
for academic research and teaching. For example, what should be the 
contribution of strategic studies to such topics as terrorism, cyber warfare 
and climate change? Arguably, all three of these are of concern to a nation’s 
national security. The current wave of extremist Islamic terrorism is an 
enormous threat to the very fabric of Western civilisation. Understanding 
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the origins of terrorism, why it has been spawned by a particular extremist 
interpretation of the Islamic faith and how to counteract it are extremely 
challenging questions for governments. SDSC currently has no expertise in 
this area, although in the past it had one person who was a long-established 
terrorism expert. However, studying terrorism demands a different set of 
intellectual methodologies from traditional strategic studies of power-
based relations between nation states. It requires a deep knowledge of 
Islam, its Middle Eastern origins and—not least—the backgrounds and 
actions of individual terrorists. My view is that this is a highly specialised 
area and is more appropriately located in such institutions as national 
security colleges and university departments specialising in terrorism.
Similarly, the threat from cyber attacks and understanding both defensive 
and offensive retaliatory measures demands very specialised technical 
expertise that few academics yet possess. Moreover, the demand for 
this specialised knowledge is high, not only from governments but also 
from the private sector, given their vulnerabilities to penetration from 
foreign governments and individual hackers. Again, my view is that 
the intellectual and technical skills demanded are very different from 
conventional academic training, at least in the social sciences, so we are 
better off leaving it to such organisations as the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, which has established a specialised International Cyber Policy 
Centre that produces an annual report called Cyber Maturity in the Asia-
Pacific Region, which has become the definitive work on this topic.13 This 
publication is the result of 12 months of research and analysis delving into 
the cyber maturity of 20 countries in our region. I see no point in SDSC 
seeking to allocate scarce academic resources to this space.
Finally, there is the vexed question of climate change. There can be no 
doubt that this is a legitimate area for academic research, including in 
the broader strategic studies arena. The defence organisations of both 
the United States and the United Kingdom have identified it as an area 
of strategic concern, although the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper 
makes no specific reference to the challenges of climate change (whereas 
it does address the threats from terrorism and cyber attacks).14 The security 
threat from climate change gets only a passing reference in the White 
13  Tobias Feakin, Jessica Woodall and Liam Nevill, Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2015, 
International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2015.
14  Australian Government, 2016 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 2016, pp. 46–8, 51–2, www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-
White-Paper.pdf (retrieved 16 January 2018).
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Paper, being identified as ‘a major challenge for countries in Australia’s 
immediate region’.15 This statement is made in the context that increased 
sea-level rises and the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events 
‘will exacerbate the challenges of population growth and environmental 
degradation, and will contribute to food shortages and undermine 
economic development’.16
However, the Defence White Paper offers little practical guidance about 
the implications of this for the Australian Defence Force, other than 
helping Pacific island countries build their resilience to natural disasters.17 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions are obviously an 
important ADF contribution to the security of the South Pacific. But the 
White Paper does not address the implications of severe climate-induced 
inundation of low-lying, vulnerable South Pacific countries. It is a major 
deficiency in the Defence White Paper that the strategic implications of 
such events are not addressed. There is important research work here for 
SDSC to do in cooperation with the world-class academic expertise on 
the South Pacific resident in The Australian National University’s College 
of Asia and the Pacific.
Priorities for strategic studies in the 2020s
Longer-term priorities for academic strategic studies research will depend 
on events as they unfold, not least because of unpredictable ‘black swan’ 
shocks to the system such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the 
election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. But some 
potentially threatening new trends can be identified now. In my view, we 
are entering an exceedingly dangerous era for which we are ill-prepared 
intellectually. My basic thesis is that forces of anti-Western nationalism are 
on the rise in Russia and China at the same time as Western democracies 
are being undermined by extreme Islamic terrorism assaults and the 
growth of xenophobic domestic attitudes to the outside world, as we 
have witnessed in the US presidential election in November 2016. We do 
not have a term yet for this new instability, but it should focus around 
unpredictable new nationalisms. Of course, nationalism has raised its ugly 
head before in recent history. As Barbara Tuchman observes in her book 
15  Ibid., pp. 55–6.
16  Ibid.
17  Ibid., p. 74.
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The Proud Tower, the last time events of this sort coincided in the same 
way was between 1890 and 1914.18 That period was a pivotal moment 
in world history when widespread, violent anarchist terrorism and the 
helplessness of society to defend itself occurred at precisely the same time 
as the geopolitical challenge to the established power of Great Britain 
from the rising military power of Germany. The nations of the West were 
self-satisfied and setting themselves up, all unwittingly, for the catastrophe 
to come in World War I. This was a time of the most accelerated rate 
of change in human experience as industrial and scientific revolutions 
were transforming the world and undermining traditional employment 
certainties. The parallels with today are unsettling. I am not predicting 
here that history will repeat itself, but we are entering a dangerous era 
because of the following coincidence of events:
• Russia and China, both authoritarian powers, are challenging the 
Western liberal order through the use of military force and coercion. 
They are aligned in their hostility towards the United States and its 
democratic allies and are now seeking to alter international borders 
and extend their territories—for example, in the South China Sea 
and Ukraine. Unlike Russia, China is not yet using military force 
to assert its territorial claims, but it is using such harsh coercion and 
militarisation of its territorial claims that it is causing serious alarm in 
its neighbourhood.
• All this is occurring just as Western electorates are experiencing 
a yawning gap between governments and governed. Domestic politics 
in the West are in disarray as a result of the impact of globalisation, 
illegal immigrants and the control of borders. There is deep-seated 
anger in the United States and United Kingdom as well as other 
European countries about the loss of jobs and falling living standards. 
Governments are becoming increasingly challenged by the effects 
of globalisation on their domestic politics. A new political divide is 
occurring in Western democracies in which populous, xenophobic 
and anti-globalist politicians are on the rise and promising to put up 
walls to keep out the world. We have witnessed these dramatic forces 
at work most dramatically in recent years in both the United States 
and Britain.
18  Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914, 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966.
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• At the same time, Western democracies are facing an unprecedented 
assault by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. This has now become so 
intense and on such a scale that, for example, fears have been expressed 
by the head of France’s domestic intelligence organisation of civil war 
erupting. The very basis of Western civilisation is being deliberately 
undermined.
The above suggests some new research agendas for strategic studies, 
including the need for better analysis of the military capabilities of China 
and their implications for Australia. This means having a dedicated 
academic position to research independently the details of China’s strategic 
policies and its military strengths and weaknesses. Understanding China 
is now a crucial strategic question for Australia.
Nuclear deterrence is re-emerging as a serious topic for research. Nuclear 
capabilities and their potential use is an area where the end of the Cold 
War and the disappearance of the threat of global nuclear war has led to 
complacency about these hugely destructive weapons. This is especially 
of concern in our own region, where there is a strong latent potential 
in several countries to acquire nuclear weapons with comparatively 
little warning.
The economic geography of globalisation and its implications for social 
and political stability in Western countries now warrants the recruitment 
of an economist with geographical skills and knowledge about how 
economic and technical globalisation affects countries—and specific 
regions within countries—in different ways strategically.
We will need access to research on the implications of extreme Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism for stability in key Western countries that are 
allies of the United States. This does not mean that strategic studies 
should now become expert on the details of terrorist attacks. Rather, we 
need deep insights into the implications of terrorism for the fundamental 
social cohesion of nation states in the West.
The implications of President Trump in Washington for security in the 
Asia-Pacific region demand a rethink of Australia’s security outlook and 
the fundamental basis of our alliance with the United States so that we 
understand the policy choices now facing us. The most radical change 
to our national security policy settings since World War II has occurred 
with the election of Trump as President of the United States. This should 
be an important task for The Australian National University’s Coral Bell 
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School of Asia Pacific Affairs. It will involve bringing together strategic 
studies, international relations and area expertise on both our region and 
the United States in fundamental new ways.
With regard to defence policy, SDSC needs to return to its core business 
and rebuild its expertise in this traditional area of its research. We need to 
reappraise regularly the conclusions set forth in the 2016 Defence White 
Paper to challenge their continuing validity. For example, some ground-
breaking research needs to be undertaken about the implications for 
Australia if the comfortable timeframes of the 2016 Defence White Paper 
are wrong: such as the assertion that ‘there is no more than a remote 
possibility of a military attack on Australian territory by another country 
in the period to 2035’.19 What I have in mind here is that we need to 
be prepared for a quicker deterioration in our fundamental strategic 
circumstances if China’s military ambitions result in armed conflict with 
the United States and Japan. This would have important implications for 
the expansion base of the ADF and for its mobilisation.
Our role in education could be taken a bit higher up the scales of seniority 
and responsibility by hosting discussion groups, small conferences and 
one-on-one sessions involving senior public servants and military officers, 
diplomats and rising young politicians.20 These need not be very time-
consuming but would be arranged to be a good fit between student and 
teacher, and could be coordinated with other relevant parts of ANU, 
other universities and perhaps with key regional strategic studies centres. 
The major political parties and relevant parliamentary committees might 
welcome more such interaction with the Strategic & Defence Studies 
Centre.
Finally, there is the question of where policy-relevant work should figure 
in the research priorities of strategic studies in the second decade of the 
21st century. There is growing recognition of the practical value of such 
research in Australian universities. However, as there was in Hedley 
Bull’s day, there is lively debate today as to whether it is appropriate for 
academics in strategic studies to give consideration to the implications 
of their scholarly work for the policies of governments. At a time when 
so many of the challenges I have mentioned are arising, this is said to 
be a very important part of The Australian National University’s stated 
19  Australian Government, 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 40.
20  I am indebted to Professor R.J. O’Neill for the suggestions in this paragraph.
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strategic plan and mission. However, it still seems to be the case that 
some in academia consider it is not appropriate to suggest what are the 
implications of their scholarly work for Australian policy. While respecting 
their views, and without sacrificing academic independence, I consider 
it behoves us to inform the wider Australian community appropriately 
about such serious national security policy questions.
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Appendix 1: Strategic & 
Defence Studies Centre 
50th anniversary celebratory 
dinner keynote speech: ‘To see 
what is worth seeing’
Brendan Sargeant
It is a great privilege and pleasure to be here this evening to give the 
keynote  speech at this celebratory dinner for the 50th Anniversary 
of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre.
Let me offer my congratulations on the Centre’s 50th anniversary. 
I think the conference topic, ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’, 
is absolutely the right question to be exploring.
It is good to see so many familiar faces here tonight. Some people here 
I have worked with, and they have given me immeasurable help and 
guidance over the years. Others I know because I have read their work 
and pondered and learned from it.
I speak not only for myself but also on behalf of Defence when I say that 
the SDSC has made a huge contribution to strategic policy-making in 
Australia over many years, a contribution of incommensurable value to 
Australia. From my perspective, it has enriched the policy environment 
and deepened understanding of the world we live in and the nature of the 
choices that we make as we find our way in that world. Long may it be so.
To speak before such an illustrious audience is a daunting prospect. I am 
very conscious that almost anything I might talk about is likely to be 
familiar ground to many here.
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I am not going to talk about recent Defence White Papers, or the South 
China Sea, or the emerging Indo-Pacific. If you are looking for advice on 
government policy, there are plenty of documents available. If you are 
looking for an expert commentary, there are people in this room better 
qualified than me.
What I would like to talk about is the importance of strategy and its 
value to large institutions—and most especially one I know intimately, 
the Department of Defence.
But first I would like to digress with a couple of anecdotes to set the 
framework for my discussion.
Many years ago, I was haunting a bookshop somewhere in Little Collins 
Street in Melbourne, a bookshop that no longer exists, which sold books 
that were well beyond my price range at that time. One day when I was 
there, I came across a book that had just been published. It was called 
The Plains by Gerald Murnane.
For some reason, I purchased it—spending more money than I could 
afford—and took it home and read it. It was one of those books that 
turns you five degrees off centre from the rest of the universe and gives 
you a completely different picture of the world. Nothing is quite the same 
after reading it. I think it is one of the greatest Australian books, and it has 
never left me.
The story is simple enough. A young man who describes himself as 
a filmmaker decides to leave Outer Australia and journey to a place called 
Inner Australia.
Inner Australia is the landscape of the plains where a vast and complex 
culture has been built and sustained by a wealthy landholding aristocracy. 
These landholders are patrons of the arts and sciences. They are obsessed 
by the landscape of the plains, which is their landscape. They devote 
endless resources to discover the true meaning of the plains, to get an 
understanding of what they really are, for in knowing the world, their 
world, they will know themselves. They also know their quest is endless 
and perhaps futile.
The filmmaker meets these landowners and goes through a process of 
auditioning. Eventually he is employed by one of the landowners to be 
a resident filmmaker on his estate. The landowner expects nothing from 
this filmmaker, but believes that he might one day be capable of ‘seeing 
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what was worth seeing’. The book then describes the filmmaker’s life 
thereafter. Needless to say, no film is ever made, but the filmmaker goes 
into an endless and enriching exploration of the plains in this place called 
Inner Australia.
The book struck me with the force of revelation, for even though it was 
clearly a work of fantasy or speculative fiction, it described to me absolutely 
the reality of Australian culture in the world that I was living in. What 
I realised was that there is a world, but there are many different ways of 
describing it, and that these can create a richer sense of reality because 
the process illuminates what might not have been seen. The book is very 
rich and can be considered in many different ways, but the opposition 
set up between an Outer Australia—an Australia that is self-satisfied and 
feels that it knows reality—and an Inner Australia—where the culture is 
devoted to finding the meaning behind appearances—is worth reflecting 
on. I will come back to this, but I believe that the work of strategy is the 
work of this Inner Australia.
My second anecdote relates to my recent visit to Exercise Hamel, a large 
army exercise that took place in Cultana, a bleak and beautiful place in 
South Australia. I visited the exercise and had fun seeing what the army 
does when it is being itself.
In the exercise headquarters, the place where the exercise was managed, 
I saw a map on the wall which was very familiar to me—it hangs in my 
office—except that just north-east of the archipelago to our north was 
another country called Kamaria.
I spent some time contemplating this map, the geography and contours 
of this imaginary country inserted in a real world, and I remarked to one 
of my companions that there was an enormous amount of strategic policy 
history embedded in that simple map. One of the generals said to me: 
‘They’re tough, those Kamarians. We’ve been fighting them for 40 years.’
What intrigued me, and continues to intrigue me, is how in order to 
understand ourselves better we construct an imaginary country against 
which we define ourselves and test our ideas.
I work in an organisation called the Department of Defence that does 
many different things every moment of the day. It never sleeps. It never 
stops. It is relentless. It has its own imperatives and appetites. It has 
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a personality and life independent of those people and organisations that 
contribute to its being. It is what it is and, in its deepest dreaming, has no 
desire but to be what it is.
Most of my work is an attempt to help manage this vast enterprise. 
The practical reality is that I make lots of micro decisions or supervise the 
work of others who also make decisions or provide advice to more senior 
decision-makers.
In this world, strategy can be a distant reality, a quiet voice behind the 
noise and clutter of the daily routine. Yet I never forget what one of my 
teachers once said to me: ‘Listen to the quiet voice!’
The essence of my management task, as is also that of my colleagues, 
is to ensure that what this organisation does conforms to government 
policy and embodies in its activities the strategy that the government has 
signed up to in its policy documents. These include, most importantly, 
the White Paper and the subsidiary documents that flow from it, such as 
the Defence Planning Guidance and the Australian Military Strategy.
What I have seen over the years is a continuing tension between the 
imperatives of the institution, its personality and its own desires, to speak 
metaphorically, and the requirements of government as expressed in 
policy and strategy. In this sense, strategy is the quiet voice that calls the 
organisation away from itself and requires that it look out into the world 
and respond accordingly. For this reason, the strategic policy function 
is central to organisational health and well-being and is critical if the 
organisation is to remain relevant.
One of the features of the current environment is that there is an 
overwhelming emphasis—and rightly so—on sustaining operations. 
The challenge is to step back from this immediacy to reflect on the nature 
and meaning of the larger story that we are telling through what we do. 
The institution will tell its own story if left to itself. The task of strategy 
is to make it listen and understand that the reality it sees itself as part of 
can have many dimensions and actually be something other than what 
it thinks it is.
We do not have many strategists in Defence. That is not a bad thing, as 
long as we listen to what they are saying. This I think is the hardest part 
of working in a large organisation. It is developing the capacity to listen 
to the other voice—to journey into Inner Australia, so to speak.
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What are we doing when we do strategy?
When I reflect on the strategic history of Australia filtered through the 
development of the Defence organisation, along with the successive 
documents to chart that development—primarily White Papers—what 
I hear is an ongoing conversation. It is a conversation about who  we 
are. It is a conversation about what sort of country we are and how 
we  should participate in the world. This conversation takes expression 
in the capabilities we build, in our operational commitments and in our 
relationships with other countries.
I could trace the history of strategic thought over the time I have been 
associated with the Department of Defence. Its main narrative arc goes 
something like this: in the time after the Vietnam War, we started the 
process of thinking of ourselves as a strategic entity separate from the larger 
system in which we had participated since Federation. There were many 
debates, some still alive today. This thinking expressed itself in a policy 
and a strategy that was called self-reliance and had many dimensions in 
terms of how we organised the department, began the work of building 
the modern ADF [Australian Defence Force], and participated in the 
world.
This was essentially a nationalist project, and an important one. I also 
think it was part of a larger project of Australia rethinking its place in the 
world in the post-Vietnam era. The intervention in East Timor might 
be seen as an expression of that policy and strategy and the arena where 
its strengths and flaws were highlighted. It is a strategy that has never 
gone away.
Since Timor and particularly since 9/11, our governments have pursued 
a fairly active engagement of the ADF in many different parts of the world. 
This reflects, I think, a sense that Australia has global interests and needs 
to support them, including through the use of the Defence Force. Our 
strategy in this context might be seen as a response to globalisation and 
an attempt to respond to some of the more malignant forces unleashed 
by globalisation in ways that support our national interests. Whether 
our strategy has been sufficient for the environment we are in is a debate 
for another time.
I see the recent White Paper as a culmination of a journey that began 
decades  ago in that it seeks to recognise that Australia is not only 
a country that lives geographically in the Indo-Pacific, but also has trading 
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and national interests that extend across the world. How we balance 
the local with the global is an enduring tension in policy-making and 
strategy development. It is the location of most serious debates about 
defence policy.
So I see our strategic thinking as partly the telling of a story about who we 
are and, more importantly, who we think we are. It is a story that never 
ends, but will evolve and be reinterpreted over time as events occur and 
we respond. Most importantly, it is a story we tell both through what we 
say and what we do.
I am not one of those people who says that the current environment is 
more difficult or more challenging than the environment faced by our 
predecessors. I think that is simply being arrogant and historically myopic. 
Each time has its own demands, and every strategic challenge is new to 
those who have to face it. However, I do believe that we are in one of those 
moments in history where we are moving from one world to another. 
The strategic challenge before us is to make the transition successfully.
When you are confronted by a genuinely strategic decision, or there 
is a genuine strategic change in the environment in which you are, 
the challenge is not just a challenge of how you might respond to that 
environment by taking various forms of action. It is also a challenge to 
your self-conception, to your sense of who you are and who you might 
be. This is why strategic choices are hard and, I think, difficult for our 
institutions, which can grow comfortable with a sense of things as they are.
It is also why doing the work of strategy is hard. And it should be hard, 
really hard—emotionally, as well as intellectually.
Many of the contemporary challenges to security are also challenges 
that go to our sense of what sort of country we are and what we need 
to become. Some of these challenges have the potential to render the 
assumptions upon which we take action redundant or meaningless.
To take some examples:
• The assumptions that underpinned the current rules-based global order 
are increasingly being challenged, and are increasingly challengeable.
• Military power is increasingly a commodity, and the ability to generate 
strategic effects is being democratised. We have all seen what one 
person with a semi-automatic weapon can do.
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• We cannot assume that all players in our strategic environment are 
rational, or that they share our assumptions about how the world and 
conflict should be managed.
• It is not so easy any more to distinguish between the world within 
our national borders and the world outside.
• We are seeing genuinely transformational technologies—cyber, 
quantum computing, autonomous systems, and so on.
The task of strategy is more complex because it has to speak to many 
different realities and many different perceptions of what reality might or 
should be. It has to do this in a way that helps policy and decision-makers 
thread their way through to a course of action or decision.
Our response to these challenges, along with others that will emerge in 
coming decades, will change us. How do we understand and manage 
that change while also responding to what the world brings? Some of our 
choices will be constrained by our self-conception. We need to understand 
this as well.
What I worry about is whether we are truly seeing reality. Our institutional 
imperatives are, in my experience, so potentially powerful that they can 
blind us to aspects of the world that we live in. Do we prefer to be what 
we are rather than to consider what we need to be if we are to respond 
to contemporary realities? What are the costs of the choices that we 
might need to make, and do we really understand what those choices are? 
In a world of wicked problems—and strategic problems are all wicked—
do we prefer our tried and true solution sets rather than seeing what is 
worth seeing?
When I looked at that map at Exercise Hamel and saw the country of 
Kamaria, I asked myself a question. In creating an imaginary country that 
we have used to define and test ourselves against, have we simply created 
another reflection of what we are and what we are comfortable with being?
When I think of that young man in that imaginary world of the plains 
commencing his lifelong journey to discover the true meaning of the 
plains—an impossible but necessary quest—I see it as a wonderful 
metaphor for the work that all of us do. I am most of all taken by the 
landowner’s implicit request that he come to see what was worth seeing. 
The landowner understood that this might be the work of a whole lifetime.
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Sometimes when I read the work of people who do strategy, including 
people at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, the practical 
administrator in me gets irritated because it just complicates my decision-
making and I prefer a smooth and easy life. It puts in front of me those 
most terrifying of all questions for an administrator: Have I got it right? 
Is what we are doing making sense? Do we really understand what we are 
dealing with?
When I am in a better, less harassed mood, I appreciate how valuable that 
work is. And I treasure it.
Sometimes I look at much of the writing on strategy, and it is like 
wandering through a library of books about things that have never 
happened. Sometimes it is quite a strange experience to read these forlorn 
prophecies that have never come true. Yet, despite this, how important 
it is that we have these works of imagination, these documents of 
grim speculation and melancholy advice. They can be books of magic. 
Sometimes the writing of them ensures that what they talk about does 
not occur. They intersect with reality to help us understand that the 
reality is more complex and more multidimensional and has more that is 
imponderable than we are ever quite comfortable with. They help us make 
choices that change reality.
This conversation, which we call strategy-making, helps us understand the 
world around us and helps us understand the consequences of the choices 
that we might make or not make. It helps us change the world.
So, to the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, let us have another 50 years 
of thinking and conversation and research.
Continue the great work of building a strategic conversation in Australia 
about who we are and what we might become.
Help us understand the choices and pathways that might take us there.






Appendix 2: Conference program
The Hall, University House, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia
Day 1: Thursday, 21 July 2016
Conference opening Dr Brendan Taylor
Keynote address: Strategic Thinking Since 1945 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman
Student Awards Presentation
Session 1: Strategy and Power (Chair: Professor Michael Wesley)
21st Century Strategic Order Dr C . Raja mohan
Economics and Strategy Dr Amy King
Elements of National Power and Strategic Policy major General John J . Frewen
Great Power Grand Bargains: myth or Reality? Professor Evelyn Goh
Session 2: Strategic Thinking: Concepts and Challenges (Chair: Emeritus Professor 
David Horner)
Old Wine in New Bottles? The Continued 
Relevance of Cold War Strategic Concepts
Professor Robert Ayson
Alliances After the Cold War Professor Thomas Christensen
Nuclear Strategy After the Cold War Dr Nicola Leveringhaus
Session 3: Strategy and Domains (Chair: Professor Joan Beaumont)
The Return of Geography Professor Paul Dibb
maritime Strategy in Asia Dr Euan Graham
The Evolution of military Capability in the 
Indo‑Asia‑Pacific Region
Dr Tim Huxley
Summary Dr Brendan Taylor
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre 50th Anniversary Celebratory Dinner (Australian 
War memorial)
Keynote address: To See What is Worth Seeing Brendan Sargeant
NEW DIRECTIONS IN STRATEGIC THINKING 2 .0
216
Day 2: Friday, 22 July 2016 
Welcome Dr Brendan Taylor
Session 4: Strategic Studies in Practice (Chair: Admiral Chris Barrie)
Strategic Studies in Practice: The Australian 
Perspective
Professor Hugh White
Strategic Studies in Practice: The South-East 
Asian Perspective
mr Peter Ho
Training the Next Generation of Strategic 
Thinkers
Professor Eliot Cohen
Session 5: New Directions in Strategic Studies (Chair: Professor Daniel Marston)
US Grand Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era Dr Hal Brands
The Future of Strategic Studies: Lessons from 
the Last Golden Age
Professor Sir Hew Strachan
An Asian School of Strategic Studies? Professor Amitav Acharya
The Future of Strategic Studies: The Next 
Golden Age
Professor Robert O’Neill
Where to From Here? Professor Bates Gill
Concluding Remarks Dr Brendan Taylor
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